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Abstract 
 
 This study examines the historical development of Friedrich Nietzsche’s physiological 
relativism through a reading of his private and published works as well as several of the 
periodicals and scientific popularizations with which he was familiar. Nietzsche’s early interest 
in the relationship between genius and physiology was influenced by Arthur Schopenhauer’s 
insistence that geniuses were able to intuitively understand the objective world because of their 
unique physiological organization. However, the more physiology Nietzsche encountered the 
more doubts he had about Schopenhauer’s philosophical claims and Richard Wagner’s re-
articulation of them. Nietzsche’s rejection of Schopenhauer and Wagner can be seen in his 
changing assessment of the limits of knowledge and the meaning of genius, of physiological, 
moral, and psychological vivisection, and how he came to see a close relationship between 
cruelty, necessity, and knowledge. Nietzsche’s understanding of life as a process of dynamic 
self-regulation featured many similarities with other physiological thinkers of his age including 
Claude Bernard and his idea of the milieu intérieur and Hermann von Helmholtz’s account of the 
active nature of perception. Nietzsche’s interest in educational reform, experimentation, and self-
fashioning was a further development of his exploration of how organisms and individuals 
achieved a state of relative freedom and independence through their interdependence from their 
physical and cultural environments. His interest in the intersection of physiology, aesthetics, and 
epistemology led him to define meaningful freedom and creativity in terms of how individuals 
related to their own limitations and crafted new limitations for themselves. Even basic 
physiological perceptions were creative, for just as perceptions shaped ideas and experiences, 
ideas and experiences shaped perceptions. Nietzsche’s understanding of creativity within limits 
was the compliment of his idea of how an individual’s independence was achieved through more 
refined forms of interdependence with their physical, perceptual, cultural, and cosmic 
environments. The Übermensch was the culmination of this process, which Nietzsche described 
as “dancing in chains.” Just as organisms and individuals achieved states of relative 
independence through interdependence with their environments, the Übermensch’s independence 
was achieved through how they “tamed contingency” by assimilating the cosmos in its entirety 
by willing the eternal return of the same.   
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) was born into a world that was experiencing a series of 
crises surrounding the meaning and value of life. These crises were in part existential. They 
corresponded with the broader nineteenth century crisis of faith that saw the development of 
philosophical nihilism, pessimism, agnosticism, atheism, materialism, as well as such seemingly 
disparate ideologies as spiritualism, anarchism, and communism. At the same time, debates 
about the meaning and value of life also had a very practical and scientific character. How was 
organic life to be defined, and what distinguished it from inorganic matter? What were the best 
ways to study organic life, and did these methods differ from the best ways to study inorganic 
nature? Was it necessary, and was it even acceptable, to sacrifice living beings in order to 
understand living processes? While these two points of concern, the existential and the practical, 
could seem quite distant, nineteenth-century commentators were well aware that the question 
“what is life?” was merely the other side of the question “what is the meaning of life?” Thinking 
about the relationship between these two questions led Nietzsche to his own physiologically 
inflected form of relativism.  
In the following study I intend to show how instead of representing a sharp break from the 
philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Nietzsche’s public turn to relativism and his 
redefinition of genius in 1878 represented a continuation and radicalization of its physiological 
tendencies. Schopenhauer’s grounding of the insights of genius in their physiological 
organization led Nietzsche to explore the relationship between the physiological limits of 
perception and knowledge and the creative freedom of the individual. These limitations were part 
of the broader physiological processes of dynamic self-regulation that were essential for the 
existence of life itself. Nietzsche’s commitment to educational reform revolved around the 
question of how educators and students alike could learn how to self-consciously participate in 
their own processes of independent dynamic self-regulation and self-fashioning. From the genius 
to the free spirit and Übermensch, Nietzsche explored how processes of dynamic self-regulation 
were at once physiological, psychological, and cosmic in scope. In all of these contexts, 
however, the purpose of education remained the same: meaningful freedom, specifically, the 
ability of an organism to create its own forms of freedom, identity, and meaning from the 
contingency and determinism of its natural and social contexts.  
 2 
Nietzsche’s interest in how self-fashioning was a way of “redeeming the past” was also part 
of his personal quest to come to terms with the meaning of his own life story. His father died 
when he was only five years old and this absence likely contributed to his later search for role 
models, geniuses, and other kinds of “great men.” At fourteen he was sent to a boarding-school 
before going on to study philology at Bonn University. When he was only twenty-four he 
became an associate professor of classical philology at the University of Basel. The year after he 
enlisted as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian war. Nietzsche received his medical training 
at Erlangen, Bavaria. While he never saw active combat, his duties included attending to and 
transporting injured soldiers and he witnessed the human toll of the aftermath of the battle of 
Wörth.1 After only a week of direct service he contracted dysentery and diphtheria and was 
forced to retire from active duty. Nietzsche’s lifelong struggle with his mental and physical 
health intensified after this point. His ailments ranged from depression and anxiety to stomach 
issues, migraines, and bouts of near blindness, and scholars continue to attempt to retroactively 
diagnose the main causes of his illnesses.2 He was ultimately forced to resign his position at 
Basel in 1879. Nietzsche would spend much of the rest of his life living off his generous pension, 
writing, and seasonally travelling between Italy, Germany, and Switzerland. In 1889 his mental 
health and cognitive functions began to rapidly deteriorate to the point at which he was no longer 
able to care for himself. The intensification of his dementia-like symptoms continued for the next 
eleven years until his death from complications of pneumonia and a stroke he suffered in 1900. 
Considering how he spent his last eleven years in an increasingly vegetative state, the question of 
the relationship between the meaning and definition of life remained a salient one until his final 
days.   
Nietzsche was born right at the beginning of the Materialismusstreit, or materialism 
controversy of the 1840s and 1850s that swept through German speaking Europe. One of the 
earliest salvos in the controversy was written by the Swiss-German physiologist Carl Vogt 
(1817-1895). Vogt’s infamous Physiological Letters for the Educated [Gebildete] of all Classes, 
was published between 1845 and 1847. In these letters, he argued that all the vital activities that 
                                                 
1 Christian Emden, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
121-23.  
2 D. Hemelsoet, K. Hemelsoet, and D. Devreese, “The Neurological Illness of Friedrich  
Nietzsche,” Acta Neurologica Belgica 108, 1 (March 2008): 9-16. 
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had previously been attributed to the subtle actions of the human soul were in fact exclusively 
physical processes. This included the activity of thought, or mind (Geist), itself. More 
controversially, Vogt described the production of thoughts by the brain as a process that was 
essentially akin to how the liver excreted gall, or the kidneys excreted urine.3 During this time 
prominent materialists such as Vogt, Jakob Moleschott (1822-1893), Heinrich Czolbe (1819-
1873), and Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899) sparred with the earlier generation of physiological 
theorists who held to vitalist notions of organic life such as the physiologists Johannes Müller 
(1801-1858) and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840).4 Blumenbach’s students were 
instrumental in these debates and included Schopenhauer, as well as the physiologist Rudolf 
Wagner (1805-1864), who succeeded Blumenbach in Göttingen. What Wagner perceived to be at 
stake was the existence of an immaterial soul, its immortality, and, especially, its freedom. If 
there were no vital forces working within organic matter, if it was, in essence, merely a 
complicated form of inorganic matter, then life would be stripped of its worth and meaning. 
Whether this worth and meaning was given by God, as Wagner claimed, or by nature, the 
problem remained.   
These debates coincided with chemistry’s growing authority in Europe, and especially in 
Germany. This authority was predicated upon the perceived material benefits chemistry had 
provided throughout the century. Artificial dyes added a rainbow of readily available colours to 
fabrics and paints, industrial manufacturing benefited from the advent of lighter and more 
durable alloys, ceramics, and other novel materials, and agricultural production began to benefit 
from the advent of chemical fertilizers. Medical and physiological researchers were also 
increasingly emphasizing that their fields should be established along reductionist, chemical 
lines. Justus von Liebig (1803-1873) had been using chemical methods to break down and 
modify organic substances in his teaching laboratory in Giessen since the 1830s. His laboratory 
became a model for scientific teaching and research throughout Europe. The debates about 
materialism in the 1840s and 1850s were explicitly about the relationship between chemistry and 
physiology, and whether or not life could be understood using just chemical explanations. Even 
those who went to lengths to repudiate base materialism, like Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1876), 
still stressed the importance of understanding the chemistry underlying living processes. The 
                                                 
3 Carl Vogt, Physiologische Briefe für Gebildete aller Stände, Vol. 1, second edition (Gießen: J. Ricker, 1854), 323. 
4 See: Fredrick Gregory, Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany  (Berlin: Springer, 1977). 
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philosopher Friedrich Lange (1828-1875) gave chemistry a particularly important place 
alongside physiology in the development of German thought in his History of Materialism 
(1866). While theology and philosophy were stagnating in Germany, Lange claimed, the chemist 
and physiologist had successfully seized the “trowel of metaphysic” to answer some of the most 
pressing questions of the nineteenth century.5  
The changing meaning and authority of chemistry in the nineteenth century coincided with a 
change in the meaning and authority of physiology. For much of the eighteenth century, 
physiology was looked upon as the more speculative and theoretical branch of anatomy. 
Anatomy, by comparison, was considered to be a more exact practice that allowed for reasoned 
experiment and observation. To be able to hypothesize about physiology, the practitioner first 
and foremost had to be well versed in the rigours of anatomy. However, as Andrew Cunningham 
has demonstrated, by the end of the eighteenth century anatomy went from being an 
experimental, to a non-experimental practice, while physiology increasingly took over the 
domains that were previously considered anatomy before expanding out into further 
experimental practices.6 Thanks to the work of such physiologists as François Magendie (1783-
1855) in France, physiology came to be seen as the discipline for the study of life in action, or 
life processes, as opposed to anatomy, which was increasingly cast by Magendie and his students 
as a sterile, observational science. Magendie wrote A Summary of Physiology (Précis 
élémentaire de physiologie), the first textbook on experimental physiology in 1816. In A 
Summary of Physiology Magendie called for a reforming of physiology along the lines of 
experimental chemistry and physics in order to develop a new, experimental form of medicine. 
At the level of physiology, experimentation would lead to a systematic understanding of the 
healthy body. In pathology, it would lead to a similar understanding of disorders. Experimental 
therapeutics would be the culmination of this experimental approach, and would lead to a 
systematic understanding of what drugs and interventions brought about desired changes within 
living bodies. This program reached its culmination in the work of Magendie’s student, Claude 
Bernard (1845-1870), whose Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine (1865) laid out 
the methods of the new medicine. At each stage the “sacrifices” (the technical word), or 
                                                 
5 Lange, History of Materialism, 263-4. 
6 Andrew Cunningham, The Anatomist Anatomis’d: An Experimental Discipline in Enlightenment Europe (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2010), 156. See also, 138-9. 
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vivisection, of live animals in a laboratory setting informed the new medicine’s experimental 
achievements.7  
The routinization of physiological experimentation and vivisection in the nineteenth century 
was based on many factors. One factor was the increasing authority of vivisection as the 
scientific method for understanding life in action, as opposed to anatomy, which was 
increasingly seen as the study of mere forms. Another factor was the increased emphasis on the 
repeatability of experimental interventions in order to ensure that what was observed in the 
laboratory was not due to the idiosyncrasies of a few experimental subjects. Earlier generations 
had experimented on animals, but nineteenth-century physiologists saw it as a matter of best 
scientific practice to experiment on dozens of animals at a time to ensure the quality of their 
results. These commitments to a scientific and experimental medicine furthered the perceived 
importance of vivisection for the training of doctors and physiologists. These developments also 
coincided with the work of Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) in France, and Robert Koch (1843-1910) 
in Germany, whose methods of developing vaccines involved systematic experimentation on 
scores of animals to insure that a “true” vaccine had been isolated.  
Such an increase in the scale and scope of vivisection, however, also brought the practice to 
the attention of a growing middle class in Europe who owned household pets. Dogs, whose 
digestive and nervous systems were more physiologically similar to humans than other 
experimental animals that were often use, such as frogs or rabbits, often became the subjects of 
vivisection. Many middle and upper class Europeans, Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner (1813-
1883) among them, saw this as a senseless form of scientific barbarism, and went to great lengths 
to protest the practice. Importantly, both those in favour of and those opposed to vivisection 
often argued their cases on the grounds of the many similarities between humans and other 
animals. This only intensified after the publication of Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) Origin of 
Species in 1859 and its translation into German in 1860.  
Darwinism in Germany was different than it was in England. It was introduced into a context 
in which pre-existing debates about the meaning and purpose of the organization of nature and 
the role of vital forces in living bodies often overshadowed concerns about whatever possible 
threat the idea of human evolution might have posed to the dignity of human beings. Earlier 
German thinkers such as Gottfried Treviranus (1776-1837), Johann Herder (1744-1803), Johann 
                                                 
7 Cunningham, The Anatomist Anatomis’d, 371-5. 
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Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), von Baer, and even Schopenhauer had not shied away from 
speculating about evolution and human ancestry. Richard Wagner actively praised Darwin for 
his dedication to non-invasive observation and for showing the closeness of humans and the rest 
of the animal kingdom. While the advent of Darwinism in Germany caused a renewed interest in 
evolutionary explanations of nature, most German commentators were not convinced by 
arguments based on natural selection. Even Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), one of Darwin’s most 
famous German supporters, radically modified Darwin’s account of organic development with 
principles he found in the works of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) and Vogt to make more 
room for teleological internally structuring forces. This is why some contemporary scholars have 
chosen to describe Darwinism in Germany by its German name Darwinismus to indicate just 
how different it was from its British counterpart.8 When Nietzsche critiques Darwinism for being 
teleological, utilitarian, and too focused on the passivity of organic life relative to its 
environment, it is important to keep in mind how Darwinism was appropriated and received in 
Germany.  
The German context also meant that one could not discuss organic development and the 
purpose of nature without making some reference to the Königsberg philosopher Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804). Half of Kant’s third critique was dedicated to the role of purpose, or teleology, in 
the self-organization and development of living things. There were certain a priori principles, 
such as purposiveness, that made the human experience of nature possible, that gave it structure 
and made it comprehensible. Whether or not these laws were in nature, or just in how human 
beings were organized in their experience of nature, could not be decided. Christian Emden has 
commented that Kant’s third critique was part of the background that made German Darwinism a 
continuation of trends that already had deep roots in Germany.9 Nietzsche’s interest in 
Darwinism was likewise inflected with Kantian concerns, and at least one of the journals he read, 
Kosmos, espoused a decidedly Kantian form of Darwinian evolution.10   
                                                 
8 See: Sander Gliboff, H.G. Bronn, Ernst Haeckel, and the Origins of German Darwinism: A Study in Translation 
and Transformation (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008); Alfred Kelly, The Descent of Darwin: The 
Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860-1914 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981); 
and William M. Montgomery, "Germany," in The Comparative Reception of Darwinism, ed. Thomas F. Glick 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974).    
9 Christian J. Emden, Nietzsche's Naturalism Philosophy and the Life Sciences in the Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 91. See also, 136. 
10 Emden, Nietzsche Naturalized, 149. 
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These Kantian commitments also help to explain why the Darwinismusstreit of the 1860s led 
into the Ignorabimusstreit of the 1870s and 1880s. This controversy got its name from the Latin 
phrase “ignoramus et ignorabimus,” meaning "we do not know and will not know,” that the 
Berlin physiologist Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896) referenced in his 1872 lecture “On the 
Limits of Our Understanding of Nature.” Du Bois-Reymond, like his friend and colleague 
Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894), and the Marburg based philosopher Friedrich Lange, were 
all neo-Kantian thinkers who sought a middle path between the materialists and the anti-
materialists of the Materialismusstreit. They eschewed vital forces in nature, but also recognized 
that there could be no unmediated access to empirical reality. The physiological organization of 
the human brain and body inevitably structured the human experience of nature. This meant that 
there were limits to knowledge and the kinds of questions that could be meaningfully asked. For 
instance, the thing- in-itself remained inaccessible because it did not make sense to ask what 
nature was in itself, without anyone observing it.  
This emphasis on limits and perspectives also served a political purpose. Figures like Lange 
argued that a consistent application of scientific methods helped to show how all systems of 
authority and certainty (including science itself, but especially political authority) had their 
limitations. As Andreas Daum has shown, many German liberals and reformers, including 
Lange, Helmholtz, and du Bois-Reymond felt that growing scientific literacy and trust in 
practicing scientists could serve to liberalize the newly unified German state.11 Scientists and 
other commentators also saw the organizational principles of living bodies reflected in the 
organizational principles of the nation state. For figures like Rudolph Virchow (1821-1902), the 
cells of the body functioned like a democracy. Oscar Hertwig (1849-1922) stressed the 
importance of understanding the body as a welfare state. Haeckel presented the body as more of 
a centralized and hierarchically structured nation state much like Germany itself.12 Such figures 
were interested in a range of questions that blurred the lines between the biological and political: 
What constituted the sickness and health of living bodies, and did the health and sicknesses of 
nations mirror these processes? Did the parts of living bodies cooperate with each other, or rule 
                                                 
11 Andreas W. Daum, Wissenschaftspopularisierung im 19. Jahrhundert: Bürgerliche Kultur, naturwissenschaftliche 
Bildung und die deutsche Öffentlichkeit, 1848–1914 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998). 
12 Paul Weindling, Darwinism and Social Darwinism in Imperial Germany: The Contribution of the Cell Biologist 
Oscar Hertwig (Gustav Fisher: New York 1991); and Paul Weindling, “Theories of the Cell State in Imperial 
Germany,” in Biology, Medicine, and Society, 1840-1940, ed. Charles Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 99-155. 
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over each other? Did certain cells or organs sacrifice themselves for the greater good of the 
body? How one answered these questions would either reinforce or challenge the Realpolitik and 
jingoism that characterized much of German politics in the years after the unification of 
Germany. The common thread that unified these diverse thinkers is that they all presented life as 
an organic process that was intimately interconnected with other forms of social and political 
organization.   
This is the world in which Nietzsche came of age. It was one that was profoundly unsettled 
by the idea that life could be reducible to mere chemistry, and often outraged at the methods 
employed by physiologists who tried to prove this point. It was a context in which the definition 
of life and the meaning of life were just as likely to be caught up in nationalist debates about the 
relationship between the individual and the nation, as they were about the physiological study of 
living beings or the existential contemplation of what lent value to a person’s existence. 
Principles of self-organization, or self-regulation, often stood at the heart of these debates. 
However, these principles were not univocal. They could serve the ends of the politically 
conservative, showing how there were powerful unifying forces beyond investigation acting in 
and giving nature its structure and purpose. In this view, the inner workings of the most valuable 
people, like geniuses and leaders, were just as mysterious as vital forces. However, explorations 
of self-organization could also serve more radical ends, showing how in the absence of any 
unifying principles or purpose, mere chemistry, or fragmentary personal experiences, could 
coalesce into complex and diverse forms of life.   
The membrane between science and society is permeable and dynamic. Given the close 
relationship between science and society in the late nineteenth century it has provided a rich area 
of exploration for the history of science and science and technology studies (STS). In 1989 
Adrian Desmond, in The Politics of Evolution, demonstrated how early nineteenth-century 
concerns about the self-organization of matter were always both socially and scientifically 
charged.13 The self-organization of solar systems suggested by the nebular hypothesis, or the 
self-organization of living beings in early evolutionary theories had potentially radical political 
and social consequences. If brute matter could organize itself into complex forms that exhibited 
regularity, structure, and purposeful behaviour without being guided by the hand and wisdom of 
                                                 
13 Adrian J. Desmond. The Politics of Evolution: Morphology, Medicine, and Reform in Radical London (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
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God, then what about the lower social classes? Perhaps they could organize without the 
imposition of kings and queens.  
There is now also a wealth of resources that explore the relationship between practicing 
scientists, scientific culture, the popularization of science, and the periodical press. The 
periodical press and other “ephemeral” publications have been vital spaces for the discussion, 
spread, acceptance, diversification, and elaboration of scientific knowledge claims. This can be 
seen in the writings of Bernard Lightman, Geoffrey Cantor, Sally Shuttleworth, and James 
Secord.14 Despite his many criticisms of the periodical press, Nietzsche was a voracious 
consumer of popular media in all of its forms. The reviews, commentaries, and articles that he 
read coloured his interest in and understanding of the sciences and directed his attention to the 
works of professional resources, such as the writings of Helmholtz, du Bois-Reymond, and 
Bernard. Even these “professional” sources of scientific knowledge influenced and were 
influenced by popular discourses about the natural world. In 2008 Victoria Carroll explored the 
relationship between science and eccentricity in the early nineteenth century and how eccentric 
naturalists and scientists often “performed” science for their audiences, even as they carefully 
shaped their own public personas as people not quite of their own time.15 This language of 
performance is not merely figurative. Even Wagner's creative ideal of the Gesamtkunstwerk, or 
total work of art that incorporated all other forms of art under the aegis of musical theatre, 
reflected, and was a reflection of, the composer’s views about the absolute unity of nature.16 
Likewise, throughout the nineteenth century there arose a growing awareness that media and art 
had physiological and psychological effects on those who experienced them, and so were of 
equal political and scientific importance as the manufacturing of new dyes, engines, or medical 
interventions.  
                                                 
14 Bernard Lightman, Victorian Popularizers of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007); Geoffrey Cantor, 
Gowan Dawson, Graeme Gooday, Richard Noakes, Sally Shuttleworth, and Jonathan R. Topham, eds., Science in 
the Nineteenth-Century Periodical: Reading the Magazine of Nature  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); Geoffrey Cantor and Sally Shuttleworth, eds., Science Serialized: Representations of the Sciences in 
Nineteenth-Century Periodicals (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004); and James Secord, Victorian Sensation: 
The Extraordinary Publication, Reception, and Secret Authorship of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation  
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
15 Victoria Carroll, Science and Eccentricity: Collecting, Writing and Performing Science for Early Nineteenth -
Century Audiences (Brookfield: Pickering & Chatto, 2008). 
16 For more on the relationship between science and music in the nineteenth century, see: Myles W. Jackson, 
Harmonious Triads: Physicists, Musicians, and Instrument Makers in Nineteenth -Century Germany (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2006).  
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Recently Robert Brain has shown the close relationship between the arts, science, and society 
at the turn of the century. He argues that physiological research, especially on the psychological 
effects of art and sensation, helped to blur the line between art and science as artists and 
physiologists sought to take advantage of the insights afforded by the physiologists’ laboratories. 
In doing so, they hoped to be able to better shape society and culture, the same society and 
culture from which these laboratories themselves emerged.17 In many ways Nietzsche was ahead 
of this trend. Recognizing the self-reflective relationship between science and society, he 
attempted to diagnose and remedy what he saw as the physiological, psychological, and cultural 
ills of his age. Nietzsche felt that education, or Bildung, played an important role in this process.   
Andreas Daum’s extensive Wissenschaftspopularisierung im 19. Jahrhundert traces out the 
dynamic relationship between scientific culture, politics, religion, art, and especially the German 
concept of Bildung, or educated self-cultivation and development, after the German revolutions 
of 1848.18 Such Bildung could either be a conservative tool of normalization, or an egalitarian 
tool of radicalization. Daum argues that the popularization of science itself was not a neutral 
process of making some unskilled “public” aware of, and obedient to, the proclamations of 
expert authorities. It was a space in which a range of amateur and expert interests sought to make 
their claims heard and accepted, and in doing so, influenced one another. During these 
discussions the nature and meaning of scientific education, and education in general, was also 
contested. Was Bildung incomplete without some understanding of natural science, or was the 
study of natural science antithetical to it? Part of the reason why anti-vivisectionists argued that 
physiology was not actually a form of Wissenschaft, or system of knowledge, for example, was 
so that they could devalue its role in the development of an individual’s Bildung. Instead of 
making people well rounded, and developing their moral and intellectual character, anti-
vivisectionists argued that physiological research actually made them crueler, less moral, and 
less able to see the unities at the heart of society and nature. In contrast, Lange, du Bois-
                                                 
17 Robert Brain, The Pulse of Modernism: Physiological Aesthetics in Fin de Siècle Europe  (Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 2015). 
18 Daum, Wissenschaftspopularisierung im 19. Jahrhundert . For more on the concept of Bildung in nineteenth 
century German thought see: Rebekka Horlacher, The Educated Subject and the German Concept of Bildung (New 
York: Routledge, 2016); Marjanne E, Goozé, ed. Challenging Separate Spheres: Female Bildung in Eighteenth - and 
Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 2007); Myles W. Jackson, 
“Physics, Machines and Musical Pedagogy in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” History of Science 42, 4 (2004): 371-
418; and Eckhardt Fuchs, “Nature and Bildung: Pedagogical Naturalism in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” in The 
Moral Authority of Nature, eds. Lorraine Daston and Fernando Vidal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
 11 
Reymond and other scientific liberals argued that natural science was in fact necessary to the 
development of Bildung, because it helped people see their larger cosmic context over and above 
their own narrow nationalistic and personal origins. Nietzsche thus came to these debates about 
science and Bildung through a broad array of artistic, scientific, pedagogical, and popular 
channels.  
This work expands upon the existing scholarship on Nietzsche and science by bringing the 
history of science’s emphasis on the interrelationship between diverse forms of knowing and 
knowledge production to bear on Nietzsche’s reception of his scientific, political, and popular 
context. This approach includes bringing Nietzsche’s biography and personal correspondence 
into conversation with his engagement with the periodical press and debates about educational 
reform as well as his thoughts about the relationship between physiology, aesthetics, and 
epistemology. This is important, for these connections are often lost by a narrow focus on 
Nietzsche’s philosophical ideas as part of a traditional western canon of “great men.” Many 
contemporary commentators on Nietzsche and science have come from a background of 
continental and analytical philosophy, post-structuralist thought, or critical theory. Some, like 
Brian Leiter, present Nietzsche as an early positivist, while others, like Gilles Deleuze, present 
him as more of a pre-post-structuralist.19 Personal letters, newspaper articles and the periodical 
press, and nineteenth-century works of popular science seldom feature in contemporary 
philosophical debates. Overlooking these resources is part of a tendency that endured throughout 
the twentieth century. Many twentieth-century commentaries on Nietzsche were largely 
influenced in Germany by Martin Heidegger’s insistence that Nietzsche’s arguments about the 
life sciences were merely abstract rhetorical posturing that distracted from the “deeper” meaning 
of his philosophy. In the English speaking world, Walter Kaufman successfully moved the 
discussion away from Nietzsche and the life science as part of his project of “rehabilitating” him 
of any potential association with eugenics and the Nazi regime in the aftermath of the Second 
World War.  
One example serves to demonstrate Kaufmann’s characteristic disinclination to engage with 
Nietzsche’s physiological and biological commentaries. In his introduction to the Portable 
                                                 
19 Brian Leiter, “One Health, One Earth, One Sun: Nietzsche's Respect for Natural Science," Times Literary 
Supplement (October 1998): 30–1; and Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1985 [1962]). 
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Nietzsche where he defends the rationale for his translation, he comments about his work on 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, saying: “When Zarathustra speaks of trying the reins, the archaism is 
surely preferable to having him test kidneys.”20 While it does not have an entirely stable 
meaning, the term that Kaufmann took exception to, “Nierenprüfer,” and its cognates appears at 
least eleven times in Nietzsche’s private and published writings and cannot be so easily ignored. 
In The Gay Science aphorism “Long Live Physics!” he celebrated the kidney tester’s 
observational skills, and in a private letter described himself as a kidney tester and student of 
human nature.21 In one fragment from 1887 he described the kidney tester as a sober critic of the 
Christian ideal, whereas in another fragment from the same year he again described himself as a 
kidney tester.22 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in the aphorism “From the Land of Culture,” he 
chided these same testers for not going far enough because of their unquestioning belief in 
kidneys. From his reading of Lange Nietzsche was well aware of the terms, and limitations, of 
the Materialismusstreit and Vogt’s infamous analogy that was considered to be emblematic of it. 
Kaufmann’s tendency to shy away from such biologically and physiologically inflected terms as 
Nierenprüfer did much to influence the English discussion of Nietzsche and science throughout 
the twentieth century.  
Nevertheless, there has been some early work done on Nietzsche’s relationship to natural 
science. Alvin Mittasch’s 1944 study of Nietzsche and chemistry and George Stack’s 1983 work 
on Nietzsche and Lange are particularly valuable examples. However, the past twenty years has 
seen a boom in studies relating to Nietzsche and science. Not only was there persistent growth in 
the number of science related articles published in Nietzsche Studies and Nietzsche Research 
                                                 
20 Walter Kauffmann, “Introduction,” The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1976), 6. 
21 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs , trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 263. See also, 246. In both cases Kaufmann translates the term as 
“trying the reins;” Friedrich Nietzsche, “eKGWB/BVN-1885,574 — Brief AN Marie Köckert: Mitte Februar 1885 ,” 
Nietzsche Source, accessed November 5, 2015, http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-1885,574. He 
expresses a similar sentiment in Friedrich Nietzsche, “eKGWB/BVN-1884,482 — Brief AN Franziska Nietzsche: 
Januar/Februar 1884,” Nietzsche Source, accessed November 5, 2015, 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-1884,482. 
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, “eKGWB/NF-1887,9[18] — Nachgelassene Fragmente Herbst 1887,” Nietzsche Source, 
accessed November 5, 2015, http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1887,9[18]; and Friedrich Nietzsche, 
“eKGWB/NF-1887,10[197] — Nachgelassene Fragmente Herbst 1887,” Nietzsche Source, accessed November 5, 
2015, http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1887,10[197]. 
 13 
during this time, but also a growing number of other journal articles, monographs, and books 
dedicated to the topic.23  
Nietzsche’s relationship to Darwin and Darwinism was one of the earlier aspects of his 
thoughts about the life sciences to receive extensive treatment. The philosopher Alexander Tille 
wrote about the relationship in 1893.24 More recently, this relationship has been explored by 
                                                 
23 For studies of Nietzsche’s relationship to biological and evolutionary thought, see: Dirk Solies, “Nietzsche und die 
Lebenswissenschaften,” in Handbuch Nietzsche und die Wissenschaften. Natur-, geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliche 
Kontexte, eds. Helmut Heit and Lisa Heller (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 107-118; Andreas Urs Sommer, 
“Große Menschen züchten? Nietzsche anti-Darwin,” in Nietzsche - Macht - Grösse, eds. Volker Caysa and 
Konstanze Schwarzwald. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 171-187; Sören Reuter, “Vom Embryo zum Übermenschen? 
Zur Bedeutung entwicklungsbiologischer Denkmodelle für Nietzsches Begriff der individuellen Größe,” in Nietzsche 
- Macht - Grösse, eds. Volker Caysa and Konstanze Schwarzwald (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 190-199; Andreas Urs 
Sommer, “Nietzsche mit und gegen Darwin in den Schriften von 1888 ,” Nietzscheforschung 17 (2010): 31-44; 
Michael Skowron, “Evolution und Wiederkunft: Nietzsche und Darwin zwischen Natur und Kultur ,” 
Nietzscheforschung 17 (2010): 45-64; Werner Stegmaier, “‘ohne Hegel kein Darwin’ Kontextuelle Interpretation 
des Aphorismus 357 aus dem v. Buch der Frölichen Wissenschaft ,” Nietzscheforschung 17 (2010): 65-82; Sören 
Reuter, “‘Dieser Lehre gegenüber ist der Darwinismus eine Philosophie für Fleischerburschen’: Grundzüge einer 
möglichen Darwin-rezeption Nietzsches,” Nietzscheforschung 17 (2010): 83-104; Jutta Georg, “Die Kraft des 
Mittelmäßigen: Nietzsche, Darwin und die Evolution ,” Nietzscheforschung 17 (2010): 105-118; Anette Horn, 
“Nietzsche Decadence-Begriff und Darwins Evolutionstheorie,” Nietzscheforschung 17 (2010): 119-135; Dirk R. 
Johnson, Nietzsche’s Anti-Darwinism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Gregory Moore, “Nietzsche 
and Evolutionary Theory,” in A Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009), 517-31; John Richardson, Nietzsche's New Darwinism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Michael 
Skowron, “Nietzsches ‘Anti-Darwinismus,’” Nietzsche-Studien 37 (2008): 160-94; Edith Düsing, Nietzsches 
Denkweg: Theologie, Darwinismus, Nihilismus (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2006); Robin Small, Nietzsche 
and Rée: A Star Friendship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); George J. Stack, Nietzsche’s Anthropic Circle: 
Man, Science, and Myth (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2005); Christa Davis Acampora and Ralph R. 
Acampora, eds., A Nietzschean Bestiary (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Andrea Orsucci, “Quellen 
Nietzsches in Nägeli, Carl Wilhelm: Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre,” Nietzsche-
Studien 32 (2003): 435-437; Martin Stingelin, “Nietzsche und die Biologie - Neue Quellenkritische Studien,” 
Nietzsche-Studien 32 (2003): 503-513; Dirk Solies, “Die Naturwissenschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts und der 
Lebensbegriff des Zarathustra”, Nietzscheforschung 9 (2002): 277-287; Gregory Moore, “Art and Evolution: 
Nietzsche’s Physiological Aesthetics”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10:1 (2002): 109-126; Gregory 
Moore. Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) (While Moore does 
discuss elements of Nietzsche’s relationship to physiology in this text, the vast majority of the work revolves around 
Nietzsche’s relationship to evolutionary thought); Paul Swift, “On Teleology since Kant,” Nietzscheana, 8 (2000): 
1-20; Jean Gayon, “Nietzsche and Darwin,” in Biology and the Foundation of Ethics, eds. Jane Maienschein and 
Michael Ruse (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1999), 154-97; Keith Ansell-Pearson, Viroid Life: 
Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition  (New York: Rutledge, 1997); Irving Zeitlin, Nietzsche: A 
Re-Examination (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); Alfred I. Tauber, “A Typology of Nietzsche’s Biology,” Biology 
And Philosophy 9 (1994): 25-44; C. U. M. Smith, “‘Clever Beasts Who Invented Knowing’: Nietzsche’s 
Evolutionary Biology of Knowledge,” Biology and Philosophy 2 (1987): 65-91; Werner Stegmaier, “Darwin, 
Darwinismus, Nietzsche: Zum Problem der Evolution ,” Nietzsche-Studien 16 (1987): 264-87; Dieter Henke, 
“Nietzsches Darwinismuskritik  aus der sicht Gegenwärtiger Evolutionsforschung ,” Nietzsche-Studien 13 (1984): 
189-210; George J. Stack, Lange and Nietzsche (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983); Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, 
“Der Organismus als innerer Kampf: Der Einfluss von Wilhelm Roux auf Friedrich Nietzsche,” Nietzsche-Studien 
7:1 (1978): 189-223; Jörg Salaquarde, “Nietzsche und Lange,” Nietzsche-Studien 7:1 (1978): 236-53; and Erich 
Heintel, “Philosophie und Organischer Prozess,” Nietzsche-Studien 3:1 (1974): 61-104. 
24 Alexander Tille, Von Darwin bis Nietzsche: Ein Buch Entwicklungsethik  (Leipzig: Naumann, 1893). For other 
early commentaries, see also: Oskar Ewald, “Darwin und Nietzsche,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische 
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scholars such as Stack in Lange and Nietzsche (1983), John Richardson in Nietzsche's New 
Darwinism (2009), Edith Düsing in Nietzsche’s Denkweg: Theology, Darwinism, Nihilism 
(2006), and Dirk R. Johnson’s Nietzsche’s Anti-Darwinism (2010). Many of these studies either 
supported a close connection between Nietzsche and Darwin, or seek to show the tensions 
between them. However, some of the key studies, such as Gregory Moore’s Nietzsche, Biology, 
and Metaphor (2002), and Christian J. Emden’s Nietzsche’s Naturalism (2014) go further than 
this to show the complexity of the relationship, given the divergent meanings of and influences 
on German Darwinismus at the end of the nineteenth century, and highlight many of the non-
Darwinian evolutionary thinkers with whom Nietzsche was familiar.25  
 Contextualizing Nietzsche in the tradition of Kantian thought has also been an important 
part of appreciating his engagement with, and critiques of, the scientific culture of his day. In this 
regard R. Kevin Hill’s 2003 work on the Kantian foundations of his thought is particularly 
helpful.26 In terms of physics, Robin Small's Nietzsche in Context (2001) explored how 
Nietzsche’s understanding of time, space, and force point atoms were shaped by his engageme nt 
with such contemporary thinkers as Eugen Dühring (1833-1921), Gustav Teichmüller (1832-
1888), Johann Karl Friedrich Zöllner (1832-1882), and Afrikan Spir (1837-1890).  
Likely the two most important collected volumes on Nietzsche and science to appear in 
recent years have been Nietzsche and Science (2004), edited by Gregory Moore and Thomas H. 
Brobjer, and the extensive Handbuch Nietzsche und die Wissenschaften (2013), edited by Helmut 
Heit and Lisa Heller.27 Both volumes discuss how Nietzsche’s expansive understanding of 
Wissenschaft as the human need to create unified knowledge of the world contributed to his 
diverse range of interests. These works seek to correct for the systematic neglect of studies 
exploring role that the natural and human sciences played in his worldview. Brobjer has also 
                                                 
Kritik  136 (1909): 159-79; and Claire Richter, Nietzsche et les Théories biologiques contemporaines (Paris: Mercure 
de France, 1911). 
25 Andreas Urs Sommer also makes this point, as does Sören Reuter and Dirk Solies. See: Andreas Urs Sommer, 
“Nietzsche mit und gegen Darwin in den Schriften von 1888,” Nietzscheforschung 17 (2010): 31–44; Sören Reuter, 
“Dieser Lehre gegenüber ist der Darwinismus eine Philosophie für Fleischerburschen: Grundzüge einer möglichen 
Darwin-Rezeption Nietzsches,” in Nietzsche, Darwin und die Kritik der Politischen Theologie, Vol 17, eds. Volker 
Gerhardt and Renate Reschke (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010), 83-104; and Dirk Solies, “Nietsche und die 
Lebenswissenschaften,” in Handbuch Nietzsche und die Wissenschaften. Natur-, geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliche 
Kontexte, eds. Helmut Heit and Lisa Heller (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 107-118. 
26 R. Kevin Hill, Nietzsche’s Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of his Thought  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). 
27 Handbuch Nietzsche und die Wissenschaften. Natur-, geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliche Kontexte, eds. Helmut 
Heit and Lisa Heller (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2013). 
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contributed a number of very helpful works contextualizing Nietzsche’s thought, including his 
2008 study of Nietzsche philosophical context.28 
With the increase in scholarship surrounding Nietzsche, science, and the life sciences has 
come increased interest in the physiological dimensions of his thought.29 These studies have 
examined the way that Nietzsche related to his own states of sickness and health, climatological 
and environmental influences on health, his views on growth and nutrition, as well as the 
relationship between artistic and physiological decadence, and how philosophies recapitulate the 
physiological rates of life of those who espouse them.  
                                                 
28 Thomas H Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography  (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2008). 
29 For studies of Nietzsche’s relationship to physiological thought, see: Tobias Dahlkvist, “Nietzsche and Medicine,” 
Handbuch Nietzsche und die Wissenschaften. Natur-, geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliche Kontexte, eds. Helmut 
Heit and Lisa Heller (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 138-154; Sören Reuter, “Nietzsche und die Sinnesphysilogie 
und Erkenntniskritik,” Handbuch Nietzsche und die Wissenschaften. Natur-, geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliche 
Kontexte, eds. Helmut Heit and Lisa Heller (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 79-106; Luis Enrique de Santiago 
Guervós, “Physiology and Language in Friedrich Nietzsche: ‘The Guiding Thread of the Body,’” in As the Spider 
Spins: Essays on Nietzsche’s Critique and Use of Language , eds. João Constâncio and Maria João Mayer Branco 
(Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2012), 60-88; Annette Bitsch, “Physiologische Ästhetic: Nietzsches Konzeption des 
Körpers als Medium,” Nietzscheforschung 15 (2008): 167-188; Josef Ehrenmüller, “Nietzsches Psychologie bzw. 
Physiologie der Philosophie,” Nietzscheforschung 15 (2008): 221-230; Christian J. Emden, Nietzsche on Language, 
Consciousness, and the Body (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005); Richard S.G. Brown, 
“Nietzsche: ‘That Profound Physiologist,’” in Nietzsche and Science, eds. Gregory Moore and Thomas H. Brobjer 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), 51-70; Ruben Berrios, “Nietzsche’s Vital Aesthetics,” Nietzsche-Studien 32 
(2003), 78-102; Christian J. Emden, “Metaphor, Perception and Consciousness: Nietzsche on Rhetoric and 
Neurophysiology,” in Nietzsche and Science, eds. Gregory Moore and Thomas H. Brobjer (Aldershot: As hgate 
Publishing, 2003), 91-110; Timo Hoyer, “‘Höherbildung des Ganzen Leibes’ Friedrich Nietzsches Vorstellungen 
zur Körpererziehung,” Nietzsche-Studien 32 (2003): 59-77; Abraham Olivier, “Nietzsche and Neurology,” 
Nietzsche-Studien 32 (2003): 124-142; Gregory Moore, “Nietzsche, Medicine and Meteorology,” in Nietzsche and 
Science, eds. Gregory Moore and Thomas H. Brobjer (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), 71-90. Gregory 
Moore, “Art and Evolution: Nietzsche’s Physiological Aesthetics,” in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 
10:1 (2002): 109-126; Stephan Günzel, “Vernünftige Körper? - Körper ohne Organe! Nietzsche/Deleuze,” 
Nietzscheforschung 5/6 (2000): 105-118; Cathrin Nielsen, “Der Medusa ins Antlitz schauen - ohne zu erstarren: Zu 
Nietzsches ‘Physiologie der Kunst,’” Nietzscheforschung 5/6 (2000): 123-134; Dirk Solies, “Die Kunst - eine 
Krankheit des Leibes? Zum Phänomen des Rausches bei Nietzsche ,” Nietzscheforschung 5/6 (2000): 151-162. 
Andrea Orsucci, “'Die Geschichtliche Entwicklung des Farbensinns und Die "Linguistische Archäologie' Von L. 
Geiger und H. Magnus: Ein Kommentar zum Aphorismus 426 von Morgenröthe ,” Nietzsche-Studien 22 (1993): 243-
256; Thomas A. Long, “Nietzsche’s philosophy of Medicine,” Nietzsche-Studien 19 (1990): 112-28. Richard S.G. 
Brown, “Nihilism: ‘Thus Speaks Physiology,’” in Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, 
Language and Politics, eds. Tom Darby, Béla Egyed and Ben Jones (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), 133-
44; Bettina Wahrig-Schmidt, “‘Irgendwie-jedenfalls physiologisch’, Friedrich Nietzsche, Alexandre Herzen (fils) 
und Charles Féré 1888,” Nietzsche-Studien, 17 (1988), 434-64; Helmut Pfotenhauer, Die Kunst als Physiologie: 
Nietzsches äesthetische Theorie und literarische Produktion  (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1985); Volker Gerhardt, “Von der 
ästhetischen Metaphysik zur Physiologie der Kunst ,” Nietzsche-Studien 13 (1984): 374-93; Stephan Grätzel, 
“Physiologie der Kunst - Eine Grundlegung der Vernunft des Leibes,” Nietzsche-Studien 13 (1984): 394–398; and 
Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, “Artistische décadence als physiologische décadence: Zu Friedrich Nietzsches später 
Kritik am späten Richard Wagner,” in Communicatio Fidei: Festschrift für Eugen Biser zum 65. Geburtstag , eds. H. 
Bürkle and G. Becker (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1983), 285-94. 
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The increased number of studies of Nietzsche and science also owe something to the end of 
the Cold War. During my time studying Nietzsche’s annotations at the Anna Amalia Bibliothek 
in Weimar I was able to speak with a number of Nietzsche researchers there, one of whom was 
from Moscow, as well as the head of the collections, Erdmann von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 
about the history of the Nietzsche archive.30 The archive is in Weimar, in the former East 
Germany. Nietzsche, seen as an aristocratic apologist by many within the East German elite, was 
not positioned to be a particularly celebrated intellectual figure. It is perhaps ironic that the 
reunification of Germany would occasion such a growth in access to the kinds of materials that 
has allowed Nietzsche’s relationship to the natural sciences to be studied in a new light.  
It is now possible to explore how Nietzsche’s relativism was grounded in physiology, with 
roots in many of the same concerns about the limits of knowledge that later contributed to the 
growth of Albert Einstein’s (1879-1955) theories of relativity. To date no one has explored the 
relationship between genius, dynamic self-regulation, and vivisection in Nietzsche’s thought and 
how these ideas served as important connecting threads between a number of his seemingly 
disparate interests. Nietzsche’s reimagining of these three ideas served as the basis of his unique 
form of physiological relativism, a basis which nevertheless was furnished by his broader 
context. Nietzsche’s interest in physiology was very characteristic of his age, and was only 
intensified by his interest in Schopenhauer’s beliefs about the nature of genius and the 
relationship between knowledge and physiology. Yet Nietzsche’s growing interest in physiology 
also contributed to his doubts about the validity of Schopenhauer’s larger philosophical system. 
When he publicly broke from Schopenhauer’s system he began further exploring how 
physiological research and vivisection related to other philosophical questions, such as the role 
of necessity in nature, how scientific and historical methods demonstrated how things tended to 
emerge from their opposites, and the tension between knowing something and morally judging it. 
Vivisection also showed the many ways in which life was characterized by the dynamic self-
regulation of fragmentary parts into a consistent whole. This principle applied as much to the 
organization of cells and secretions as it did to psyches and societies. With their moral strictures 
and penal codes, societies sought to make individuals into mere organic subunits. To this end, 
                                                 
30 In a historical irony Erdmann von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff is a descendent of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff, the philologist whose heated polemics against Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy in 1872 and 1873 accused 
him of attacking the scientific method. 
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conservative education was largely a process of regulation-as-normalization. In contrast, 
Nietzsche’s vision for educational reform was in the service of helping individuals learn how to 
regulate themselves in order to accomplish their own ends; not those prescribed for them by their 
nations or educators. In this way the individual could participate more meaningfully and freely in 
the greater patterns of dynamic self-regulation that played out at all levels of organization in the 
natural world. To demonstrate this, I will show the historical and philosophical development of 
Nietzsche’s ideas about education, physiology, and freedom throughout the length of his 
intellectual career.   
Chapter one of this study explores how Nietzsche’s ideas about genius changed 
throughout the 1870s. Schopenhauer emphasized that geniuses were physiologically different 
from other people. The structure of and amount of blood flow to their brains allowed them to 
innately perceive the objective unities at the heart of nature. This was also a position that Wagner 
supported, and in his youth Nietzsche was very influenced by this understanding of genius. 
However, early on in his career his own reading of Lange and von Baer had already begun to 
conflict with Schopenhauer’s arguments about genius and did so on physiological grounds. This 
led him to a view that a clearer understanding of physiology showed the relative and fragmentary 
nature of knowledge, and how genius could only be meaningfully understood as the capacity to 
create dynamic subjective unities since none were actually present in nature itself. This meant 
abandoning Schopenhauer’s and Wagner’s holistic understanding of the world.  
Nietzsche’s abandonment of Schopenhauer’s holistic arguments is evident in his 
changing response to the role of vivisection in physiological research, which is the subject of 
chapter two. Anti-vivisectionists surrounded Nietzsche for much of the 1870s. In his public 
writings he took up their defence of the irreducible holism of living beings, the unity of 
knowledge, and the genius’ ability to intuit the truths of nature without the need to take it apart 
piece by piece. Following the work of the antivivisectionist and astrophysicist Zöllner, he 
decried the useless and fragmentary piling up of experiments and data that characterized the 
modern age in science as well as history. However, his break with Wagner allowed him the space 
to express his growing support for vivisection, both as a physical practice, and as a metaphorical 
approach to knowledge and morality. He even couched his earliest “genealogical” projects in the 
language of vivisection, or moral dissection.  
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Chapter three explores Nietzsche’s understanding of the purpose of metaphorical 
vivisection and experimentation, for it was the only way to achieve greater knowledge and 
freedom to creatively refashion one’s self. This mirrored Bernard’s emphasis that teaching the 
young the value of experimentation was the path that would lead them toward freedom of mind 
or spirit (liberté d'esprit). For both thinkers experimentation made humanity freer in its larger 
cosmic environment, just as the action of the milieu intérieur made organisms increasingly, 
though only relatively, free in terms of their local environments. Nietzsche’s concerns about 
education, and how to produce genius, were thus closely tied to his thoughts about physiology 
and developed in dialogue with authors who stressed the importance of dynamic self-regulation 
in education as well as in living systems.  
Chapter four examines what has been called Nietzsche’s physiological aesthetics and 
argues that an exclusive focus on the evolutionary dimensions of the term has obscured the role 
that aesthetics played in what could be called his physio-aesthetic epistemology. Nietzsche’s 
interest in the relationship between aesthetics and physiology goes back to his reading of 
Schopenhauer, Zöllner, Helmholtz, and Johann Nepomuk Czermak (1828-1873), and the stress 
that they placed on the active and creative qualities of perception. At an unconscious level the 
brain compared and selected from amongst its perceptions even before they entered conscious 
awareness. The brain “learned” how to perceive the world in ways that were not directly 
accessible to the conscious mind. In certain instances, experience actually shaped and 
conditioned perception. How human beings experienced the world was not static, but changed 
over time based on historical and physiological principles, and this in turn shaped how they 
tended to think about existence. Understanding the physiological, psychological, and cultural 
limits of the human being was a perquisite for understanding how to further one’s own individual 
freedom, for it was by understanding these limits that one could begin to choose other limits for 
oneself. Nietzsche argued that the meaningful freedom that could be achieved through both 
learning and creativity was characterized by an increased ability to place limitations on one’s 
self. He likened this process to the formation of Chladni sand figures, which were both 
aesthetically pleasing and seemingly spontaneous, but were produced by law-bound natural 
processes. This also extended to how one chose one’s cultural and physical diet. Experience was 
also a form of sustenance. It provided the organism with a collection of materials, in this case, 
memories, impressions, perception, and ideas, that furthered or hindered its ability to 
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dynamically self-regulate and live a life independent of its environment. Nietzsche’s continued 
interest can be seen from his engagement with the Danish philosopher Harald Høffding (1843-
1931) and his discussion of ideas as the “blood” of consciousness. Individual freedom was 
characterized at each level of organization, the physiological, psychological, personal, and 
cosmic by the ability to assimilate strategically or digest elements of their environment in such a 
way that allowed for more complicated and nuanced forms of self-limitation and dynamic self-
regulation. 
Nietzsche’s interest in how dynamic self-regulation combined elements of meaningful 
freedom with a necessary relationship to the environment culminated in his idea of the 
Übermensch. Organic life arrived at a state of relatively free “independence through 
interdependence” by creating physiological barriers between itself and its environment (for 
instance, by being warm blooded or cold blooded). Human beings created more elaborate forms 
of independence through interdependence. They did this at an unconscious level through how 
their experiences produced ideas and memories that insulated them from being overwhelmed by 
fragmentary sensory impressions and perceptions. At the personal or conscious level, they 
achieved this state of independence through interdependence from their experiences of the world 
and through learning. By willing the totality of all things the Übermench became the culmination 
of this process. Their environment was the eternal return of the same, which they assimilated by 
willing it in its entirety. Nietzsche’s idea of genius thus became the antithesis of Schopenhauer’s. 
Whereas Schopenhauer emphasized the genius’ depersonalized wholeness and independence 
from their environment, Nietzsche’s genius, the Übermensch, was characterized by their 
personalized wholeness and interdependence with their environment, whether it was physical, 
psychological, personal, or cosmic.  
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Chapter 1: The Frame of Genius 
 
Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into 
numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented 
knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of ‘world history,’ but 
nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled 
and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die. – One might invent such a fable, and yet 
he still would not have adequately illustrated how miserable, how shadowy and transient, 
how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature. There were eternities 
during which it did not exist. And when it is all over with the human intellect, nothing 
will have happened. For this intellect has no additional mission which would lead it 
beyond human life. Rather, it is human, and only its possessor and begetter takes it so 
solemnly – as though the world’s axis turned within it. But if we could communicate with 
the gnat [Mücke], we would learn that he likewise flies through the air with the same 
solemnity, that he feels the flying center of the universe within himself. There is nothing 
so reprehensible and unimportant in nature that it would not immediately swell up like a 
balloon at the slightest puff of this power of knowing. And just as every porter wants to 
have an admirer, so even the proudest of men, the philosopher, supposes that he sees on 
all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought.31  
  
~Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 1873. 
 
 
 On the surface of it, Nietzsche’s exploration of genius is polyvocal to the point of 
seeming contradictory. When he wrote about philosophers being the “proudest of men,” or 
extolled the virtues of artists, saints, sages, heroes, and other exceptional individuals he was 
articulating the myriad of ways that genius manifested itself in different domains of knowledge 
and ability. Yet Nietzsche’s interest in genius also grew up alongside his changing understanding 
of the limits of knowledge and the consequences of these limits. He spent much of his 
intellectual career trying to come to terms with whether or not genius could have any meaning in 
a vast and indifferent cosmos in which the individual was swallowed up by natural necessity. 
Furthermore, there was no necessary relationship between the human intellect and the 
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construction of the cosmos. Human intellect was finite and no matter how exceptional the genius, 
they would still not be able to access any kind of absolute world or unconditional truth. What, 
then, was the point of it all? Nietzsche’s attempt to try to diagnose and “cure” the nihilism and 
existential anxieties of the nineteenth century had as its two poles the indifference of the cosmos 
and the exceptional human agent that acted within it. However, his thoughts about these topics 
changed over time. Part of the polyvocal character of his discussion of genius was due to the 
legacy that he inherited from Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy and from his relationship 
with Wagner, as well as the growing sense of physiological relativism that he developed from his 
readings of Lange and von Baer.  
To understand Nietzsche’s interest in genius it will first be helpful to comment on his 
search for “great men” and role models that contributed to his fascination, and later encounter, 
with Wagner. The understanding of genius that Nietzsche took away from his early reading of 
Schopenhauer shaped what this encounter meant for him. Wagner appeared to Nietzsche as a 
“flesh and blood” example of Schopenhauer’s definition of genius. Schopenhauer’s geniuses 
were physiological prodigies whose genius was a kind of monstra per excessum (monstrosity of 
excess). These geniuses were born, not made, and their insights came from a range of 
physiological differences that made them indifferent to the distractions of the phenomenal world 
around them.  
Throughout much of the 1870s there was a pronounced tension between Nietzsche’s 
published and unpublished writings. His published works tended to repeat and reaffirm Wagner’s 
understanding of the role and meaning of genius. However, his unpublished works expressed 
doubt about the ability of the human mind to grasp fully the vastness and indifference of the 
cosmos and espoused a form of physiological relativism. Any meaningful definition of 
knowledge could only be relative to the physiological organization of the human organs of 
sensation. This meant that humans could never have a privileged knowledge of the inner or 
objective workings of nature, but only of their own contingent sensations and impressions. 
Nietzsche’s self-censorship can already be seen in The Birth of Tragedy (1872) where he 
repeated Schopenhauer’s description of the world as Will and representation in the dichotomy of 
the Dionysian and Apollonian drives. Following Wagner, he also defended the ideal relationship 
between the creative genius and the genius’ audience, argued that myth and art were truer than 
critical history, and critiqued scholarly and professional “theoretical men” for being small 
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minded anti-geniuses. Yet his presentation of a musical Socrates as an example of how 
theoretical men could overcome the narrow limitations of their reductionist approach to nature 
and history owed a great deal to his reading of Lange’s History of Materialism.  
Schopenhauer’s emphasis on the physiological underpinnings of genius contributed to 
Nietzsche’s interest in further exploring the relationship between an individual’s physiological 
organization and their ability to know the world. According to his letters, at first Nietzsche 
believed that Lange’s History of Materialism provided an important support for Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy. Lange, however, explicitly denied Schopenhauer’s philosophy and provided a very 
different definition for what constituted the nature of genius. Lange’s genius was a self-
consciously creative individual who was aware of how the limits of knowledge placed on him by 
his own body meant that he could only ever create unities and not “discover” them in nature in 
any objective sense. Lange even presented Socrates as an example of this form of genius; an 
individual who was capable of mastering his passions in an act of self-conscious self-fashioning, 
whose genius emerged from how he responded to his context; not in spite of it. Nietzsche’s 
attempt to reconcile these two visions of genius increasingly began to look like his acceptance of 
Lange and his rejection of Schopenhauer. This is particularly evident in his lectures on the Pre-
Platonic Philosophers (1869 to 1872). In this series he described myth as an 
anthropomorphization of causality that was ultimately discredited when ancient philosophers 
started to consider how metaphysical beliefs were shaped by physiological limitations.  
Nietzsche also discussed von Baer’s lecture “Which Conception of Living Nature is the 
Correct One?” (1860) in his lectures on the Pre-Platonic Philosophers. He referenced von Baer’s 
observation that physiological rhythms of life helped to dictate whether a species was more 
likely to believe that being or becoming were primary in nature. In his lectures, as well as in his 
unpublished essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” (1873), Nietzsche both drew 
from and subverted von Baer’s metaphors of mosquitoes, spiders, and bees. He did so to show 
that while materialism was an insufficient hypothesis, so too was the kind of teleological 
metaphysics that von Baer proposed in its place. Comparing insect and arachnid life to human 
life showed not only the limits of human sensations and sense of permanence, but also revealed 
the necessity with which humans made objectively “wrong” metaphysical claims about 
existence. Humans instinctually falsify the world with the same necessity with which a spider 
spins the web that it uses as both a shelter and as a source of food. A lack of understanding of the 
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physiological workings of the human body concealed this point from most philosophers. This 
flew in the face of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, in which the immediacy of an individual’s 
experience of their own bodies served as the basis for an understanding of the world as Will and 
representation. Yet in Nietzsche’s private writings of the early 1870s he was already doubting 
this and stressing that comparative anatomy and physiology proved that not only was the thing-
in-itself unknowable, but that it made no sense to talk about it as a source of human knowledge 
of the world. All one could hope to understand was the aesthetic relationship between things, 
their interpretation, and invention. Yet even these interpretations and inventions were 
conditioned by the historical, physiological, and psychological limitations of the human being.   
 Nietzsche’s continued public support for Wagner and Schopenhauer began to falter in his 
Untimely Meditations (1873-1876). The first essay in the series, “David Strauss, The Confessor 
and Writer” continued the defence of myth, miracles, and genius that Nietzsche began in The 
Birth of Tragedy and attacked the pedantic demands of critical history and natural science. 
However, in the second essay, “On the Uses and Disadvantages,” Nietzsche sought some 
mediation between his private understanding of genius and Wagner’s. While Nietzsche 
continued to attack critical historians and natural scientists for being “theoretical men,” he 
presented a vision of artistic genius that did not aim at truth or justice, and attempted to explore 
how such a genius could be educated, not born, by shaping their first nature into a second nature. 
Nietzsche continued this argument in “Schopenhauer as Educator,” albeit he did so with more 
nods to Wagner’s philosophical position. In the final mediation, “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” 
Nietzsche used a series of fragments of Wagner’s own writings to show the limitations of 
Wagner’s sense of holism and how Wagner’s understanding of genius did violence to history. 
The fact that the essay met with Wagner’s approval only further proved Nietzsche’s point.  
 The publication of Human, All Too Human (1878-1880) signaled Nietzsche’s public 
break with Wagner. It was the culmination of Nietzsche’s almost decade-long private attempt to 
reimagine the meaning and nature of genius and education based on his understanding of critical 
history, natural science, and physiology. Importantly, Wagner’s attack on Human, All Too 
Human in his article “Public and Popularity” specifically responded to these elements of 
Nietzsche’s text. Wagner repeated the arguments that Nietzsche himself had earlier made in 
favour of the miraculous qualities of genius and against critical history and natural science. 
Wagner’s defence of Joan of Arc’s “miraculous” accomplishments and his criticism of the 
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popularity of chemistry should be understood in this light. After this point Nietzsche would 
continue to develop the ideas presented in Human, All Too Human. This moment in his 
intellectual biography serves as an important reference point for how his thoughts about 
meaningful freedom, physiology, genius, and the limits of knowledge contributed to his interest 
in vivisection and dynamic self-regulation, as well as his later articulation of the relationship 
between the Übermensch and the eternal return of the same. 
 
Embodying Genius: Schopenhauer’s Indifferent Ideal  
 
 Gregory Moore has observed that Nietzsche was representative of a broader fascination 
with genius that was common in the nineteenth century.32 Initially, Wagner was merely one of a 
number of prominent figures that Nietzsche came to admire in this quest for a role model. While 
studying away from home in 1861 he asked his mother and sister to get him a picture of some 
“famous living man,” either Liszt or Wagner, or some character from Shakespeare, such as 
Macbeth.33 Yet of these potential models, it was Wagner who he was able to meet in person. He 
first met him in November 1868 at the home of Wagner’s sister, Ottilie. By his own account, 
Nietzsche was invited to meet Wagner after Sophie Ritschl (the wife of his teacher Friedrich 
Ritschl) impressed Wagner with her knowledge of the composer’s musical work. She claimed 
that Nietzsche was the reason she knew so much about him.  
Nietzsche first visited the Wagners in Tribschen in May 1869. Soon afterwards he 
became a welcome member of their social circle. Reading through Cosima Wagner’s (1837-
1930) journals helps to shed some light on Nietzsche’s domestic encounters with the Wagners. In 
them one can see Nietzsche in his mid-twenties, frequently sick and preoccupied with work, 
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eagerly forwarding reports on what the newspapers were saying about the Wagners. Cosima 
Wagner’s journals also show Nietzsche’s interest in educational reform, popular culture (and 
Richard Wagner’s place within it), as well as the popularization of knowledge. He also shared 
with the Wagners an abiding interest in Schopenhauer’s philosophical and political works. 
Nietzsche encountered Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation in 1865. 
According to Brobjer, shortly thereafter he went about collecting most of the philosopher’s major 
works, although the only other text that we know he read was Parerga and Paralipomena.34 It is 
likely that he read On the Will in Nature and his reference to Schopenhauer’s colour theory 
implies that he was at least familiar with On Vision and Colors.35 Nietzsche’s early enthusiasm 
for Schopenhauer had all the excesses of a fresh convert. He encouraged his friends to become 
Schopenhauerians and treated Schopenhauer’s opponents as personal enemies. Wagner would 
play a pivotal role in supporting Nietzsche’s missionary fervor. In a letter to Carl von Gersdorff 
(1844-1904) sent on September 28th 1869, Nietzsche expressed one of the reasons why he was so 
excited at the prospect of entering into the Wagners’ social circle: “I have already written telling 
you how invaluable this genius of a man is to me, as a flesh-and-blood illustration of what 
Schopenhauer calls a genius.”36 A living genius was a far better companion than the picture of 
one he had requested in 1861. Yet what did Nietzsche mean by a flesh-and-blood example of 
Schopenhauer’s genius and in what ways did Wagner come to embody it?  
While Schopenhauer was a self-described idealist, his philosophical system relied heavily 
on an understanding of the human body as the intersection of the phenomenal world of 
appearance and the noumenal world of the thing- in-itself, things understood apart from human 
experience. This is likely in part because of Schopenhauer’s early medical training, but also 
because he embraced a critique of Kant’s system that was widespread in the 1790s: Since 
causality was one of the categories of understanding that shaped human experience of the 
phenomenal world, how could it be applied to the thing- in-itself and the noumenal world, which 
are fundamentally outside of experience?37 How could a category that ordered experience, 
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causality, also cause the relationship between the real world and the human experience of it? 
Schopenhauer argued instead that existence was composed of two elements, Will and 
representation. He associated Will with objective reality and the thing- in- itself, and 
representations with the appearances or experiences immediately available to people as 
subjective individuals. While Will was ontologically prior to representation, one did not cause 
the other. They were merely two perspectives of the same world. Schopenhauer argued that the 
body and its organs were in fact physical manifestations of an individual’s will, which was itself 
part of the larger, noumenal universal Will. The individual will and body were, in a larger sense, 
identical.38 Schopenhauer took this position so far that he even claimed that an individual’s will 
shaped their physical appearance; especially their physiognomy.39 Humans had a double 
relationship to their own bodies, as representations (their external awareness of themselves) and 
as will (their internal awareness of themselves).40 Whenever a person moves a limb they are 
acting on their will and representation at the same time, a fact that Schopenhauer believed to be 
“a miracle of such common occurrence that we no longer notice it.”41  
Schopenhauer argued from this “miracle” that a human being’s relationship to their body 
was the source of their ability to understand and sympathize with the rest of existence. Normally, 
an individual’s will, with its blind collection of instincts, drives, passions, and animal yearnings, 
could only lead to discontent and misery, but it was possible to abrogate, or quiet it, and thus 
gain special access to the objective world. This objective world was the universal Will contained 
in Schopenhauer’s dichotomy of Will and representation. He made this distinction between the 
subjective, individual will and the objective, universal Will to highlight that true objectivity was 
found when an individual could experience the world with the same sense of unity and identity 
that they experienced in their relationship with their own bodies. Thus unlike Kant, 
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Schopenhauer argued that it was possible to have an experience of the transcendent. He believed 
that this state of impersonal, universal understanding could be achieved through aesthetic 
experiences, particularly musical ones since music was a direct expression of will in a way that 
other art forms were not. The aesthetic experience of music abrogates the wills of those who hear 
it, causing them to forget their individual wills and putting them in a sympathetic relationship 
with the universal Will behind the music. The listeners forget themselves, and in forgetting 
themselves they also forget the distinction between subject and object. Outside of rare aesthetic 
experiences, however, only a genius could achieve this state of dispassionate objectivity.   
Schopenhauer naturalized Kant’s a priori forms of empirical knowledge (time, space, and 
causality) into “brain-functions.”42 Human experience was structured by how humans were 
organized at a physiological level. Schopenhauer considered the brain to be the phenomenal 
equivalent to the noumenal mind. This meant that the categories of understanding were also “in” 
the brain in a tangible sense. The genius’s noumenal insights also had physiological 
manifestations. Schopenhauer described the qualities of the brain, nervous, and circulatory 
systems that made a person a genius. All of the geniuses’ nervous fibers, the flow of their blood, 
and their sensations were more sensitive than in ordinary people, and were in fact much more 
closely related to those of children than adults.43 They suffered more from noise, pain, and 
memories because their senses were so refined. In their highest moments of aesthetic insight, 
they achieved a state of such sensitivity that they could see through their individual wills to have 
an unmediated access of the objective world.44 Since the genius’ brain was overdeveloped it was 
important for the rest of their body to be particularly robust, especially their stomach, for: “the 
brain leads its parasitic life on the organism in a very decided, isolated, powerful, and 
independent manner.”45 Schopenhauer’s emphasis on the convolutions, blood flow, nervous 
sensibility, and overall size of the brain as the monstrous, parasitic organ of genius lead him to 
also focus on weight as a key indicator of genius. He observed with some satisfaction that Lord 
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Byron’s brain weighed six pounds, George Cuvier’s five pounds, while the ordinary brain only 
weighed an uninspired three pounds.46  
The physiological differences between geniuses and non-geniuses meant that the genius 
could actually perceive universals, totalities, and unities in nature, whereas non-genius remained 
trapped at the level of subjective experience. Yet this privileged insight made the genius far less 
aware of the particulars, partial impressions, and contingencies that make up daily life.47 
Schopenhauer described geniuses as often being immodest and antisocial figures who were 
fundamentally set apart from the rest of society by their double intellects. Unlike “normal” 
people, their overflowing intellect was far more than was required for the satisfaction of their 
subjective will and daily needs, and instead gave their perceptions a heightened keenness and 
objectivity. As Schopenhauer argued, subjectivity could never lead an individual to become a 
genius:  
The normal man […] has only a single intellect, which may be called subjective by 
contrast with the objective intellect of genius. However acute this subjective intellect may 
be—and it exists in very various degrees of perfection—it is never on the same level with 
the double intellect of genius.48 
 
Geniuses were monstrosities. Each was a “monstra per excessum,” or monster of excess, whose 
overdeveloped intellect went far beyond that which would be required for the satisfaction of their 
will.49 Indeed, the basic needs of a genius’ individual will often suffered because of this excess. 
They were not able to look after themselves in the mundane world of daily life. Yet this excess 
of intellect allowed the genius to be indifferent to the subjective aspect of their own wills, and 
resulted in their insights being closer to objective truth than those of any “normal” person.   
Schopenhauer implied that geniuses’ indifference was a consequence of the fact that they 
did not experience a clear distinction between themselves as subject and the world as object.   
He used Goethe as an example of this indifference. Schopenhauer cited the fact that the older 
philosopher was still making observations for his theory of colours during the turmoil of the 
Napoleonic wars.50 However, Schopenhauer stressed that this indifference did not rob the genius 
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of their intellectual goals, which they instinctually pursued in order “to give permanent form to 
what he sees and feels:” “It works, in the main, by a necessity similar to that which makes a tree 
bear its fruit; and no external condition is needed but the ground upon which it is to thrive.”51 
This “ground” was the genius’ early environment.  
The external contingencies of a genius’ biography could only dictate whether they 
survived or not, not the content of their genius. While a mature genius could endure the neglect 
brought about by their indifference to the demands of their individual will, young geniuses were 
particularly susceptible to the contingencies of mundane life. Yet Schopenhauer stressed that 
these contingencies in no way shaped the later content of the mature genius’s philosophy or art,  
because insofar as genius was the breaking down of the subjective and objective it could not 
contain something that was unique to them. This is why Schopenhauer argued against the value 
of biographies, for he felt that: “To read a philosopher's biography, instead of studying his 
thoughts, is like neglecting a picture and attending only to the style of its frame.”52 
Schopenhauer’s physiological understanding of genius reinforced his argument for the 
indifferent relationship between geniuses and their lived experiences.  
Wagner discovered Schopenhauer in 1854. In a letter to his fellow composer and future 
father in law Franz Liszt (1811-1886) he claimed that he was in agreement with Schopenhauer’s 
understanding of human nature and of genius, its “monstrous” development, its physiological 
underpinning, its indifference to external circumstance, and that he too saw the important role of 
aesthetic experiences in revealing the objective truth of the world.53 He did not, however, 
mention Schopenhauer’s deterministic tendencies. Shortly thereafter Wagner began modeling 
himself after Schopenhauer’s vision of genius. By the time Wagner and Nietzsche met in 1868 
the composer’s followers had already come to see him as the living embodiment of what 
Schopenhauer meant by genius. Yet just as there was something self-conscious about how 
Wagner took up the mantle of Schopenhauer’s genius, Nietzsche’s adoration of Wagner also had 
its performative aspects.  
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The Rebirth of Schopenhauer from the Spirit of Wagner  
 
Even during his halcyon days at the Wagners’ home in Tribschen, Nietzsche showed 
some misgivings about giving himself up entirely to the master. In her diary entry for August 3rd 
1871 Cosima Wagner commented on how Nietzsche was the most gifted of the Wagners’ young 
friends, but that he was also strangely reserved: “as if he were trying to resist the overwhelming 
effect of Wagner’s personality.”54 Earlier Nietzsche had reflected on this very tendency to 
gravitate towards, but also to resist the effects that powerful personalities had on him.55 In his 
letters Wagner could be incredibly supportive and encouraging of his young protégé. Yet this 
support was conditional upon Nietzsche’s own efforts to champion Wagner’s various causes. 
Wagner seldom tolerated opposition, and often responded with either coldness or angry demands 
when he felt his requests had been denied. Nietzsche wrote that Wagner expected him to visit at 
least once every four weeks or else risk incurring the composer’s displeasure, and in her diaries 
Cosima Wagner recalls a heated dinner conversation during which Richard Wagner became 
angry with Nietzsche for having sworn an oath not to eat meat.56 A little over a week later, 
Nietzsche wrote to Gersdorff, dissuading his friend from a vegetarian lifestyle and asking him to 
“bear in mind the struggle and the asceticism of truly great men, Schopenhauer, Schiller, 
Wagner,” who needed a diet rich in meat to fuel their greater acts of artistic asceticism and 
creation.57  This pattern of praise and punishment can help to explain why many of Nietzsche’s 
early works are so polyvocal and equivocal. 
Readers may be forgiven for suspecting that between 1867 and 1878 there were two 
Nietzsches. One of them was an apparently devoted Wagnerian who published The Birth of 
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Tragedy and the Untimely Meditations. The other published nothing of his thoughts, but wrote 
prolifically, planning a dissertation On the Concept of the Organic After Kant and a project on 
Democritus, writing “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” and his lectures On the Pre-
Platonic Philosophers. When asked to write an overview of philosophy in Germany, the 
physiologist and psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) described the Wagnerian Nietzsche 
as a timely and likely ephemeral figure. For Wundt, Nietzsche represented a stream of modern 
enthusiasm for Schopenhauer’s mystical tendencies that had aligned itself with Wagnerian 
music. This is how he described Nietzsche in an article for the English journal Mind, which 
Nietzsche very likely saw shortly after its publication:58  
The philosophy of Schopenhauer has still indeed numerous adherents, who give 
expression to their views in writings not always of a strictly philosophical character, 
while they accept as much as suits them from Hartmann or other pessimists. A promine nt 
representative of this pessimistic strain in our literature is Prof. Friedrich Nietzsche of 
Basel, the successive parts of whose Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen [Untimely 
Meditations] have drawn much notice. In the writings of Nietzsche and others of the 
same stamp, the pessimistic mood is combined in a very peculiar way with an 
enthusiastic devotion to certain ideas closely related to religious mysticism. Richard 
Wagner and his music are ardently worshipped by this sect of pessimists. The great 
composer himself was won over to Schopenhauer by the philosopher's profound views of 
the nature of music, and his enthusiastic admirers declare that the Will has been revealed 
as cosmical principle in the Nibelungen.59   
 
Nietzsche struck Wundt as an opportunistic apologist for the “religious mysticism” that claimed 
direct access to the world as Will through Wagner’s musical genius. While Wundt was 
criticizing the published Nietzsche for his mystical zeal, the other, doubtful Nietzsche was far 
from faithful to the Wagnerian cause.  
Porter has observed that the philological studies Nietzsche undertook between 1867 and 
1878 (especially his work on Democritus and the personality of Homer) contributed to his doubt 
that the historical past, like the objective world, was actually knowable by human historians.60 
Likewise, Emden has recently argued that during the same time Nietzsche’s studies of the natural 
sciences, and especially physiology, led him to the same kind of doubts about the accessibility of 
the natural world. Both these philological and physiological concerns contributed to his 
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intellectual split with Wagner.61 Nietzsche’s unpublished work during this time shows how his 
concern with the question of the accessibility of the objective world manifested in his doubts 
about whether or not it was possible to go from fragmentary sense impressions or historical 
documents into unified accounts of history or nature. Unities, or coherent narratives, could only 
be aesthetic, contingent constructs. Instead of Schopenhauer’s inspired genius whose monstrous 
intellect gave him privileged access to reality, the unpublished Nietzsche equated the profundity 
of genius to that of a gnat, equal in arrogance, and ignorance, in the face of the vast uncertainties 
of existence. It did not matter if humanity is blessed with geniuses, for: “when it is all over with 
the human intellect, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no additional mission 
which would lead it beyond human life. Rather, it is human, and only its possessor and begetter 
takes it so solemnly.”62 The published and unpublished Nietzsche used very different tones that 
responded to very different pressures, and yet they both typified the theme of fragmentation and 
the quest for wholeness. Nietzsche was not, of course, two different people and even his 
published works betray traces of the tension between the devoted Wagnerian and the doubtful 
philologist interested in critical history and natural science. This can be seen in his earliest major 
publication, The Birth of Tragedy. Here Nietzsche simultaneously reproduced Wagner’s 
arguments about the nature of genius, and how average intellects could never be in a position to 
question it, while also presenting a decidedly un-Wagernian vision of genius in the figure of the 
musical Socrates.   
The Birth of Tragedy (1872) was not only about ancient Greek theatre. In it Nietzsche 
used Schopenhauer’s understanding of the relationship between geniuses and non-geniuses to 
celebrate Wagner’s artistic accomplishments for heralding the rebirth of ancient Greek theatre. In 
the dedicatory address to Wagner Nietzsche wrote that: “as [I] hatched these ideas, [I] was 
communicating with you [Wagner] as if you were present, and hence could write down only 
what was in keeping with that presence.”63 Considering the content of Nietzsche’s unpublished 
works at the time, this statement is likely a sign of self-conscious self-censorship. At the very 
least, there are themes in this work that are particularly evocative of these tensions.  
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On the surface, The Birth of Tragedy examines a distinction Nietzsche made between the 
Dionysian and Apollonian drives. These opposing drives closely correspond to the world as Will 
and representation in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The Apollonian drive manifests itself in how 
human beings engage with the world of appearances, or representation, and in the inevitable way 
in which they conceptually separate things into either subject or object. This compulsion to 
categorize, shape and separate, without actually getting at the thing- in-itself lead Nietzsche to 
associate the Apollonian with the same physiological processes that caused humans to shape 
their own unrealities in the act of dreaming. Unlike in his later philosophy, here the creative side 
of the Apollonian is overshadowed by the fact that it can never access the thing-in- itself, but only 
the world as it appears, and because of this he associates it with the Hindu (and 
Schopenhauerian) concept of māyā, or the realm of illusions. By contrast, the Dionysian hero 
and Dionysian intoxication are the stand-ins for Schopenhauer’s genius and the leaps of reason 
that allowed them access to the objective world.64 Again drawing on physiological language, 
Nietzsche associated Dionysian drives with a state of intoxication that blurred the boundaries 
between subject and object. In this way it was the opposite of the separating and categorizing 
Apollonian drive and corresponded to the thing- in- itself (the will) in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. 
Having created this dichotomy, he then went about applying it to the tensions between geniuses 
and non-geniuses. As the hero (genius), Dionysius had a specific role to play vis-à-vis his 
spectators (non-geniuses). 
Nietzsche argued that the ideal spectator was the non-genius who was still able to 
appreciate works of genius, and who understood themselves to be symbolically members of the 
chorus. In this way they were able to share in the suffering of the hero-god on the stage and be 
reassured that the terrible destructiveness of the fragmentary world of becoming was 
counteracted by the unity and stability of art: “sharing his suffering it [the chorus] also shares 
something of his [the genius’] wisdom and proclaims the truth from the heart of the world.”65 
Implicitly, Nietzsche was defending Wagner’s ability to see into the heart of the objective world, 
and the elder composer’s desire for a group of followers capable of appreciating his genius. Even 
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while Nietzsche critiqued Euripides for bringing the spectator onstage and qualifying them to 
pass judgment on the drama, he nevertheless identified the ancient Greek playwright as a genius 
fighting against the tide of public opinion: 
Why should the artist be bound to accommodate himself to a power whose strength lies 
solely in numbers? […] If this genius [Euripides] had had the slightest reverence for the 
pandemonium of the public, he would have broken down long before the middle of his 
career, beneath the heavy blows of his failures.66  
 
Rhetorically, this passage strongly echoes the narratives of Schopenhauer’s and Wagner’s own 
trials and tribulations before they achieved public acclaim.67 This work repeats Schopenhauer’s 
arguments about genius as Nietzsche saw them reflected in the relationship between geniuses 
and non-genius in ancient Greek society. Implicitly, it was an argument about the “average” 
person’s inability to pass judgment on works of genius. It also repeated the way Schopenhauer 
described how the depersonalized dynamics of genius played out in the psyche of the individual 
artist. 
In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche repeated Schopenhauer’s denigration of the merely 
“subjective” artist whose only concern was his individual desires. In contrast, the artistic genius 
could silence his personal will in order to gain insight into the objective world.68 This is a point 
that Nietzsche felt he need to stress. While a lyrical genius, forced to express their genius 
through conventional language could poetically speak of an “I,” this “I” did not refer to 
themselves, but to the “only truly existent and eternal self resting at the basis of things,” an 
abstracted supra-personal “I.”69 The individual loving, hating, human being could not be a 
genius, and even when geniuses loved, hated, or expressed any human quality, the part of them 
that was a genius had no part to play in it, and was not influenced by it. It is thus telling that the 
desultory effects that the “theoretical man” had on genius was in part the way in which they 
attempted to reduce genius to the level of common human drives and desires.  
 Nietzsche’s discussion of the “theoretical man” was broad enough to encompass both 
Socrates and Nietzsche’s contemporary fellow scholars. Their common compulsion to separate 
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and categorize meant that they could not appreciate the “miraculous” insights of the suffering 
Dionysian hero or mystical genius, which were fundamentally holistic and intuitive instead of 
reductionist and analytical. As soon as critical historians attempted to look at myths historically, 
they lost their life and vitality:  
For this is the way in which religions are wont to die out: under the stern, intelligent eyes 
of an orthodox dogmatism, the mythical premises of a religion are systematized as a sum 
total of historical events; one begins apprehensively to defend the credibility of the 
myths, while at the same time one opposes any continuation of their natural vitality and 
growth; the feeling for myth perishes, and its place is taken by the claim of religion to 
historical foundations.70  
 
Nietzsche’s criticism of historical scholarship reflected his own doubts about the ability of 
philologists to access the past-in-itself. However, in this instance these doubts were bent to the 
service of Wagner’s glorification of myth as a “truer” artistic representation of the past-in-itself 
than was available to critical historians. Evoking Schopenhauer’s language of genius as a case of 
monstra per excessum, Nietzsche defined Socrates as the typical non-mystic, a hypertrophic 
antithesis to genius. Socrates possesses “a monstrous defectus of any mystical disposition […] in 
whom, through a hypertrophy, the logical nature is developed as excessively as instinctive 
wisdom is in the mystic.”71 This dedication to reductionism lead the theoretical man to view 
myth and tragic genius with suspicion, since a belief in myth and genius was tantamount to 
accepting that miracles were possible, that there could be causes without effects and effects 
without causes.72 In his early published works Nietzsche derided this criticism as nothing more 
than evidence of the theoretical man’s own pedantic inability to appreciate the spontaneous way 
in which the artistic genius could access the objective world. In private, however, he had already 
expressed grave doubts about the “miraculous leap” of genius into the objective world, spurred 
on, in part by his encounter with Lange. 
 
The Artistic Lange: Lange, Socrates, and Genius 
 
One of the reasons why it can be so difficult to parse the conflicting ideas present in 
Nietzsche’s early work on genius is because he often used the same terms to mean different 
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things. In keeping with his double life, this was a strategy Nietzsche used to simultaneously 
express his own thoughts while he presented them in ways that would be read by Wagner and 
Wagnerians as supporting their own agenda. At the same time Nietzsche seemed only half-aware 
of these tensions. Lange offered Nietzsche an alternative account of genius, creativity, art, and 
the limits of knowledge than those present in Schopenhauer, yet Nietzsche initially understood 
them to be in accordance with Schopenhauer’s philosophy. That Nietzsche moved away from 
much of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, but preserved in a modified form those ideas that were 
most reminiscent of Lange, shows that he became increasingly aware of these tensions as he 
began to more openly express his own views throughout the 1870s. This process is apparent in 
the figure of the artistic Socrates from The Birth of Tragedy, which represented Nietzsche’s 
covert move away from Wagner’s depersonalized vision of genius and towards a vision whose 
genius emerged from how they creatively navigated the limitations placed on them by their 
history, society, and physiology. 
 Nietzsche first read Lange’s History of Materialism and Critique of its Importance in the 
Present in 1866, well before he wrote The Birth of Tragedy and shortly after his discovery of 
Schopenhauer. He would return to it, in different editions, for the rest of his productive life.73 
The work is an encyclopedic study of materialism. Beginning with antiquity, it goes on to 
summarize, critique, and expand on many of the most pertinent scientific questions of the 
nineteenth century. Lange described the debates surrounding Greek and Roman natural 
philosophy, giving special place to theories of atomism. He also entertained the idea that the 
sophists may be justifiably called precursors to Kantian philosophy because of the way in which 
they made “man the measure of all things.”74 The work influenced how Nietzsche lectured on 
Greek philosophy, and his lecture on Democritus is one of the few public places where he 
explicitly praised Lange.75  
 Nietzsche’s early reception of Lange cannot be seen apart from his enthusiasm for 
Schopenhauer. In a letter to Gersdorff, he wrote: “What we possess in him [Schopenhauer] was 
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recently made quite clear to me by another work, which is excellent of its kind and very 
instructive: [Lange’s History of Materialism].”76 Nietzsche claimed that Lange demonstrated 
how the world available to the senses is the product of human organization, and that even the 
human ability to examine their organs of perception could only provide them with 
representations of an unknown object: the objective world. The consequence of this is that 
objectively their organization was as unknown, and unknowable, as the objective world itself of 
which the human body formed a part. Instead of finding coherence in nature, humans could only 
ever create it in accordance with their own physical limitations, and this creative act placed 
philosophy and natural science on the same level as art. Nietzsche concluded from this that: 
[T]he true essence of things –the thing- in- itself– is not only unknown to us; the 
concept of it is neither more nor less than the final product of an antithesis which is 
determined by our organization, an antithesis of which we do not know whether it has 
any meaning outside our experience or not.  
Consequently, Lange thinks, one should give the philosophers a free hand as long as 
they edify us in this sense. Art is free, also in the domain of concepts. Who would refute 
a phrase by Beethoven, and who would find error in Raphael’s Madonna? 
You see, even with this strictly critical standpoint our Schopenhauer stands firm; 
he becomes even almost more important to us. If philosophy is art, then even Haym [the 
historical critic] should submit himself to Schopenhauer; if philosophy should edify, I 
know no more edifying philosopher than our Schopenhauer.77 
 
Yet, as has already been shown, for Schopenhauer the noumenal was knowable as Will. By 
conflating the two positions Nietzsche was smoothing over important differences that he would 
later emphasize when he made his formal break with Schopenhauer’s philosophy. This also 
shows the associations Nietzsche made between Lange and Schopenhauer when it came to 
questions about the relationship between art and philosophy, and how physiological organization 
shaped the human ability to interpret the world and judge the works of genius.  
Much has been made of Nietzsche’s introduction of the “artistic Socrates” in the Birth of 
Tragedy.78 The figure seemed to represent the self-overcoming of the theoretical man, whose 
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consistent adherence to reductionist logic eventually led them back around to an appreciation of 
the role that art played in revealing the “miraculous” unity of existence. Some scholars still 
follow in Kaufmann’s footsteps by considering the artistic Socrates to be a cipher standing in for 
Nietzsche himself. While there is likely some truth to this claim, a more compelling argument 
can be made. Lange provided the model for the artistic Socrates. Lange held to the same 
scholarly standards that Nietzsche had identified in his Wagnerian critiques of the “theoretical 
man,” yet employed these methods to show how creativity and art were the basis of philosophy 
and knowledge. This was how, as the theoretical man, Lange first killed, and then set the stage 
for the rebirth of tragic art. Nietzsche initially understood Lange’s philosophy as a powerful 
defence of the privileged position of the inspired artist in Schopenhauer’s worldview. It is no 
surprise that Lange’s thoughts about the limits of reductionist and materialist logic would show 
up in Nietzsche’s arguments about the self-overcoming of the theoretical man in the Birth of 
Tragedy.  
Nietzsche has the artistic Socrates represent a series of very specific doubts: the question 
of whether or not what is unintelligible is necessarily unintelligent, whether there can be wisdom 
without logic, whether or not art was necessary for science [Wissenschaft], and whether or not 
strict causal reasoning can lead to an understanding of the “deepest abysses of being.”79 
Importantly, these were doubts that Nietzsche had already encountered in Lange. As Lange had 
written years earlier: 
Kant would not understand, what Plato before him would not understand, that the 
‘intelligible world’ is a world of poesy, and that precisely upon this fact rests its worth 
and nobleness. For poesy, in the high and comprehensive sense in which it must be taken, 
cannot be regarded as a capricious playing of talent and fancy with empty imginations 
[sic] for amusement, but it is a necessary offspring of the soul, arising from the deepest 
life-roots of the race, and a complete counterbalance to the pessimism which springs from 
an exclusive acquaintance with reality.80  
 
Lange gave a special place to the constructive intellectual role of art and myth in light of the 
limitations of materialism as a metaphysical system. When Nietzsche described myth as the 
consequence and purpose of science, or how science turns into art, he was employing Lange’s 
particularly reflective neo-Kantian analysis of the limits of reductionism and materialism. This is 
why Lange was likely one of the people Nietzsche would have considered as the “noble and 
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gifted men” who “see to their horror how logic coils up at these boundaries [of knowledge] and 
finally bites its own tail – suddenly the new form of insight breaks through, tragic insight which, 
merely to be endured, needs art as a protection and remedy.”81 In Lange, Nietzsche encountered 
many critiques of the limits of knowledge. Yet Lange emphatically did not think of himself as 
one of Schopenhauer’s disciples, and it is telling that his vision of genius differed from 
Schopenhauer’s in ways that Nietzsche would adopt after his break with Wagner with the 
publication of Human, All Too Human.  
 Unlike Schopenhauer’s genius, Lange’s genius did not gaze into the “deepest abysses of 
being,” but instead gave voice to the yearning of their age for its own creative vision of unity and 
perfection. While there are definite limits placed on human understanding by the categories of 
causality, space, and time:  
We are constituted not merely to know, but also to imagine and construct; and though 
with more or less mistrust of the definite validity of what the understanding and the 
senses have to offer us, yet mankind will ever hail with joy the man who understands 
how, by the force of genius, and by employing all the constructive impulses of his era, to 
create the unity in the world and in our intellectual life which is denied to our knowledge. 
This creation will, indeed, be only the expression of the yearning of the age after unity 
and perfection; yet even this is no small thing, for the maintenance and nourishment of 
our intellectual life is as important as science itself, although not so lasting as this is: 
since the investigation of the details of positive knowledge, and of the relations which are 
the exclusive objects of our knowledge, is absolute, owing to its method, while the 
speculative apprehension of the absolute can only claim a relative importance as the 
expression of the views of an epoch.82  
 
Lange argued that for Kant, the faculty of reason was what made possible a unity of the 
noumenal world beyond human experience, while imagination was the faculty that produced the 
unity of sensory experience. However, Lange claimed that he was more doubtful about the role 
of reason in producing these unities, and instead attributed both kinds of unity to the imaginative 
faculty. The imaginative genius, aware of the limitations placed upon knowledge, nevertheless 
was able to create a vision of unity that was historically contingent and human. Nietzsche drew a 
great deal of inspiration for his “musical Socrates” from his interpretation of the self-overcoming 
of the theoretical man that he read in Lange. Yet this inspiration also subverted the tragic 
                                                 
81 Nietzsche, “Birth of Tragedy,” 97-8. 
82 Lange, History of Materialism, 90-1. 
 40 
understanding of art that Nietzsche claimed to be defending with it. Lange’s own account of 
Socrates was quite different. 
 Lange argued that Socrates was an important example of creative self-fashioning, whose 
self-control was “not the tranquility of a nature which has nothing to control, but the 
preponderance of a great mind over strong sensual traits and a naturally passionate 
temperament.”83 Socrates was one of the examples of a genius whose philosophy of life arose out 
of a struggle with themselves and their context. Lange stressed that “it is impossible to separate 
the men from the doctrines, the purely philosophical elements from the whole intellectual 
movement, if we wish to understand why certain philosophical innovations [as those of Socrates 
and other Greek philosophers] could attain such an important significance.”84 As opposed to 
Schopenhauer, Lange claimed that Socrates’ genius would not be diminished by historical 
critique. Instead, a clearer understanding of these historical dimensions was the very prerequisite 
for being able to see what genius was and how it came to be. As Lange argued: “So long as we 
do not possess very careful biographies of the chief leaders of scientific progress, which take 
account of the whole man, the ground beneath our feet is very uncertain.”85 This emphasis on 
context was an important step in Nietzsche’s understanding of how a thinker’s personal historical 
and organic development was recapitulated in their metaphysical worldviews. It is even possible 
to see Nietzsche arriving at some of these conclusions in his lectures on the pre-platonic 
philosophers. 
 
Lange’s Comparisons and von Baer’s lecture “Which Conception of Living Nature is the 
Correct One?” 
 
From 1869 to 1872 (the year that the Birth of Tragedy was published) Nietzsche gave a 
lecture series on The Pre-Platonic Philosophers. His reading of Lange heavily influenced the 
series. Lange presented Nietzsche with a likely model for the figure of the artistic Socrates with 
his discussion of how the limits of reductionism and materialist thought, limits that were based in 
our physiological organization, lent a new, if relative, value to the creative genius of art and 
myth. In The Pre-Platonic Philosophers Nietzsche presented a more refined argument about the 
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relationship between myth and physiological relativism. He argued that antiquity first used myth 
to anthropomorphically explain causality in a way that made causality equivalent to sudden, 
almost miraculous human acts of will. This was also very much in keeping with how Nietzsche 
described myth in The Birth of Tragedy. Yet in The Pre-Platonic Philosophers he claimed that 
this view of myth was supplanted when ancient philosophers such as Democritus began 
considering how metaphysical claims, such as the question of whether being or becoming were 
primary in nature, were shaped by physiological limitations. The celebration of myth was then a 
self-conscious acknowledgment that the world that humans described would always be a human 
world, as creatively inspired as it was limited by human perceptions. Yet instead of referencing 
Democritus, or some other philosopher from antiquity, Nietzsche referenced Karl Ernst von 
Baer’s 1860 lecture “Which Conception of Living Nature is the Correct One?” to demonstrate 
this point. Drawing on the comparative physiology examined by Lange and von Baer The Pre-
Platonic Philosophers and “On Truth and Lies” explored how humans brought forth forms of 
creative genius and mythological accounts of nature, morality, and history, with the same 
necessity with which spiders spin their webs, or bees build their hives. Nietzsche accepted von 
Baer’s relativistic account of perception even while he rejected the naturalist’s teleological 
account of how all of nature existed for the benefit of human beings. Instead, he employed von 
Baer’s and Lange’s examples to highlight the limita tions of human self-knowledge, further 
undermining the basis of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Throughout the 1870s the “two 
Nietzsches” steadily grew closer and closer together until they fully merged with the publication 
of Human, All Too Human in 1878. At the same time as Nietzsche was criticizing his scholarly 
and scientific colleagues for being uninspired, anti-geniuses, and theoretical men, he was 
privately sharing in their critical project, doubt, and relativistic distrust of absolutes. 
Understanding Nietzsche’s unpublished concerns from the early 1870s will help shed light on the 
traces of this merging in Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations (1873-1876).    
Nietzsche highlighted the circularities of materialists thought in his lectures on The Pre-
Platonic Philosophers. He began by highlighting how the Greek philosopher Zeno showed the 
ways in which space and time were realities for human beings, but were not valid outside of this 
human frame of reference. As soon as philosophers tried to make space and time absolutes, they 
found that “extremely relativistic opinions [were] reinterpreted as universal laws.”86 Taken to 
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their logical conclusions these opinions became contradictory when presented as eternal truths or 
aeternae veritates. Nietzsche continued this relativistic line of inquiry in his account of 
Democritus and the atomists. He argued that for Democritus two things were necessary if the 
senses were actually going to provide human beings with knowledge of the world itself: The 
sense impression had to be strong enough to be perceived and humans had to have a 
corresponding receptive organ that would be able to interpret the impression as sensation. 
However, since only like can be sensed by like in this way: “The result is that we do not perceive 
much of what is perceptible, because it does not correspond to our senses, and that it could be 
[perceived] by beings with senses other than our own.”87 Here, Nietzsche paraphrases 
Schopenhauer’s criticism of materialism, but he does so along with Lange’s defence of the 
relative value of materialism as a method:88   
All things objective, extended, and efficacious, thus all things material, which qualify as 
the most solid of foundations to materialism—[all this] is nonetheless only an extremely 
mediated given, an extremely relative existence that has passed through the machinery of 
the brain and has entered into the forms of time, space, and causality, by dint of which it 
is presented as extended in space and working in time. Well, the materialist wants to 
deduce the truly immediate given —representation— out of a given of this sort. It is an 
incredibly circular argument (petitio principii): the final member suddenly reveals itself 
as the point of departure, on which the first element of the chain is already hung. […] The 
absurdity consists in this, that he proceeds from objectivity, while in truth everything 
objective is conditioned by the knowing subject in multifarious ways and consequently 
vanishes entirely whenever the subject is denied. On the contrary, materialism is a 
worthwhile hypothesis of relativity in truth; accordingly, ‘all is false’ has been discovered 
to be an illuminating notion for natural science. We still consider, then, all its results to 
be truth for us, albeit not absolute. It is precisely our world, in whose production we are 
constantly engaged.89 
 
The critiques of the circularity of materialist thought in The Birth of Tragedy, how it ultimately 
comes back around to show its own limitations, is repeated in this passage from his unpublished 
works. Here, Nietzsche’s defence of materialism as a “hypothesis of relativity in truth” would 
inform the image of the “musical Socrates.” He also articulated two very different definitions of 
myth in these two projects.  
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Nietzsche’s account of myth differs radically between the Birth of Tragedy and The Pre-
Platonic Philosophers. In his lectures he described myth as an attempt to “understand all 
transformation following an analogy to human behaviour, to human acts of will.”90 Myth was an 
anthropomorphic way of explaining causality that made causality analogous to a human will. 
This is a far cry from how he described tragic myth’s ability to provide insight into the “deepest 
abysses of being” in The Birth of Tragedy. While ancient Greek figures such as Empedocles did 
productively mix mythic and scientific modes of thinking, this led to the eventual rejection of 
myth as a method of investigating the natural world.91 Science, and a rigorous understanding of 
the role played by necessity in nature, was born with atomism: 
Of all the more ancient systems, the Democritean is of the greatest consequence. The 
most rigorous necessity is presupposed in all things: there are no sudden or strange 
violations of nature’s course. Now for the first time the collective, anthropomorphic, 
mythic view of the world has been overcome.92  
 
The same year Nietzsche wrote The Birth of Tragedy he had already turned his own “Cyclops’s 
eye” on myth, citing, not Socrates, but Democritus as his predecessor.93 However, it is important 
to note that there are two notions of myth playing themselves out between these two texts. The 
one, which Democritus is said to have done away with, is the anthropomorphizing effect of myth 
as a mysterious cipher standing in for causation, allowing for natural occurrences to be explained 
as sudden, miraculous changes only understandable as acts of will. The other form of myth, 
following Lange, is the self-consciously creative ability to make unities in the world, which one 
nevertheless realizes are only unities relative to human beings.  
 Nietzsche argued that the demythologization of nature began when ancient philosopher s 
began exploring how metaphysical beliefs were shaped by physiological limitations. This was 
particularly the case with the philosophical question of whether or not being or becoming was 
primary in nature. Lange had already given Nietzsche an account of why early peoples thought 
the fixed stars were immovable because of the vast scales involved in measuring their 
movements.94 Repeatedly, in the lecture series Nietzsche called those who studied nature in 
Ancient Greece Physiologen. These Physiologen had free spirits: 
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The free spirit surveys things, and now for the first time mundane existence appears to it 
worthy of contemplation as a problem. That is the true characteristic of the philosophical 
drive: wonderment at that which lies before everyone. […] Becoming, purpose, 
knowledge – the contents of pre-Platonic philosophy.95  
 
The approach taken by these free spirited Physiologen reminded Nietzsche of the approach taken 
in the natural science in the nineteenth century. Both periods wrestled with the idea that 
“whenever a human being believes he recognizes any sort of persistence in living nature, it is due 
to our small standards.”96 This applied to the patterns of the fixed stars, geological processes, and 
other aspects of deep time, as well as processes that happened too quickly to be perceived. 
Nietzsche cited a dramatic example employed by the von Baer in his 1860 lecture “Which 
Conception of Living Nature is the Correct One?” Nietzsche paraphrased von Baer’s 
“remarkable thought experiment” and described how:  
The rates of sensation and of voluntary movements, thus of conscious life, appear among 
various animals to be approximately proportional to their pulse rates. Well then! Since, 
for example, the pulse rate among rabbits is four times faster than among cattle, these 
will also experience four times as much in the same time period and will be able to carry 
out for times as many acts of the will as cattle—thus, in general, experiencing four times 
as much. The inner life of various animal species (including humans) proceeds through 
the same astronomical time-space at different specific rates, and it is according to these 
that they subjectively and variously judge the fundamental standard of time. For this 
reason alone, only because for us this fundamental standard is small, does an organic 
individual, a plant or an animal, appear to us as something remaining at one size and in 
one shape, for we could observe it one hundred times or more in a minute without 
noticing any external alterations.97 
 
Nietzsche went on to paint a dramatic picture of what the world would look like to a creature 
with perceptions thousands of times faster, or slower, than our own, and how this would go on to 
influence whether or not such a creature would tend to think of being or becoming as the 
metaphysically more primary experience in nature. This is a remarkable passage that speaks to 
the same series of doubts that lay behind “On Truth and Lies,.” Von Baer’s essay offers a 
number of insights that Nietzsche would later take up more publicly in Human, All Too Human. 
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Nietzsche seldom mentioned von Baer explicitly: he only did so once in his lectures on 
The Pre-Platonic Philosophers and once in Human, All Too Human (1878) where von Baer was 
described favourably as “the great naturalist.”98 Von Baer’s physiological and embryological 
researches took on a decidedly neo-Kantian tone in his efforts to preserve the distinction between 
organic and inorganic matter.99 His interest in comparative anatomy and physiology, as well as 
his search for fundamental organic archetypes (Grundformen) was also greatly influenced by his 
reading of the French naturalist Georges Cuvier (1769-1832).100 Cuvier and his comparative 
approach were vital for Schopenhauer’s understanding of the physiology and anatomy. The 
World as Will and Representation and On the Will in Nature make frequent reference to both 
Cuvier and von Baer. Nietzsche seems to have been primarily interested in how von Baer’s 
critiques of materialism employed comparative physiology and the relativity of sensation and 
perception. However, he would come to repudiate the older naturalist’s teleological placement of 
humans at the center of creation.  
 In the lecture “Which Conception of Living Nature is the Correct One?” von Baer rallied 
a swarm of spiders, mosquitoes, butterflies, bees, and ants to demonstrate the inner working of 
the economy of nature (Haushalt der Natur). Von Baer employed metaphors about the lives of 
mosquitoes, spiders, bees and other creatures to demonstrate points about the cycling of nutrients 
through nature, the limitations of the physiology of sensation and perception, the relationship 
between an organism’s inner and outer world, and the meaning of drives and instincts. Nietzsche 
challenged and adapted these metaphors in his essay “On Truth and Lies” (1873). Von Baer 
began his lecture with an account of nutrition, and the ways in which organic matter was cycled 
through nature from the sun, to plants, to “lower” and then “higher” forms of life, which then 
also passed away and provided sustenance once again for “lower” forms of life. However, von 
Baer sought to clarify that his account was not entirely circular, for “this eternal transformation 
of matter, it is really the means by which matter is perfected and refined” leading it to some 
higher purpose in the human being.101 He used the case of the mosquito [Mücke] to demonstrate 
this point, recalling a story about a woman he once met who had asked him why mosquitoes 
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were created: “‘For what purpose were the bothersome mosquitoes created?’ a woman asked me 
once, who had just been afflicted by these intrusive visitors. ‘So that we can have more fish in 
our fresh waters,’ I had to answer.”102 Von Baer argued that European civilization would not 
have been possible without mosquitoes, since early peoples depended almost exclusively upon 
fish for their diet, and a large part of the diet of fresh water fish were the free swimming larvae 
of mosquitoes. Nietzsche inverted this argument about mosquitoes existing for human beings at 
the beginning of “On Truth and Lies.” Yet he did so while maintaining von Baer’s larger 
argument about the limitation of human perception that followed after it.    
 Von Baer argued that human sensory experience and human scales placed limits on what 
humans could perceive and measure. This brought him to the discussion about heart rate and 
perception that Nietzsche paraphrased in his lectures on The Pre-Platonic Philosophers. 
However, whereas Nietzsche used von Baer’s argument as an example of physiological 
relativism, von Baer stressed that it was still possible to evaluate the approximate objectivity of 
impressions based upon the scale of the organism that had them. Since nature worked with 
unlimited time in unlimited space, creatures with larger organs making observations over longer 
periods of time would be in a privileged position to understand the objective world. For von 
Baer: “The scale for their activity can never be too great, only always too small.”103  
 This emphasis on larger perceptions over longer periods of time meant that von Baer was 
committed to a view of nature in which becoming was primary over being. Only the underlying 
patterns of organic forms remained more or less stable. Yet he softened this potentially overly-
materialistic account by encouraging his listeners to hope for the immortality of the soul, 
reminding them that while the human body may be animal, human culture and history were more 
enduring. He employed a sort of parable to demonstrate this point. A person in the woods hears 
the sound of a horn playing music, but is chided by a nearby spider that the “music” was not 
music as humans understood it, but was clearly nothing more than the rhythmic vibration of the 
horn, something the spider could perceive. Von Baer claimed that the spider was correct as far as 
it could perceive, but that there was a higher level of understanding available to someone who 
could also hear the melody, and a higher one still to someone who could read the sheet music for 
the song being played. Von Baer used this parable to cast doubt on materialistic accounts of 
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mind and soul. Simply because materialists could not see and measure something did not mean 
that it did not exist.104 This discussion of semi-tangible patterns leads him to his discussion of 
insect’s instincts and drives and how they related to human instincts and drives.   
 Von Baer claimed that the study of instincts and drives was one of the most important 
duties of the entomological society because “it must foster consideration for the intellectual 
[geistigen] side of nature.”105 He reasoned that there were different degrees of will in nature and 
different degrees of self-control.106 Human beings were at the pinnacle of this hierarchy, for their 
instincts did not express themselves as necessities, but as moral imperatives. Humans were not 
only self-conscious, they were conscious of the difference between themselves and the external 
world around them and the ways that they could act upon the world or upon themselves. This is 
why von Baer called the ideas of “what should be done,” “conscience,” or “belief” “the highest 
form of instincts” that made progress in a historical sense possible.107 Human beings had a 
fundamental drive to metaphysical and moral speculation. Von Baer felt that this demonstrated 
the freedom of the will and the insufficiency of materialistic accounts of nature. Nietzsche 
agreed with von Baer about the limits of a purely materialist account of nature, but disagreed 
with him about how an instinctual drive to metaphysical and moral speculation supported a 
defence of the freedom of the will, or of human’s higher capacity to understand themselves 
relative to the rest of nature.  
 In “On Truth and Lies” (1873) Nietzsche presented a critique of knowledge that was 
influenced in part by his reading of Lange and von Baer. It hinged upon the limitations imposed 
upon human knowledge by the physiology of their sense organs and the role that instinctual 
drives to construct metaphors played in obscuring these limitations.108 He called the drive to 
form metaphors: “the fundamental human drive, which we cannot for a single instant dispense 
with in thought, for one would thereby dispense with man himself.”109 However, Nietzsche 
compared this “fundamental human drive” to the instinctually driven activity of a spider building 
                                                 
104 Ibid., 271-3. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., 276. 
107 Ibid., 282. 
108 Compare, for instance, Nietzsche’s critique of “identical things” with Lange’s criticism of mathematical 
abstractions: Lange, The History of Materialism, 175. 
109 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 121. 
 48 
its web, for metaphor was both the product and the context of human activity. This is an image 
that he would continue to use throughout his career. 
 In a neo-Kantian vein, Nietzsche claimed that “we produce these representations [of 
causality, time and space] in and from ourselves with the same necessity with which the spider 
spins.”110 While this act of spinning was the driving force behind the human need for myth and 
art, it also made the idea of absolute knowledge seem increasingly absurd. Humanity would 
inevitably find in the world exactly what its categories of understanding hid there for it to find. 
Reflecting on the way the Romans and Etruscans placed their gods in a seemingly arbitrary 
astronomical pattern of “rigid mathematical lines,” Nietzsche argued that every people set up an 
equally arbitrary conceptual heaven above them and then went about looking for absolute truths 
within it. 
Here one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in 
piling up an infinitely complicated dome of concepts upon an unstable foundation, and, 
as it were, on running water. Of course, in order to be supported by such a foundation, his 
construction must be like one constructed of spiders’ webs: delicate enough to be carried 
along by the waves, strong enough not to be blown apart by every wind. As a genius of 
construction man raises himself far above the bee in the following way: whereas the bee 
builds with wax that he gathers from nature, man builds with the far more delicate 
conceptual material which he first has to manufacture from himself. In this he is greatly 
to be admired, but not on account of his drive for truth or for pure knowledge of things. 
When someone hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in the same place 
and finds its there as well, there is not much to praise in such seeking and finding. Yet 
this is how matters stand regarding seeking and finding ‘truth’ within the realm of 
reason.111 
 
Nietzsche’s use of animal imagery is important here and is strikingly evocative of von Baer’s 
essay. Nietzsche began “On Truth and Lies” with a description of a mosquito imagining that it 
had “the flying center of the universe within” itself. Here he was turning von Baer’s teleological 
explanation that mosquitoes exist so that humans can have more fresh water fish to eat around to 
argue that if mosquitoes could reason, they would likely imagine that humans existed for their 
benefit. Nietzsche’s discussions of spiders and bees also subverted metaphors originally found in 
von Baer’s lecture, as well as the materialism against which they were supposed to be directed.  
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 In his parable von Baer sought to undermine the epistemic authority of the spider 
(materialists) that could see vibrations, but not hear music. The spider was compelled to build 
webs, so it could not help but see everything in terms of vibrations. He juxtaposed the limited 
instincts of the spider with those of bees, whose capacity to build “states” with queens and gather 
more nutrients than they needed for their own subsistence showed that their instincts were not 
reducible to the instincts of a single individual. Von Baer suggested that there was a more 
fundamental pattern behind the activities of the bees as a collective, a semi-tangible instinct that 
was more like the rhythm or melody of a song than the mere vibration of the trumpet playing 
it.112 He compared these instincts to the more rarefied moral instincts possessed by humans: 
“what should be done,” “conscience,” and “belief,” and even a religious “call to the universal 
source of being.”113 However, Nietzsche had other intentions in blurring the lines between the 
creative drives of bees and humans. In “On Truth and Lies” he instead argued how even such 
rarefied instincts could not avoid the problems facing those of the spider and its web. Simply 
because humans have a metaphysical “call to the universal source of being” does not mean that 
such a drive was capable of leading them to anything like an absolute truth about the world.  
 Nietzsche’s use of animal imagery in “On Truth and Lies” was also notable because of 
the way it drew on contemporary discussions of comparative anatomy and physiology that could 
be found in von Baer’s writings as well as in Lange’s discussion of physiology in The History of 
Materialism.114 Lange compared how a tree would be experienced by a worm, a June bug, a man, 
and an angel, and asked if this would mean that there were five trees, one as seen by each 
different creature and one “tree-in-itself.”115 He answered this in the negative, stating that while 
there were four very different conceptions of the tree, they nevertheless referred to the same, 
unknowable thing- in- itself. What sets man apart was that: “by the comparison of his organs with 
those of the animal world and by physiological investigations, he succeeds in regarding his own 
conception as being just as imperfect and one-sided as those of the different kinds of animals.”116 
For Lange this form of comparison reinforced the need for the neo-Kantian position on the 
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inscrutability of the thing- in- itself. Nietzsche would take an even more radical message from 
these physiological comparisons, asserting that they demonstrated that there was no meaningful 
way of talking about things- in-themselves. One could only talk about the aesthetic relationship 
between things.  
 Nietzsche followed Schopenhauer’s critique of a causal relationship between the thing- in-
itself and things as human’s experience them while maintaining that there was no way to 
experience the thing- in-itself as will. Beyond this, he critiqued “the invincible faith” in things- in-
themselves laying behind human experience altogether. Such rarified ideas as the sun-in-itself, 
window-in- itself, table-in-itself, etc., were beliefs that were only possible when one forgot that 
humans were “artistically creating” subjects:  
It is even a difficult thing for [man] to admit to himself that the insect or the bird 
perceives an entirely different world from the one that man does, and that the question of 
which of these perceptions of the world is the more correct one is quite meaningless, for 
this would have to have been decided previously in accordance with the criterion of the 
correct perception, which means, in accordance with a criterion which is not available. 
But in any case it seems to me that ‘the correct perception’ – which would mean ‘the 
adequate expression of an object in the subject’ – is a contradictory impossibility. For 
between two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no 
causality, no correctness, and no expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation.117 
 
Nietzsche thus redefined knowledge as a form of aesthetic invention and interpretation whose 
limits were the limits of human perception. These aesthetic inventions were not entirely free, for 
they were conditioned by the physiological, psychological, and historical contingencies of 
human life. Indeed, despite Nietzsche’s critiques of history in the Untimely Meditations (1873-
1876), in “On Truth and Lies” he made historical contingencies primary to psychology and 
physiology ones. Physiological impressions were themselves historical assessments of pleasure 
or pain that became physiologically engrained only after millions of repetitions handed down 
through generations. 118 Eventually these assessments become so conditioned that it appeared as 
if the nerve stimulus was the cause of the image presented to the eye. This served as further 
proof for Nietzsche that the working of the human body was still poorly understood.  
As early as 1868, in his unfinished dissertation on The Organic After Kant, Nietzsche 
questioned the supposedly self-evident relationship between the human will and human actions. 
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In these notes he repeated Lange’s claims that a human’s sense of purpose and causation was 
conditioned by their organization as organic beings. Like Lange’s genius, Nietzsche reflected 
that the human understanding of the world as a coherent whole only emerged from their yearning 
for unity and their projection of unity into nature and experience.119 Like Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche placed the origin of human understanding of self and world in the human body. Unlike 
Schopenhauer, he claimed that this understanding was an illusion. He expressed similar 
sentiments in “On Truth and Lies” five years later:  
What does man actually know about himself? Is he, indeed, ever able to perceive himself 
completely, as if laid out in a lighted display case? Does nature not conceal most things 
from him – even concerning his own body – in order to confine and lock him within a 
proud, deceptive consciousness, aloof from the coils of the bowels, the rapid flow of the 
blood stream, and the intricate quivering of the fibres!120  
 
When a person moves a limb they really have very little idea about how their volition brought 
about the motion. Nietzsche would explicitly question this image again in Beyond Good and Evil 
(1886).121 He continued to explore the limitations of human self-knowledge, and how these 
limits related to the human body throughout the 1870s and 1880s. The human understanding of 
the body and its actions was made up of the same metaphysical cobwebs and drives for unity and 
meaning as their understanding of the rest of the natural world. On the surface of it, in his next 
collection of published works, the Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche showed relatively little 
interest in the limits of self-knowledge, being much more concerned with Bildung and self-
fashioning. However, there are many places in these works where the doubt he highlighted in 
“On Truth and Lies” continued to show through in his published writings, even while he was 
claiming to support Wagner and the Wagnerian sense of genius. 
 
 The Timely Meditations  
 
The relationship between physiological relativism and creative genius that Nietzsche 
explored in his unpublished writings of the early 1870s became more and more overt in his 
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published works. This movement can be seen in his Untimely Meditations. Published between 
1873 and 1876 the Untimely Meditations increasingly revealed the tensions in his thoughts about 
the nature of genius, and the relationship that genius had to history and nature. The first 
meditation “David Strauss, The Confessor and Writer,” was published in 1873, followed by “On 
the Use and Abuse of History for Life” in 1874, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” also published in 
1874, and “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” which appeared in 1876.  
“David Strauss,” was a polemical gift to Wagner and largely maintained the ideas about 
genius that Nietzsche had already expressed in The Birth of Tragedy.122 David Strauss (1808-
1874) was a German theologian whose 1835 historical investigation of Jesus in his Life of Jesus, 
Critically Examined helped Nietzsche through the process of giving up his Christianity. Despite 
his harsh critiques in “David Strauss,” upon news of Strauss’ death in 1874 Nietzsche hoped that 
the aged scholar had not even seen his polemic. Strauss had seen it, yet instead of being 
dismayed, he expressed confusion over the bile of the attack.123 This was likely because Strauss 
the individual was not entirely the intended target of the polemic. Instead, the text was calculated 
to be an attack on critical historians in general and their pernicious effects on the belief in genius.  
 Nietzsche’s work on Strauss makes one thing abundantly clear: Strauss was not a 
genius.124 Strauss is presented as the arch-Bildungsphilister “cultivated philistine,” the very 
antithesis of genius. His superficial smattering of historical and scientific scholarship, desire for 
comfort, and worship of utility and progress led him and his followers to a grotesque level of 
enervated self-satisfaction, but not to “true” culture. Nietzsche defined culture in “David Strauss” 
as the “unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people,” and concluded that “a 
people to whom one attributes a culture has to be in all reality a single living unity and not fall 
wretchedly apart into inner and outer, content and form.”125 Despite what he had written that 
same year about the impossibility of any knowledge of the thing-in- itself in “On Truth and Lies,” 
in “David Strauss” he continued to follow Schopenhauer and Wagner in their elevation of the 
genius as a figure capable of holistically and intuitively uniting the subjective and objective 
worlds.  
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Nietzsche also repeated his attack on the “theoretical man” in “David Strauss.” Just as the 
unmusical Socrates of The Birth of Tragedy looked on miracles and myth with suspicion because 
they were suspensions of the laws of cause and effect, the philistine hated the genius: “for the 
genius [had] the justified reputation of performing miracles.”126 In this defence of miracles, 
Nietzsche was once again defending Wagner’s belief that the genius had miraculous or mythical 
access to the objective world through his holistic intuitions. It also supported Wagner’s stance on 
the miraculous freedom of artistic genius over and against the determinism of natural and 
historical laws.127 Nietzsche’s continued public support of these Wagnerian doctrines would start 
to show cracks with the 1874 appearance of his second Untimely Meditation, “On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life.” 
 “On the Uses and Disadvantages” was partly a repetition of Nietzsche’s attack on the 
“theoretical man” or Bildungsphilister. Even though he did not explicitly use the term “genius” 
in this text it was also a critique of the ways that the Wagnerian artistic genius, the “great man,” 
could be destructive to history.128 Drawing from the same imagery he used in “Truth and Lies,” 
in “On the Uses and Disadvantages” Nietzsche described how artistic geniuses refashioned 
fragments of history to weave isolated events into unified artworks. The artist works: “always 
with the presupposition that if a unity of plan does not already reside in things it must be 
implanted into them. Thus man spins his web over the past and subdues it, thus he gives 
expression to his artistic drive – but not to his drive towards truth or justice.”129 This indifference 
to truth and justice is revealing. The artistic genius did not have any privileged access to truth or 
justice. This shows how some of Nietzsche’s doubts about Wagner and Schopenhauer were 
already becoming visible in 1874. This was not the only way that the text challenged their 
accounts of genius.  
Nietzsche opened “On the Uses and Disadvantages” with a presentation of history as a 
physiological phenomenon. Genius depended upon an individual’s ability to assimilate the things 
of the past. This was demonstrated by whether or not one could “develop out of oneself in one’s 
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own way.”130 This definition of genius prefigured the account of creative self-limitation that 
Nietzsche would later present in “Schopenhauer as Educator,” and paralleled Lange’s discussion 
of the ability of “the greatest men of every epoch” to reconcile within themselves the 
contradictions of their times.131 Nietzsche used a number of organic metaphors of self-regulation, 
assimilation, and growth, in this account of genius. Humans did not have only one given nature 
(as one would expect from Schopenhauer’s philosophy) but also a second one that they crafted 
for themselves out of the contingencies and injustices of their first natures and histories in much 
the same way that a spider created the web in which it lived or the bee created its hive. Instead of 
Schopenhauer’s idea of inborn greatness, Nietzsche argued that history could actually be used to 
refashion oneself. Everything that existed was the outcome of earlier generations, which, 
inevitably also contained many aberrations, passions, and errors: 
[I]t is not possible wholly to free oneself from this chain. If we condemn these 
aberrations and regard ourselves as free of them, this does not alter the fact that we 
originate in them. The best we can do is to confront our inherited and hereditary nature 
with our knowledge, and through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and 
implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature 
withers away. It is an attempt to give oneself, as it were a posteriori, a past in which one 
would like to originate in opposition to that in which one did originate: - always a 
dangerous attempt because it is so hard to know the limit to denial of the past and 
because second natures are usually weaker than first. What happens all too often is that 
we know the good but do not do it, because we also know the better but cannot do it. But 
here and there a victory is nonetheless achieved, and for the combatants, for those who 
employ critical history for the sake of life, there is even a noteworthy consolation: that of 
knowing that this first nature was once a second nature and that every victorious second 
nature will become a first.132 
 
Schopenhauer’s genius became great because they were great, it was only a question of whether 
or not the environment was sufficiently nourishing for them to survive to adulthood. Once the 
seed had “taken” it would grow. In the above passage Nietzsche was arguing instead that genius 
was a kind of self-fashioning and assimilation of the past. By taking on a second nature it was 
possible to overcome the many inevitable accidents and limitations of one’s first nature. In this 
passage Nietzsche rejected Schopenhauer’s dismissal of biography as a useful way to understand 
the origin of genius. Instead, he argued that genius emerged from the genius’ resistance to, not 
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indifference to, their context. Of the four Untimely Meditations, “The Uses and Disadvantages” 
was unsurprisingly Wagner’s least favourite. The composer complained that Nietzsche would 
have done better to write something about Schopenhauer “from a pedagogical point of view.”133 
This set the stage for the third meditation, also published in 1874: “Schopenhauer as Educator.” 
Despite Nietzsche overtly seemingly to comply with Wagner’s wishes, from “Schopenhauer as 
Educator” to “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” he moved even further away from Schopenhauer’s 
and Wagner’s philosophies.  
The themes Nietzsche explored in “Schopenhauer as Educator” (1874) included 
education, cruelty to animals, humans as beasts of prey, dissection, and vivisection, which would 
come to play a major part in his later critiques of Wagner. However, in 1874 he employed them 
in another apparent attack on critical historians, natural scientists, and other “theoretical men.” 
This time he claimed that they were the atomistic dissectors of knowledge.134 Nietzsche 
described the age in which he lived as “the age of atoms, of atomistic chaos.”135 It was one in 
which natural science and philology had removed the illusions that had previously held the world 
together. Nietzsche claimed to be rhetorically turning the reductionist methods employed by 
theoretical men against them in an attempt to dissect the psyche of historical and scientific 
scholarship. He claimed that doing this revealed the theoretical man to be nothing more than “a 
confused network of very various impulses and stimuli,” who needed to dissect in order to 
understand fragments, but who was incapable of synthesizing what they had learned into a 
coherent whole, or of understanding how anything large or sudden was possible.136 Nietzsche 
was still writing in deference to Wagner’s sense of the genius as the only person capable of 
miraculously being able to see into and reproduce the objective world. Unlike the theoretical 
men of learning, geniuses are: 
those true men, those who are no longer animal, the philosophers, artists and saints; 
nature, which never makes a leap, has made its one leap in creating them, and a leap of 
joy moreover, for nature then feels that for the first time it has reached its goal – where it 
realizes it has to unlearn having goals and that it has played the game of life and 
becoming with too high stakes.137  
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This is a position he would repeat in “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” (1876).138 Nietzsche stressed 
that the genius was the exception to the rules of gradualism and continuity in nature. However, 
the genius in “Schopenhauer as Educator” was still not Schopenhauer’s definition of genius. The 
title alone indicated as much, for the Schopenhauerian genius was born, not educated. In 
particular, Nietzsche criticized the idea that geniuses could be left to chance, saying that this 
belief was “hardly to be distinguished from cruelty to animals protracted into the human 
world.”139 Nietzsche was steadily breaking away from Schopenhauer’s definition of genius even 
as he was overtly writing in support of it. This was most obvious in “Richard Wagner in 
Bayreuth.”  
 The original “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” was far more critical than the final version, 
and Nietzsche seriously considered abandoning the project. However, his friend Peter Gast 
(1854-1918) encouraged him to publish a more tactful version.140 In order to accommodate this, 
Nietzsche brought together what Montinari has called “an extremely adroit mosaic of quotations” 
from Wagner’s own works.141 It is no small irony then that the work that Wagner heralded as an 
incredible triumph should have been composed from the atomistic fragments of his own writings. 
Nietzsche used Wagner’s words in “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” to show the destructive effect 
that Schopenhauer’s genius has on the genius’ understanding of their own past. 
Nietzsche had warned how the genius could do violence to history in “The Uses and 
Disadvantages.” However, in “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” he described this reshaping as a 
positive attribute of genius because it was actually art, more so than history, that brought people 
closer to the absolute truth of an event.142 This “poetic invention” allowed the genius to 
transform a single event into something that typified whole ages, and achieve “a truth of 
representation such as the historian can never attain to.”143 This was the last time that Nietzsche 
would make a claim like this in his published works. However, underneath Nietzsche’s apparent 
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compromising of his own thoughts and his subservience to Wagner was a complete breakdown 
of his ability to live a double life as Wagner’s champion and as his critic. As can be read in his 
wavering analyses of myth, genius, education, and history throughout the Untimely Meditations. 
The two Nietzsches existed at the expense of Nietzsche as a whole individual. As the veneer of a 
friendly relationship between the two began to fade, Nietzsche was working on a way to 
articulate the problems he saw with Wagner’s project that led him to see the elder composer, not 
as a mystically inspired creative genius, but as a fallible human being.  
 
 Wagner, All Too Wagner 
 
 Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits appeared in three installments. The first 
book was published in 1878, the second “Assorted Opinions and Maxims,” came out in 1879 and 
the final book “The Wanderer and his Shadow” appeared in 1880. Over these three years 
Nietzsche began to resolve the tensions between his public and private writings. In this work he 
supported reductionist methods for the study of history and the natural sciences, dismantled his 
earlier public support for Wagner and Schopenhauer’s genius, and instead offered his own 
alternative to genius in the figure of the “free spirit.” Importantly, this is how Wagner understood 
the text as well.  
In Human, All Too Human Nietzsche explicitly stated that the precondition of the 
appearance of genius was the destruction of the visible traces of the genius’ own past, with all of 
its inevitable accidents and contingencies. As he claims in the aphorism “Taking Care of One’s 
Past:”  
 
Because men really respect only that which was founded of old and has developed 
slowly, he who wants to live on after his death must take care not only of his posterity but 
even more of his past: which is why tyrants of every kind (including tyrannical artists and 
politicians) like to do violence to history, so that it may appear as preparation for and 
step-ladder to them.144  
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The cult of genius that then surrounded such figures was “an echo of [the] reverence for gods 
and princes,” which required a mythological origin story to legitimize it. In obscuring his past 
the genius made “whole classes of the people,” the “folk,” appear less than what they were.145 
However, the folk were also complicit in this. Nietzsche explained how such figures as Raphael 
and Shakespeare became elevated into miraculous and ahistorical icons to soothe the folk’s sense 
of vanity. As he wrote: “our self-love […] promotes the cult of the genius: for only if we think of 
him as being very remote from us […] does he not aggrieve us.”146 In this way Nietzsche was 
obliquely critiquing both Wagner and his supporters.  
 Wagner made a great deal of “the folk” as his audience of choice: a specific, archaic, and 
unified German people whose undivided essence could still be seen in the artistic use of the 
German language, in folktales, and folk music. However, he also claimed that the folk’s sense of 
itself had been diluted by foreign, particularly Semitic, influences. His frequent appeals to 
German nationalism served to justify his own search for popularity and public acclaim. The folk 
were the imagined ideal audience that Nietzsche had praised in The Birth of Tragedy. In 
“Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” Nietzsche also claimed that to really see the effects of Wagnerian 
music one would have to look toward the future, for only then would one “come to understand 
what Wagner will be to this folk: something he cannot be to any of us, namely not the seer of a 
future, as he would perhaps like to appear to us, but the interpreter and transfigurer of a past.”147 
This ambivalent assessment helped to set the stage for Nietzsche’s critique of the relationship 
between genius and folk that saw its culmination in Human, All Too Human.   
In Human, All Too Human Nietzsche argued that Wagner’s genius actively discouraged 
the development of alternative geniuses by destroying any account of their origins. This genius 
“repulses all thinking as to how it has become, it tyrannizes as present completeness and 
perfection.”148 As he claimed in “fatality of greatness:”  
 
Every great phenomenon is succeeded by degeneration, especially in the domain of art. 
The example of greatness incites all vainer natures to extreme imitation or attempt to 
outdo; in addition to which, all great talents have the fatal property of suppressing many 
weaker shoots and forces and as it were laying nature to waste all around them. The most 
fortunate thing that can happen in the evolution of an art is that several geniuses appear 
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together and keep one another in bounds; in the course of this struggle the weaker and 
tenderer natures too will usually be granted light and air.149  
 
Nietzsche’s language of nature echoes both his discussion of second nature in “The Uses and 
Abuses” and “Schopenhauer as Educator.” Intending to secure his position, Wagner’s genius 
simultaneously paved the way for the gradual atrophying and destruction of the very ideas that 
first elevated them to their place of authority and power.  
 Nevertheless, Nietzsche did not merely attribute genius to a misunderstanding of origins 
or a lack of opposition. Exceptional people did exist. However, these people existed exactly 
because of their history and often by virtue of their very incompleteness. In Human, All Too 
Human he inverted the value that Schopenhauer gave to genius as a “monstra per excessum,” 
with twice the intellect needed to accommodate the appetites of their wills, turning the geniuses’ 
“indifference” to their surroundings into a potentially fatal imbalance. Nietzsche expanded upon 
this point further in “the origin of genius” where he observed that: 
It has already been remarked that a mutilation, crippling, a serious deficiency in an organ 
offers the occasion for an uncommonly successful development of another organ, the 
reason being that it has to discharge not only its own function but another as well. It is in 
this way we can suppose many a glittering talent to have originated.150  
 
The incompleteness that made this form of genius possible precluded it from ever granting its 
owner insight into the depths of being, or the thing-in- itself. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-
1885) Nietzsche would dramatically describe this belief about genius as a celebration of “inverse 
cripples:”   
And when I came out of my solitude and went across this bridge for the first time, I could 
not believe my eyes and had to look, and look again, before saying at last: ‘That is an ear! 
An ear as large as a human being!’ Then I looked more closely, and in fact under the ear 
there was something else moving, something pitifully small and meager and puny. And in 
truth, the enormous ear was sitting on a thin little stalk— but the stalk was a human being! 
With the help of a magnifying glass one could even make out an envious little face, as well 
as a bloated little soul dangling from the stalk. The people told me, however, that the huge 
ear was not only a human being but a great human being, a genius. But I never did believe 
the people when they talked of great human beings— and I held to my belief that it was an 
inverse cripple, with too little of everything and too much of one thing.’151  
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In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche no longer defended his earlier position that some genius 
was the result of some miraculous inborn hypertrophy. Instead, he dedicated a great deal of the 
work to exploring the role that education and experience played in the origins of genius.  
 Nietzsche’s developing understanding of genius in Human, All Too Human required a 
reconsideration of the purpose and direction of education. In the aphorism “Miraculous 
Education” he contradicted Wagner’s idea that the genius’ insights were miraculous: 
To the present day, however, all the world continues to believe in miraculous education: 
for the greatest disorder, confusion of objectives, unfavourable circumstances have 
succeeded in producing the most fruitful and capable men […]. Soon these cases too will 
be examined more closely and tested more carefully: no miracles will ever be 
discovered.152  
 
Genius could be taught. Its origins could be questioned and understood. The educational 
trajectory of a genius that no longer relied upon miracles would be characterized by three main 
considerations: the amount of energy inherited by the student (the “givens” of their physiological 
and psychological history), how new energy could be ignited within them, and thirdly, the 
question: 
how can the individual be adapted to the enormously diversified demands of culture 
without being distracted by them and his individuality dispersed – in short, how can the 
individual be set in place within the counterpoint of private and public culture, how can 
he play the main theme and at the same time the subordinate themes as well?153  
 
This third point was crucial, for it made Nietzsche’s vision for education into one of freedom and 
self-creation without the excesses of the cult of genius. Indeed, it was what made Human, All 
Too Human a handbook for the autodidactic education of other free spirits. If the free spirit was 
to survive and thrive it must be able to play a diversity of roles without its identity being 
subsumed by the folk, while at the same time it must also be able to acknowledge and adjudicate 
between those aspects of culture it accepts into itself, adapts, challenges, or can accept as simply 
other than it.  
Nietzsche proposed a “cult of culture” in opposition to the cult of genius. It was an idea 
that owed much to his reading of Lange. He emphasized the need for a balanced culture and an 
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appreciation of the inevitable contingencies, accidents, and fragmentary qualities of human life 
and history:  
For the system of all that which humanity has need of for its continued existence is so 
comprehensive, and lays claim to so many and such varying forces, that humanity as a 
whole would have to pay heavily for any onesided [sic] preference, whether it be science 
or the state or art or trade, to which these individuals [geniuses] would entice it. It has 
always been the greatest fatality for culture when men have been worshipped […] – Next 
to the cult of the genius and his force there must always be placed, as its complement and 
palliative, the cult of culture: which knows how to accord the material, humble, base, 
misunderstood, weak, imperfect, onesided [sic], incomplete, untrue, merely apparent, 
indeed to the evil and dreadful, a proper degree of understanding and the admission that 
all this is necessary; for the harmonious endurance of all that is human.154  
 
This cult of culture was the counterpart that prevented the cult of genius’s holistic longings from 
becoming tyrannical and self-defeating.  
 From its very first page Human, All Too Human was strewn with references that seem to 
have been calculated to gall Wagner. Nietzsche dedicated the first edition of the work to the 
French enlightenment thinker Voltaire (1694-1778). In Cosima Wagner’s diaries she recounts an 
exchange she had with Wagner about how much David Strauss’ work on Voltaire angered the 
composer, alongside his frustrations with scientists who seemed always so quick to claim that as 
individuals they were nothing, but that their science was infallible.155 In The History of 
Materialism Lange had repeated du Bois-Reymond’s 1868 assertion in Voltaire in his Relation to 
Natural Science that modern scientists were more or less Voltairians, following his arguments 
about the limits of free will and the relationship between mind and body.156 Nietzsche’s first 
meditation on Strauss attempted to address this issue, and it is reasonable to assume that his 
dedication to Voltaire was also a rejection of his early work as Wagner’s propagandist.    
 Strauss’ Voltaire was a short history of Voltaire’s life and thought that described the 
poet’s daily habits, family, sexual relationships, his creative works, scandals, and means of 
subsistence. It also had a section on Voltaire’s thoughts about Joan of Arc and human nature.157 
Strauss argued that Voltaire’s poem The Maid of Orleans was a scathing critique of knowledge 
biased on divine revelation, the idea of purity, and of spirit without body. He also believed that it 
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depicted its title character as either a brave but mentally afflicted woman who was used as a 
political tool to inspire resistance to France’s enemies, or a calculating political player in her own 
right who used the stories of her miracles to her own advantage.158 Voltaire made Joan of Arc all 
too human. For Wagner, this only demonstrated the arrogance of natural science and critical 
history in the face of miracles and the mysterious workings of genius. These attacks on Strauss 
and Voltaire recurred in his condemnation of Human, All Too Human. 
In the April, June, and August 1878 editions of the Bayreuther Blätter Wagner published 
a series of three articles entitled “Public and Popularity.” The third of these articles contained his 
public response to Human, All Too Human.159 Wagner claimed to take umbrage at the academic 
public for the pedantic, and publicly funded, way in which it bred the kind of “cultural philistine” 
(Bildungsphilister) that Nietzsche had critiqued in “David Strauss.”160 He took issue with how 
Nietzsche was challenging Schopenhauer’s idea of genius, claiming that such challenges were 
merely representative of scholars’ envious relationship to greatness that lead them to cast the 
very idea of genius overboard as “a radical error.”161 To prove this point Wagner set up a 
dichotomy between Voltaire, “that idol of all ‘free minds [spirits]” and the poet Friedrich 
Schiller in their diverging treatments of Joan of Arc. 
Wagner claimed that Voltaire depicted Joan of Arc as a mere human because his 
understanding of her only depended on the historical documents available to him. Schiller, by 
contrast, inspired by no documents other than his own genius saw in her “humanity’s all-noble 
type:” “not only did his poetic canonization of the heroine bestow upon the Folk an infinitely 
touching and e’er-loved work, but it also anticipated Historical [sic] criticism, hobbling after, 
which a lucky find has at last put in possession of the rightful documents for judging a 
marvellous phenomenon.”162 It seemed to Wagner that nothing was sacred to historical criticism, 
not even Jesus, the archetype of biblical genius.163 By looking to trace back the origins of genius 
into strictly chemical, physiological, or historically contingent parts, defenders of historical 
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criticism and natural science made themselves incapable of seeing greatness for what it was: 
unifying, intuitive, spontaneous, and miraculous.  
Wagner lamented how the state had given special place of pride to physics, and 
especially chemistry, instead of art. In response to this scholars from every discipline, even 
philology, were scurrying to mimic the style of the natural sciences.164 Philologists like 
Nietzsche found in the experiments of the natural sciences a “profound authority for an 
altogether special skepsis” that Wagner described as a confused and chaotic swinging between 
the extremes of popular academic opinion. Nevertheless, from this: “both philologists and 
philosophists [sic] obtain peculiar encouragement, nay obligation, to an as yet illimitable 
progress in the art of criticizing [sic] all things human and inhuman.”165 This was another oblique 
attack on Human, All Too Human, one that echoed the passage in Cosima Wagner’s diaries 
where Wagner charged David Strauss with the same combination of scientific skepticism and 
dogmatism. However, Wagner did have some sympathy for the natural sciences. This helps to 
shed some light on how he thought about the tensions between science and genius.  
 In “Public and Popularity” Wagner claimed that scientists like Charles Darwin were not 
to be blamed for the atomizing and chaotic effect that modern science and scholarship was 
having on culture, provided that they were content to only have hypotheses and stay within their 
own narrow professional spheres. The problem was that some of Darwin’s followers (and here 
he strongly implied Strauss and Nietzsche) were using his emphasis on gradualism in nature to 
make reckless arguments about the gradualness and contingency of historical figures and events. 
Wagner stressed that the main flaw of reductionist science and scholarship was how both 
excluded the possibility of “spontaneous” events in nature, history, and society:  
For we now are told that, as no change has ever taken place without sufficient ground, so 
the most astonishing phenomena—of which the work of ‘genius’ forms the most 
important instance—result from various causes, very many and not quite ascertained as 
yet, ‘tis true, but which we shall find it uncommonly easy to get at when Chemistry has 
once laid hold on Logic. Meanwhile, however, the chain of logical deductions not 
stretching quite so far as an explanation of the work of Genius, inferior nature-forces 
generally regarded as faults of temperament, such as impetuosity of will, one-sided 
energy and stubbornness, are called in to keep the thing as much as possible upon the 
realm of Physics.166 
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This was one of Wagner’s many defences of “the miraculous leap of genius” in which he argued 
against the tendency of lesser intellects to pass judgment on genius out of a misguided adherence 
to causality. It was partly an attack on determinism and reductionism in historical scholarship 
and natural science and partly a defence of the holistic insights of genius and the role that art 
played in enabling a direct experience with Schopenhauer’s objective realm of the Will. While 
the fact that Wagner chose to present a defence of Darwin, and single out chemistry and Joan of 
Arc in his critique of Nietzsche may seem strange, all three points struck to the root of the 
physiological and historical doubts Nietzsche raised in Human, All Too Human about the nature 
of genius. They were doubts that he had already expressed in “On Truth and Lies” and his 
lectures on the Pre-Platonic Philosophers, where he critiqued the idea that causality could be 
understood as being analogous to human will (which would make it “miraculous”), and argued 
that critical history and natural science both showed how knowledge consisted of the human 
ability, and need, to create apparent unities where none had previously existed in nature or 
history.    
 
Conclusion  
 
Nietzsche’s work throughout the late 1860s and 1870s was characterized by his attempts 
to balance his defence of Wagner’s interests and Schopenhauer’s philosophy with his own 
private exploration of an alternative vision of genius. It was a vision of genius that incorporated 
the insights of critical history, physiology, and the natural sciences, instead of largely rejecting 
them as Wagner did. Despite this tension, Nietzsche’s interest in physiology and the relationship 
between knowledge of the objective world and the working of the human body was largely 
inspired by his readings of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer grounded the holistic and miraculous 
insights of genius in the physiological organization of geniuses themselves that were unaffected 
by the arbitrary forces of biography, context, or indeed, of causality itself. Pursuing this interest 
in the relationship between physiology and philosophy led Nietzsche to believe that the 
reductionist methods of modern scholarship and science revealed the limits of self-knowledge, 
and indeed, the limits of knowledge itself. He gleaned this understanding from figures like Lange 
and von Baer, who led him further away from Schopenhauer’s and Wagner’s worldviews. 
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Instead, he came to believe that a more meaningful definition of genius rested in individuals who 
could intentionally fashion themselves from out of the accidents, indifference, and limitations of 
their historical, physiological, and psychological contexts.  
The tension between his own ideas and his commitment to Wagner can be seen 
throughout Nietzsche’s early writings. Nietzsche was being truer to his own thoughts in his 
lectures on The Pre-Platonic Philosophers and “On Truth and Lies” than in The Birth of Tragedy 
or “David Strauss.” He tried, and, arguably, he failed, to find a compromise of the two positions 
in “On the Uses and Disadvantages,” and “Schopenhauer as Educator,” before covertly 
parodying Wagner in “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth.” There was a polyvocal aspect to 
Nietzsche’s writings in support of Wagner’s ideals that can be seen well before the publication of 
Human, All Too Human. His arguments about the musical Socrates, the increasingly ambiguous 
way he presented the relationship between Wagner’s genius and history, and his changing 
definitions of genius between “David Strauss” and “Schopenhauer as Educator” all point to this. 
Even more striking are the ways that Nietzsche recast arguments he had made in the Untimely 
Meditations in Human, All Too Human as he critiqued the idea of miracles and sudden leaps in 
nature, the cult of genius, the folly of believing in the miraculous education of geniuses, and the 
idea that genius was a sort of ideal case of “monstra per excessum.” These critiques depended, at 
their base, on Nietzsche’s developing understanding of critical history and physiology as it 
applied to the idea of genius. The fact that Wagner specifically attacked Nietzsche’s appeals to 
critical history and chemistry in his response to Human, All Too Human serves as further proof 
that these were important and contentious backgrounds to Nietzsche’s intellectual and personal 
break with the composer.167 Nietzsche’s interest in the relationship between, genius, physiology, 
and philosophy would continue on into the 1880s. From Human, All Too Human onwards he 
continued to develop his ideas about self-fashioning and its relationship to genius and education 
as he explored notions of dynamic self-regulation and the definition of meaningful freedom in a 
deterministic and amoral cosmos. These ideas would eventually lead him to an understanding of 
the relationship between the Übermensch and the eternal return of the same. They also served as 
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the background to his changing understanding of the meaning and value of vivisec tion as a 
physiological and philosophical methodology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 67 
Chapter 2: Nietzsche as Vivisectionist 
 
“I would like to know how to meet my fate (vivisection) and my pain with the silent gaze 
of a dog.”168 
 
  ~Friedrich Nietzsche, from a fragment found in Nietzsche’s Nachlass. Dated around  
  November 1882-February 1883. 
 
Late nineteenth-century debates about whether the insights of genius depended on a 
holistic or reductionist understanding of the world were not limited to artistic or historical topics. 
In the natural sciences these debates became matters of life and death. This was especially the 
case in the study of physiology and the practice of medicine where vivisection became an ever 
more common resource for the study of the basic elements of life and living systems. Those, like 
Wagner, who supported holistic models of genius also supported holistic studies of living 
organisms and campaigned against vivisection and other reductionist approaches for being 
useless and immoral. Vivisection thus became another arena in which Nietzsche challenged the 
basis of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and Wagner’s political and artistic legacy. 
Even after his break with Wagner, Nietzsche continued to find himself in circles that 
included antivivisectionists and vegetarians who paid allegiance to Schopenhauer’s philosophical 
system. Nietzsche’s sister Elizabeth was one such antivivisectionist, who married the anti-
Semitic, antivivisectionist Bernhard Förster in 1885. Bernhard’s brother, Dr. Paul Förster, 
became one of the leaders of the antivivisectionist movement in Germany at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Nietzsche was also aware that Wagner had supported the project of the 
antivivisectionist Baron Ernst von Weber (1830-1902) and the doctor Ernst Grysanowski (1824-
1888). On an intellectual front, Nietzsche had already enthusiastically followed Zöllner’s career, 
who, aside from being an astrophysicist was also a prominent antivivisectionist. All of these 
figures were mentioned in, or actively wrote for the Bayreuther Blätter, the organ of Wagnerism 
founded in 1878 to coincide with the establishment of the Bayreuth Festspielhaus, and Nietzsche 
continued to comment on this periodical in his correspondence until his breakdown in 1889. 
Finding himself surrounded by antivivisectionists whose political, intellectual, and moral world-
views he found increasingly distasteful, Nietzsche sought to antagonize and refute them.  
                                                 
168 Friedrich Nietzsche, “eKGWB/NF-1882, 4 [91] — Nachgelassene Fragmente November 1882 — Februar 1883,” 
Nietzsche Source, accessed November 5, 2015, http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1882,4[91].  
 68 
Nietzsche’s early support for, and later critique of, genius, parallels his early resistance 
to, then promotion of, vivisection. The claims that Schopenhauer and Wagner made about the 
irreducible holism of genius and the intuitive nature of their insights lent themselves to debates 
about the holism of living organisms and the methods best suited to understanding them. Despite 
his holistic claims, Wagner presented the world as a series of dichotomies, particularly between 
the genius and the non-genius, freedom and determinism, and self-interest and self-denial. In 
contrast, Nietzsche’s reductionism systematically broke down these dichotomies in his search for 
the basic elements of physiological and psychological life. He identified three forms of 
vivisection that taken together showed how reductionist methods revealed the interconnected and 
necessary character of existence. Physiological vivisection showed the physical necessities of 
life, how living beings were organized, and how they related to their physical surroundings. 
Moralizing vivisection was how human beings, especially those from acetic traditions, 
suppressed their own motivations and drives towards some moralistic end. Nietzsche referred to 
this “pre-scientific’ form of reflection as the “spiritualization,” but also as the “torture,” of the 
animal life of the human being. This form of vivisection was conducive to some kinds of self-
reflection and doubt. However, since it focused on judging and morally evaluating rather than 
knowing and understanding, it could only accomplish so much before it ultimately prevented the 
development of more systematic, or scientific forms of self-reflection. The final form of 
vivisection was psychological. Nietzsche first described psychological vivisection as 
“psychological observation,” but he often talked about this method as a form of dissection or 
vivisection. Nietzsche sought to use psychological vivisection to understand human values and 
drives scientifically, without judging them good or evil, in order to show their many historical 
and physiological contingencies and necessities. While Nietzsche never explicitly articulated his 
ideas about vivisection in these terms, they help reveal three different but interconnected streams 
of thought in his writing. They also help to show how Nietzsche described the different forms of 
suffering that coincided with the growth of human understanding. This sheds light on some of his 
more controversial rhetorical comments about the necessity of pain and cruelty. 
Physiological vivisection was a necessary complement to psychological vivisection, for it 
furthered understanding of human drives and values at their most basic level. The debates about 
the necessity of vivisection, and how a reductionist understanding of living beings lent itself to 
philosophical determinism, also contributed to Nietzsche’s thinking about the broader nature of 
 69 
necessity and its relationship to knowledge. His interest in the idea of amor fati, the love of fate, 
or of life exactly as it was and must be, developed in the context of these debates. Vivisection 
was often used to study the ways in which organisms were dynamic self-regulating systems. The 
“freedom” of organisms consisted of the ways in which they fashioned themselves from out of 
their material environment. It consisted of a kind of “independence through interdependence.” 
This was a freedom that Nietzsche would latter attribute, in increasingly nuanced ways, to his 
own ideas about the education of the genius, the free spirit, and ultimately, the Übermensch.  
Despite the importance of vivisection to Nietzsche’s intellectual development there have 
been no major studies exploring his interest in it. Walter Kaufmann briefly noted that just as 
Socrates was the “gadfly” of Athens, Nietzsche sought to be the vivisectionist of modern values. 
Yet vivisection was more than a shorthand for the sometimes unpleasant, but vital role of the 
philosopher in society, and he neglected to comment on Nietzsche’s relationship to the very 
physical practice of vivisection in the late nineteenth century.169 Geoff Waite represents the 
opposite extreme of this trend, and has instead used Nietzsche’s interest in vivisection to paint a 
picture of him as a covert “esoterrorist,” or secret terrorist, who not only celebrated cruelty, pain, 
and euthanasia, but whose influence was responsible for sabotaging left wing political 
movements from inside their own ideological ranks.170 This portrait misrepresents both 
Nietzsche’s and Schopenhauer’s relationship to vivisection, which is better understood in terms 
of their historical contexts. 
 This chapter begins with an overview of Schopenhauer’s and Wagner’s thoughts on 
vivisection. A more radical and anti-Semitic group of antivivisectionists cited Schopenhauer as 
an inspiration after his death. This group, led by Weber, Grysanowski, and Marie-Esperance von 
Schwartz (1818-1899) put out a prominent antivivisectionist pamphlet called The Torture 
Chambers of Science (1879). Torture Chambers contained several arguments about pity and the 
meaning and role of Wissenschaft in society that Nietzsche would later critique. These arguments 
were very much in keeping with Wagner’s worldview, and the composer met with Weber shortly 
after the publication of the pamphlet. The section concludes with a look at Wagner’s relationship 
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to vegetarianism and vivisection, and how Weber used Wagner’s influence after his death to 
support the antivivisectionist cause.   
 The chapter then explores Nietzsche’s early attack on, and later support for, vivisection. 
Starting from a common position with the antivivisectionists that humans were indeed animals, 
he broke down their notions of innocence, pity, and purity. In Human, All Too Human, published 
between 1878 and 1880, he argued that the only way to understand human motivations and 
morality was through a process of “psychological observation,” which he understood as a form 
of psychological vivisection. Antivivisectionists claimed that physiology was not a true science 
because it had to rely upon vivisection, which, because of the violence involved, could never be 
performed in any kind of systematic way. Nietzsche argued instead that different forms of 
vivisection were defining features of science and scholarship. While antivivisectionists often 
compared physiologists to the torturers of the Catholic Inquisition, Nietzsche subverted this anti-
Catholic image by pointing to a historical case where a protestant, John Calvin, actually burnt the 
vivisectionist Miguel Serveto at the stake. This consideration of the Inquisition served as part of 
the backdrop to his early thinking about the relationship between innocence, cruelty, knowledge, 
and necessity.  
 This chapter will go on to consider Nietzsche’s commentaries on vivisection in light of his 
opposition to the writings in the Bayreuther Blätter, especially those of the Förster brothers, as 
well those of Zöllner. In his early career, Nietzsche supported Zöllner’s critique of reductionism 
in the sciences as the ideological twin of his critique of reductionism in the study of history. 
However, he also found a precedent in Zöllner for the idea of psychological vivisection. For 
Zöllner, this was a form of personal polemics that the astronomer leveled against figures like 
Helmholtz and du Bois-Reymond. Nietzsche would make vivisection into a tool of self-analysis 
that went beyond moralizing judgments to try and understand the origin and nature of moral 
evaluations and values. However, he recognized that such analysis was a sublimated kind of 
cruelty and “cutting up” of the psyche, and he classified it along with physiological vivisection 
as an example of the relationship between cruelty and knowledge. He contrasted the sublimated 
cruelty of psychological vivisection to the festival of cruelty of the moralizing vivisection 
undertaken by antivivisectionists and members of the Bayreuther Blätter circle. Yet even here he 
sought to qualify his attacks with a reminder that moralizing vivisection also brought about the 
creation of new values.  
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 Schopenhauer’s Mercies: Wagner, Weber, and Antivivisection in Germany 
 
The debate about the human use of animals, both as food and as experimental subjects, 
did not begin in the nineteenth century. However, the scope and scale of these debates expanded 
drastically as animal experimentation became the touchstone of the new experimental 
physiology. Magendie and Bernard, in France, and Ernst von Brücke (1819-1892), Carl Ludwig 
(1816-1895), du Bois-Reymond, and Helmholtz, in Germany, moved to make nineteenth-century 
physiology into a systematic, experimental science based on physics and chemistry. To 
accomplish this goal, they sought to employ the exacting methods of measurement, analysis, and 
instrumentation used in these inorganic sciences. Ludwig's invention of the kymograph in 1847, 
which could graphically show rate of change in blood pressure or muscle contractions was one 
such symbol of the instrumental precision of the new physiology. Du Bois-Reymond contributed 
to this trend with his use of galvanometers to detect the minute changes of electrical impulse that 
coincided with the transmission of nerve impulses in frogs and in 1850 Helmholtz used a 
ballistic galvanometer to measure the velocity of the propagation of the nerve impulse itself.171 
These methods required an ever increasing number of experimental subjects, as control groups, 
and as ways to test and confirm the results of other researcher’s experiments. Germany also 
became a European-wide center for physiological teaching, with government supported 
physiological laboratories. This further increased the demand for experimental animals as 
teaching tools. However, these changes did not go unchallenged. Animal protection societies 
developed along with the rise of experimental physiology.  
The first formalized animal protection societies in Germany and Switzerland began in the 
1840s to prevent the cruel treatment of domestic animals. As Tröhler and Maehle point out, these 
early societies had an explicitly anthropocentric focus. Animals were not to be protected for their 
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own sakes, but for the sake of the humans who had to witness their brutalization.172 
Schopenhauer, however, was a notable voice opposing this justification at the start of the 
century. He rejected what he considered to be Kant’s “Jewish Christianity” and its utilitarian 
argument that cruelty to animals was only blameworthy because it might make humans less 
compassionate towards each other.173 Citing the Sanskrit phrase “tat tvam asi” (this art thou), he 
praised the Hindu and Buddhist religions for recognizing the fundamental identity of animals and 
humans and for their prescription of a vegetarian diet.  
The early to mid-nineteenth century saw the rise of a range of “back to nature” movements, 
sometimes referred to collectively as naturalism or Naturalismus, that claimed to draw their 
authority from ancient (often Pythagorean) and eastern (Hindu and Buddhist) wisdom about 
health and the body. In 1867, Eduard Baltzer (1814-1887) founded the Society for Healthy 
Living, an organization that promoted vegetarianism, exercise, and health retreats. Baltzer had 
been partly inspired to found the society based on his reading of the chemist Theodor Hahn 
(1824-1883). Hahn’s vegetarian bestseller The Paradise of Heath, the One Lost, and the One 
Regained was published in 1865. In it he proposed that health was tied up with living according 
to nature. “Living according to nature” meant many things to Hahn, including taking water cures, 
seeking out healthy or pure environments, vegetarianism, an aversion to modern, allopathic 
medicine, and the protection of animals.  
Hahn’s vegetarianism and defence of animals was tinged with the belief that meat eating was 
an unnatural and Jewish practice.174 As it did for Schopenhauer, Hahn, Wagner, Weber, and 
many of their followers, anti-Semitism went hand in hand with the return to nature. The Old 
Testament sentiment that humanity had “dominion over nature” was often cited as an example of 
Jewish arrogance and cruelty, and attacks on the inhumanity of kosher methods of butchering 
animals were used to target both Jews and “Judaized” vivisectors. The revolutions of 1848 led 
many Jewish Germans to hope that they would soon benefit from the same rights and freedoms 
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as their neighbours. However, the rapid industrialization, urbanization, and gross inequalities that 
characterized nineteenth-century capitalism led to periods of intense economic instability that 
culminated in the recessions of 1873. Jews were increasingly associated with both distant and 
wealthy urban intellectuals and liberals, as well as poor, subversive revolutionaries and 
criminals. Whether over-refined or under-civilized, this scapegoating presented Jews as an 
unnatural or degenerate people.175 
Schopenhauer was relatively moderate compared to those who followed after him. He 
believed that it was unfortunate, but true, that human beings who lived in the north had to eat 
meat for the sake of their health. Only using chloroform to render the animals insensate before 
they were slaughtered could make this process anything like humane.176 He also made some 
allowances for vivisection. He had performed fatal animal experiments while still a student in 
Göttingen in 1809.177 Forty-two years later he claimed that vivisection should be restricted to 
well-defined purposes with immediate practical results, and even then only conducted when the 
practitioner was absolutely sure that there was no solution to the problem under investigation that 
could be found in the existing medical literature.178 In his Parerga and Paralipomena he 
recounted his time spent studying under Blumenbach at Göttingen: 
Blumenbach in his lectures on physiology spoke very seriously to us about the horrors of 
vivisection and pointed out to us what a cruel and shocking thing it was. He therefore 
said that it should very rarely be resorted to and only in the case of very important 
investigations that are of direct use. But it must then be done with the greatest publicity in 
the large lecture-hall after an invitation has been sent to all the medical students, so that 
the cruel sacrifice on the altar of science may be of the greatest possible use. Every 
quack, however, now considers himself entitled to carry out in his torture-chamber 
[Folterkammer] the cruelest tortures on animals in order to decide problems whose 
solution has long since appeared in books, which he is too lazy and ignorant to look up.179  
 
Schopenhauer was insistent on the use of chloroform in those rare cases when vivisection was 
necessary. Yet he also saw the difficulty that this principle posed when investigating the working 
of the nervous system itself: 
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This method, however, is necessarily excluded in the case of operations which are 
performed on the activity of the nervous system and its sensitiveness and which are now 
so frequent, for the very thing to be observed would thus be stopped. Alas, the animal 
most frequently taken for vivisection is morally the noblest of all, the dog, who is, 
moreover, rendered more susceptible to pain by his highly developed nervous system.180 
 
Offering no ready solution to this problem, but tacitly seeming to accept the necessity of 
vivisection, even when it could not be done with chloroform, Schopenhauer was a much more 
moderate figure than those who followed after him.  
 Schopenhauer’s increased popularity after his death in 1860 corresponded with the 
expansion and professionalization of animal experimentation. As the century wound on 
vivisection became one of the main resources for physiological education and research. Yet this 
also coincided with the rise of a much more radical antivivisectionist block, for whom all 
experiments on animals were anathema. These groups were particularly concerned with 
experiments performed on dogs, cats, and other animals that were increasingly moving into the 
homes of the middle classes as pets. While animals such as frogs and chickens were far more 
commonly employed in physiological research, they tended not to be the focus of 
antivivisectionist indignation, except where they served as further proof of the cruelty of 
vivisectors. In the 1870s a number of prominent antivivisectionist writings from Great Britain 
were translated into German just as antivivisectionist sentiments in Germany had begun to peak. 
These sentiments reached full force in the early 1880s.181  
 Scholars generally agree that Britain was the centre of European antivivisectionist agitation 
from the 1870s onwards.182 The movement was led by such vocal and influential figures as the 
Irish suffragette and writer Frances Power Cobbe (1822-1904), cofounder of the National Anti-
Vivisection Society (NAVS) in 1875 and the English suffragette and theosophist Anna Kingsford 
(1846-1888). The NAVS was one of the the catalysts that led to the founding of a Royal 
Commission in 1875 to investigate the necessity and cruelty of vivisection and animal 
experimentation. While antivivisectionists instigated the commission, however, it was largely led 
by supporters of vivisection, such as the scientific naturalist Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), 
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who sought to set the limits of legal vivisection under terms that were favorable to physiological 
research.183 The act that the commission proposed, and which was passed by parliament in 1876, 
the Act to Amend the Law Relating to Cruelty to Animals, was seen by many opponents and 
supporters of vivisection as an unsatisfactory compromise. Despite this, however, the fact that 
antivivisectionist agitation could lead directly to legal reform galvanized many antivivisectionist 
movements around Europe, including in Germany.  
 The aristocratic anglophile, Baron Ernst von Weber, was one of the major German-
speaking opponents of vivisection in the 1870s and 1880s. He had come to the antivivisectionist 
cause after reading a moralistic novel by the aristocrat Marie-Esperance von Schwartz on the 
cruelties of animal experimentation: Gemma, or Virtue and Vice written under her pseudonym, 
Elpis Melena in 1877. Afterwards, he agreed to publish the works of her friend, the medical 
doctor and antivivisectionist Ernst Grysanowski. Together the three embarked on a campaign to 
marginalize or assimilate moderate animal protection societies and bring about the complete 
abolition of vivisection. One of the most successful texts in this campaign was Weber’s pamphlet 
on The Torture Chambers of Science that was first published in 1879. Distributed in public 
places throughout German-speaking Europe, the work received a very wide circulation and was 
frequently reviewed in the newspapers.184 There is no direct evidence that Nietzsche read Weber 
directly, but Weber was known by, and referenced in the works of Wagner, Zöllner, and the 
Förster brothers. Torture Chambers was one of his best-known writings, and it will be helpful to 
consider it in more detail.  
The Torture Chambers of Science tried to be many things at once: A programmatic call for 
the end of vivisection; a how-to guide for the establishment of antivivisectionist societies across 
the German speaking world; a populist, Christian work that sought to call on the aid of the elite, 
cultivated [gebildete] public; and an argument against the dominance of professionals in 
determining legal policy. It was a list of vivid atrocities with the names of the offenders included, 
as well as a list of those, particularly women, who opposed them. It sought to appeal to its 
audience’s reason, ethics, religion, culture, humanity, and especially pity (Mitleid) in the fight 
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against scientific barbarism. It also included a photograph “according to nature” of a smiling dog 
that was enjoying smoking a pipe beside a glass of beer. Under it was written: “Should animals 
such as this one be allowed to be cut up alive?”185 
 
Weber, Die Folterkammern der Wissenschaft, 29. 
 
Aside from these more visceral appeals, it also contained arguments about the definition of 
science (Wissenschaft, in the larger German sense), the relationship between knowledge, 
suffering, and morality, and the moral and physiological relationship between humans and other 
animals. Theoretical physiologists performed their experiments with the intention of exploring 
such organic processes as the physiology of nutrition, self-regulation, the senses, the nervous 
system, and the effects of poisons and therapeutics. While claiming to eschew the “practical” 
arguments about the utility or nonutility of vivisection, Weber also emphasized that physiology 
was not a “positive science,” and that it was specious to conflate physiological study with other 
sciences, especially physics, for it lacked both practical and scientific justification.186 Despite the 
claims of the vivisectionists, Weber argued, the discoveries of past physiologists like William 
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Harvey, John Hunter, Sir James Simpson, and John Bell did not result from live animal 
experimentation, but from the effective use of autopsies, deduction, and a priori reasoning.187 
Worse, vivisection could only muddle these forms of reasoning because the vivisected body was 
quite different from the healthy body.188 Wissenschaft, science and scholarship, he argued, 
existed to serve human ends, and was not an end in itself. Therefore, cruelty, suffering, 
barbarism and the “demoralization” of society could not be part of it. Vivisection had all of these 
consequences.  
Weber also argued that there were definite limits to human knowledge. With all of its 
complexities the brain could never be known in its entirety, but only appreciated through the 
unity of its effects. Here Weber cited George Jesse’s Notes upon the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Vivisection from 1876:  
What would we think of a person who wished to cut up and tear into pieces an image by 
Raphael or Titian, and to examine them under the microscope in the hope that he could 
thereby come to an understanding of the secrets of the composition and colouring of these 
artworks? Are not the actions of the vivisectors exactly the same, when they seek the 
wonderful secrets of life through crude cutting and tearing apart of those living works of 
art: to try and fathom breathing and feeling organisms?189  
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, this line of reasoning was nearly identical with that 
employed by Schopenhauer and Wagner in their understanding of the working of genius, and the 
geniuses’ ability to intuitively see the unities of nature without getting lost in fragmentary 
particulars. It is no wonder then that this was the text that Wagner claimed led him to his staunch 
support for the antivivisectionist cause. 
At some point Torture Chambers of Science came to Wagner’s attention, and on the 11th of 
August 1879 he wrote to the Dresden Animal Protection Society asking to become a member.190 
In response to his inquiry, Weber visited the Wagners in September of that year. Weber visited 
the Wagners on and off for the rest of that year and even sent them a copy of a work by Claude 
Bernard as further proof of the cruelty of vivisection.191 After this meeting Wagner’s circle 
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became the centre of a matrix of beliefs including anti-Semitism, Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 
antivivisectionism, and vegetarianism.192 As Hermand observes, this matrix of beliefs played an 
important role in Wagner’s composition of Parsifal (1882). Part of the narrative was dedicated to 
an appeal for a return to the gentle and pure vegetarianism that humans had enjoyed before they 
had fallen to the level of beasts of prey (Raubtier) by their carnivorous diet.193 When the 
antivivisectionist split between moderates and radicals the same month that Wagner met him, 
Weber and his supporters formed the radical International Society for the Prevention of 
Scientific Animal Torture with Weber as the president.  
Despite his overt support for Weber’s cause, however, Wagner had a complicated 
relationship to both vegetarianism and vivisection. He claimed that he had not joined earlier 
animal protection societies because of their emphasis on the human cost of cruelty to animals, 
and rather thought it cowardice to protest their mistreatment on anything other than moral 
grounds. While campaigning for vegetarianism, he was a practicing omnivore, and remained so 
throughout his life.194 While he abhorred vivisection, the physician was one of his highest 
cultural ideals, and he hoped that his son would one day become a surgeon. He made a 
distinction between physicians as “the secularized savior[s] of life,” and the “speculative 
physiology” of vivisectors.195 In part because of the friendship between his wife Cosima Wagner 
and Helmholtz’s wife Anna von Helmholtz (1834-1899), Wagner maintained a cordial, if 
intellectually distant, acquaintanceship with the physiologist, even as he condemned Helmholtz’s 
other vivisectionist colleagues.196 Wagner cited Schopenhauer as his guiding light in matters 
relating to the importance of pity in the relationship between humans and animals, yet ignored 
the fact that Schopenhauer had only called for a restriction, not the abolition, of vivisection.  
Wagner’s “Open letter to Mr. Ernst von Weber, author of the pamphlet ‘The Torture 
Chambers of Science’” appeared in the October 1879 edition of the Bayreuther Blätter. Wagner 
used many of the same arguments in it that he had previous employed against Nietzsche in 
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“Public and Popularity” (1878). Just as the genius was profaned by any attempt at systematic or 
fragmentary analysis, so too was living nature. Life, like genius, was a holistic, spontaneous, and 
even miraculous phenomenon. State funded science and the “cult of utility” that came with it was 
only capable of encouraging scientists and physiologists to destroy the very things that they 
sought to understand. The holistic impression of pity was what truly allowed individuals to 
understand the world around them. In his “Open Letter,” Wagner offered compassion, or pity 
(Mitleid) in the place of utility, appealing to an “exact analysis of that mocked-at ‘feeling’ [of 
pity].”197 He offered no exact analysis of this feeling in the text, although he did seek to refute 
those who believed that pity was a form of “sublimated egotism.”198 The text also echoed “Public 
and Popularity” in seeking to exonerate Darwin from charges that he had contributed to the 
stultifying and fragmenting effects of modern science. Here, Wagner claimed that Darwin: “an 
honest inquirer, a careful breeder and comparer, a scientific friend of beasts, laid once more open 
to us men the teachings of primeval [Brahmin] wisdom, according to which the same thing 
breaths in animals that lends us life ourselves; ay, shewed [sic] us past all doubt that we 
descended from them.199 As this passage shows, a salient feature of the vivisection debates in 
Germany was how most of the major players treated the basic kinship of humans and animals as 
unproblematic. While Darwin’s 1859 publication of the Origin of Species served to further 
support this kinship in the eyes of both physiologists and antivivisectionists, like evolutionary 
thought in general, Darwin was not seen as the origin of this idea. Following Schopenhauer, 
Wagner and his supporters saw this kinship as a primeval truth of nature that brought with it the 
human responsibility to protect their fellow creatures. Pity was what led to an understanding of 
this primal truth. As Schopenhauer had written in 1851: “tat tvam asi” (this art thou).  
 Wagner continued supporting Weber’s causes until his death in 1883. Shortly thereafter, 
Weber released a collection of the composer’s letters to him showing how the “greatest heroes of 
German history,” Wagner and the chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), both opposed 
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vivisection.200 Weber continued to benefit from the support of the Bayreuther Blätter and its 
followers until his own death in 1903.201 Even after Wagner’s death Nietzsche was still forced to 
wrestle with the composer’s legacy.    
 
 The Curare-arrow of Knowledge 
 
 Nietzsche’s Wagnerian context was saturated with antivivisectionist sentiment that was 
as much personal and political as it was metaphysical and artistic. Both vivisectionists and 
antivivisectionists argued from a common standpoint of the many similarities between humans 
and other animals, and Nietzsche picked up on this point as he began publicly breaking away 
from Wagner’s social circles. As he began to push back, at first covertly, and then openly, 
against Wagner he also reimagined the meaning of vivisection. Aside from physical vivisection, 
he also began to think in terms of subtler forms of analysis; psychological forms of vivisection 
that he called “psychological observations” in Human, All Too Human. Importantly, all forms of 
vivisection brought with them the question of what was meant when proponents and detractors 
talked about them being necessary or unnecessary. Nietzsche became increasingly convinced that 
some kinds of cruelty, including the cruelty of coming to terms with the nature of necessity, were 
required for knowledge and growth. Even the idea of “innocence” that was so often used by 
antivivisectionist to give a special status to animals that they denied to people was itself a form 
of cruelty.  
 Nietzsche would only overtly explore the relationship between knowledge, necessity, and 
cruelty that typified vivisection in Human, All Too Human and the works that followed after it. 
Publicly, his early comments on physiological vivisection were uniformly negative. In 
Schopenhauer as Educator (1874) he attacked what he called the scholarly “theoretical man’s” 
poverty of feeling and dissecting approach to knowledge for causing the “atomistic chaos” of the 
modern world. He also made it clear that he did not just mean academic historians when he 
mentioned that they were capable of anything, “even of vivisection.”202 In his early writings 
vivisectionist sympathies were another sign of the Bildungsphilister, or anti-genius, who could 
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not grasp the immediate and objective unities available to true genius, or appreciate them like the 
genius’ admirers. He even ironically asked the question how something “extra- and suprahuman” 
could emerge from these all too human impulses.203 However, in his private readings and 
writings he had a much more complicated relationship to vivisection.  
 Nietzsche was actively reading the works of many provivisectionists during the late 
1860s and early 1870s. As the previous chapter demonstrated, supporters of vivisection such as 
Lange and von Baer employed research derived from vivisection that influenced Nietzsche’s 
thoughts about the relativity of knowledge and the physiological dimensions of genius. He also 
explored the works of practicing vivisectionists during the 1870s, such as Hermann Ludimar 
(1838-1914) and du Bois-Reymond. These physiologists would later be specifically attacked in 
Weber’s Torture Chambers of Science. Nietzsche was also reading commentators who were 
friendly to Schopenhauer’s philosophical system, but who also supported vivisection as a 
practice during this time. These figures included the philosopher Eduard von Hartmann (1842-
1906) and Czermak. While Nietzsche expressed his antipathy to Hartmann’s worldview, he had 
many more positive things to say about Czermak. On April 12th 1870, Nietzsche sent the 
Wagners a copy of Czermak’s “On Schopenhauer’s Theory of Colour: A Contribution to the 
History of the Theory of Colours.” He was excited about the text because it claimed that 
Schopenhauer had been the first to discover the Young-Helmholtz theory of colour vision.204 
While Weber would call out Czermak for his experiments on the nervous physiology of dogs in 
1879, Nietzsche had already expressed positive interest in Czermak and his work in 1870.205 This 
is important to note, because it helps to show how Schopenhauer’s writings helped to serve as 
the basis for Nietzsche’s interest in vivisection in the first place, and how the young philosopher 
did not see any problems with sharing a physiological text by a known vivisectionist with the 
Wagners while they were still on friendly terms.  
 But Nietzsche was also cognizant of the pain inflicted on animals through vivisection. In 
a fragment in his early Nachlass from the spring/summer of 1878 he wrote: “It is like I have been 
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shot by the curare-arrow of knowledge: I see everything.”206 Curare, a poison from South 
America that causes paralysis of the muscles that eventually leads to death by asphyxiation, was 
a major target of antivivisectionists’ agitation. It was used in cases where anesthetic was deemed 
likely to interfere with the results of the experiment, particularly when experimenting on the 
nervous systems of animals. Weber was quick to observe that Bernard had already shown that 
curare was not actually an anesthetic, and that animals experimented on under its influence could 
feel everything that was done to them.207 It is tempting to see this fragment from Nietzsche’s 
Nachlass as a commentary on his own experience in his relationship to Wagner just before their 
break, and at the very least it shows his knowledge of a substance that played a major role in the 
debates surrounding vivisection in the 1870s and 1880s. This connection is strengthened when 
one considers what Human, All Too Human had to say about the consequences of human beings 
being animals.  
Like Schopenhauer and Wagner, Nietzsche remained committed to the idea that humans 
were animals. Yet the way he sought to understand the relationship between them, and the 
consequences this relationship had for how human beings lived their lives was quite different. 
Instead of appealing to vegetarianism as the only “pure” diet for the human animal and calling 
for an end to animal experimentation, like Wagner, or calling for a release of our animal will that 
would allow us to perceive the objective “Will” in itself, like Schopenhauer, in Human, All Too 
Human Nietzsche returned to the program of physiological relativism he had begun to develop in 
his early unpublished writings and lectures. The text simultaneously undermined Wagner’s ideas 
about Schopenhauer’s genius while dismantling the composer’s antivivisectionist position. While 
Nietzsche used the term psychological observation for his analysis of morality and psychology in 
this text, the way he talks about it sounds a great deal like a form of psychological vivisection.  
In Human, All Too Human Nietzsche appealed to the practice of psychological observation to 
demonstrate that not only were humans animals, but, just like any other animal, they were not 
morally accountable for their actions. Both were ruled by necessity, with instinctive attraction to 
pleasures and the aversion to pains. If self-defence was morally justified, then every action was 
morally justified, for every wicked act was related to self-preservation, or the intention of 
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procuring pleasure and avoiding displeasure.208 Even when people were pointlessly wicked, this 
was not evil so much as it was a kind of stupidity, failure of imagination, or innocence. Nietzsche 
observed that:  
When one does not know how much pain an act causes, it is not an act of wickedness; 
thus a child is not wicked, not evil, with regard to an animal: it investigates and destroys 
it as though it were a toy. But does one ever fully know how much pain an act causes 
another? As far as our nervous system extends we guard ourselves against pain: if it 
extended further, namely into our fellow men, we would never do harm to another.209  
 
The fact that this child is investigating and destroying an animal is one of the many oblique 
references to vivisection in the text, which explicitly vivisects the idea of pity itself. Here it is 
relevant to point out that the German word that was used in these discussions, Mitleid, means 
“suffering with.” This passage suggests that the German word for compassion, or pity, 
understood as a kind of “suffering with” is actually impossible. It is impossible to truly suffer 
with another person or creature because one’s sense of self, one’s nervous system, does not 
extend that far. It is only possible to know one’s own suffering, and the suffering caused by the 
knowledge or sight of the suffering of others. Yet that form of “suffering with” is not impersonal 
or purely altruistic, but is instead fundamentally grounded in how an individual relates to 
themselves.      
 Nietzsche is most explicit that one of the goals of psychological vivisection or 
psychological observations is the vivisection of pity in the second book of Human, All Too 
Human, “On The History of the Moral Sensations.” The first aphorisms of this section, 
beginning from “Advantages of Psychological Observation,” reads like a balancing of the pros 
and cons of the use of physiological and psychological vivisection, coming out in their favour. 
He complained that: “The art of psychological dissection [Zergliederung] and computation is 
lacking above all in the social life of all classes, in which, while there may be much talk about 
people, there is none at all about man,” and that such discussions cannot be found in current 
assessments of public events and personalities.210 Personal polemics could not help individuals 
understand human psychology; psychological vivisection, however, could. It is likely that this 
was a critique of journals like the Bayreuther Blätter.  
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 Despite the skill involved, Nietzsche admitted that psychological vivisection could be 
unpleasant to look at for those motivated only by philanthropy and not the spirit of science. It 
laid human motives bare and seemed to implant a sense:  
of suspicion and reductionism into the souls of men: A certain blind faith in the goodness 
of human nature, an innate aversion to the dissection [Zerlegung] of human actions, a kind 
of modesty in regard to the nakedness of the soul may indeed be more desirable things for 
the total happiness of an individual than that psychological perspicacity which may be 
helpful in particular cases.211 
 
However, Nietzsche nevertheless came down on the side of vivisection as a mode of 
psychological observation and analysis because he believed that it had become necessary. The 
analytical basis of science as a form of Wissenschaft, here implying both the historical and 
natural sciences, could not dispense with such methods. Investigators needed to be able to take 
things apart in order to understand where they came from. The errors of all philosophy hitherto 
had depended on false assumptions about human actions and sensations, and these sensations, as 
psychological, historical, and indeed, physiological phenomena, could not be understood apart 
from their origins. To understand origins, one had to take things apart, and learn how they were 
built up “brick upon brick” with the courage not to be ashamed of such “modest labour.” Those 
who have been ashamed of such labour, and here we can read Wagner, the Wagnerians, and the 
antivivisectionists, erected a false ethics on the basis of their erroneous analysis: “religion and 
mythological monsters [Unwesen] are then in turn called upon to buttress it, and the shadow of 
these dismal spirits in the end falls across even physics and the entire perception of the world.”212 
This was an attack on Wagner’s “mythological” worldview, as well as his ethical position. 
Wagner was aware of this attack in Human, All Too Human, and responded to it in his open letter 
to Weber by dismissing those who thought that Mitleid and unegotistical actions were just a form 
of “sublimated egotism.”213 Yet for Nietzsche, this kind of response was exactly why 
psychological observation had become necessary: “and mankind can no longer be spared the 
cruel sight of the moral dissecting table [Secirtisches] and its knives and forceps.”214  
 Wagner derided the usefulness of vivisection even as he claimed that questions of 
usefulness should not enter into the discussion of morality. Nietzsche also equivocated about the 
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extent to which psychological observation was useful, but stood firm on its necessity because 
science in all of its forms could not dispense with it. In defending psychological vivisection on 
these grounds, he provided his own description of science: 
Science, however, knows no regard for final objectives, just as nature knows nothing of 
it: but, as the latter occasionally brings into existence things of the greatest 
appropriateness and usefulness without having willed them, so genuine science, as the 
imitation of nature in concepts, will also occasionally, indeed frequently promote the 
wellbeing of mankind and achieve what is appropriate and useful - but likewise without 
having willed it.215 
 
It is in this early discussion of psychological observation, and in its relation to vivisection, that 
we can start to see the seeds of the ideas that formed the basis of his “fröhliche Wissenschaft,” or 
gay science. Nietzsche’s gay science was a kind of innocent and playful approach to analysis that 
involved taking things, concepts, and morals apart, recognizing their basic components and 
internal necessities, and then choosing how to put them back together. Importantly, it was the 
willful creativity of this “putting things back together” that differentiated gay science from other 
forms of science that claimed to merely be uncovering an objective world. This is what made gay 
science closer to nature than conventional scientific approaches, because gay scientists could 
recognize that they were assimilating, modifying, and reproducing their experiences in a creative 
and relative way. However, at this earlier stage of Nietzsche’s thinking he was focusing on the 
“incidental” qualities of science to prove a point about the contingent or non-teleological 
qualities of knowledge, nature, and necessity.  
Arguments about the necessity of vivisection were well known to the antivivisectionists. In 
Torture Chambers of Science Weber insisted that vivisection was not necessary. It was not 
possible to get nature to answer questions about its organization like an inquisitor. He argued that 
the arguments about the necessity of vivisection were the very same ones used by the Inquisition. 
Just as his contemporaries considered the Inquisition to be a barbarous and senseless event, 
Weber argued that posterity would also judge his vivisectionist adversaries in the same way.216  
Nietzsche inverted Weber’s claim about the Inquisition when he commented on the death of 
the Spanish physician Miguel Serveto. Serveto featured in a serious of studies about the history 
of vivisection that were written in the 1870s. In 1876 Henri Tollin, a scholar from Magdeburg, 
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published a book on Serveto in which he sought to give the physician pride of place for the 
discovery of the circulation of blood. Tollin stressed that Serveto’s works on the physiology of 
the pulmonary and nervous systems were performed to observe the “seat of the soul,” and that 
the Spanish physician felt the only way to do this with approximate certainty was to vivisect 
human beings. However, since Serveto recognized that this was inappropriate [unthunlich] he 
was forced to work on embryos and observe their development.217 Tollin would go on to write a 
number of books and articles on the topic of Serveto, and the relationship between religion and 
vivisection more generally.218 We do not know if Nietzsche read Tollin, or reviews of his works, 
but a reference to Serveto in Human, All Too Human suggests a familiarity with the debates 
about Serveto that Tollin had reignited at the end of the 1870s. Nietzsche’s aphorism “Judge 
Not” begins by cautioning readers against judging those from earlier periods of time according to 
modern values. Yet the first example he uses, John Calvin’s burning of Serveto, inverts the anti-
Catholic and anti-Semitic undercurrents of Weber’s account as it presents a Protestant burning a 
vivisector to death. Not only was Serveto burned by Calvin, but he was burned in absentia by 
Catholic authorities and charged with being a “judaizer,” a heretic who was introducing Jewish 
ideas into Christianity, by Catholics and Protestants alike.219 Tollin’s works were broadly 
reviewed in the periodical press in Germany and France.220 His interest in Serveto was partly 
spurred on by his interests in both vivisection, and attempts to understand the seat of the soul, 
and Nietzsche’s references to the Spanish physician strongly implies that Nietzsche thought 
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about the physician as someone involved in an enterprise similar to his own, vivisecting 
“psychological observations.”   
The burning of heretics by both Catholics and Protestants were both examples of the cruelty 
of earlier generations. Nietzsche argued that at the time both Calvin’s burning of Serveto and the 
tortures of the Inquisition were equally innocent because everyone involved believed that they 
were saving the world from eternal damnation. The idea of how others suffer was very weak 
within individuals and could easily be overridden by the belief in eternal ideals. Nietzsche 
argued that while his contemporaries had come to believe that the views about God and religion 
that motivated the Reformation were false, contemporary political dissidents were treated just as 
cruelly because modern society believed instead in the necessity of the state. The torturers of the 
Inquisition and Reformation were innocent in the same way children were innocent towards 
animals, even as they destroy them: “The cruelty towards animals exhibited by children and 
Italians is attributable to want of understanding; the animal has, especially in the interest of 
ecclesiastical teaching, been placed too far below man.”221 He concluded from his considerations 
of the cruelty of innocence that egoism was not evil, because the idea of another is very weak in 
the human animal: “That the other suffers has to be learned; and it can never be learned fully.”222 
Humanity had not had much time in which to learn that others suffer, and even the humans of the 
nineteenth century were essentially the same as those of the Reformation.  
Nietzsche admitted that people in the nineteenth century no longer forced their opinions on 
others physically in quite the same way as their Reformation forbearers. Nevertheless, there were 
still those who contradicted the opinions of others with violent polemics and outbursts of rage. 
Nietzsche implied that any critic involved in personal polemics only: “betrays clearly that he 
would have burned his opponents if he had lived in another age, and that he would have had 
recourse to all the methods of the Inquisition if he had been an opponent of the Reformation.”223 
While the Inquisition was reasonable at the time, insofar as the inquisitors involved saw 
themselves acting out of necessity and self-defence, they were only able to commit their violence 
because they believed that they possessed an absolute truth and were thus obliged to do anything 
possible to maintain it. Here, Nietzsche is indirectly subverting the vivisectionists’ arguments to 
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show that their own heated polemics indicated a similar backward (zurückgeblieben) inquisitorial 
mindset as the Reformation. Those who were more in tune with the current age recognized that 
no one was in possession of the truth: 
[T]he rigorous procedures of inquiry have propagated distrust and caution, so that anyone 
who advocates opinions with violent word and deed is felt to be an enemy of our present-
day culture, or at least as one retarded. And the pathos of possessing truth does now in 
fact count for very little in comparison with that other, admittedly gentler and less noisy 
pathos of seeking truth that never wearies of learning and examining anew.224 
 
Nietzsche recognized the importance of uncertainty and the dangers of absolutes. However, he 
also saw how those values that people esteemed the most grew out of those they esteemed the 
least. Even the dangers and cruelties of the Inquisition and the Reformation were necessary from 
a historical perspective, and could not be judged in any absolute moral way if modern observers 
wanted to go beyond the same kinds of moralizations that led to the Inquisition and the 
Reformation in the first place. This acknowledgment of uncertainty and necessity led Nietzsche 
to the position of the curare-paralyzed observer of natural and moral phenomenon. 
  One of the great ironies of existence that Nietzsche explored in Human, All Too Human 
was the way in which human beings are from their very beginnings illogical and unjust, because 
their judgments about the value of life have evolved from more basic material: “Good actions are 
sublimated [sublimirte] evil ones; evil actions are coarsened, brutalized good ones.”225 Not only 
this, but human evaluations are by necessity premature and limited in relationship to both 
themselves and to other things in the world because both are constantly in a state of flux. 
However, the irony creeps in because human beings are particularly well placed to recognize the 
illogical aspect of their origins and judgments. They cannot even avoid forming these illogical 
and unjust judgments, because human aversions and attractions are judgments at their most basic 
physiological level.226 
 Nietzsche’s psychological observations continue a theme he developed in his essay on 
“Truth and Lies” (1873). Humanity has no goal (just as science as “the imitation of nature in 
concepts” has no goal). Humans interpret and evaluate the world with the same physiological 
necessity with which spiders spin their webs, and human intelligence is squandered as nature 
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squanders thousands of seeds for the sake of producing a single tree. This knowledge oppresses 
those who feel that their freedom of will is the seat of their dignity. Yet those with a cheerful and 
creative temperament able to “hover” over and compare individuals, customs, laws, and 
traditional values will find in this very necessity the source of their contentment. These people do 
not need to be on their guard: “against malice or sudden outbursts and in whose utterance there is 
nothing of snarling and sullenness - those familiar tedious qualities of old dogs and men who 
have long been kept on the leash.”227 In this regard free spirits were the very opposite of those 
who took after the Reformation and Inquisition, the antivivisectionists and their allies.  
 It is telling that the last aphorism of the second section of Human, All Too Human, 
“Unaccountability and Innocence,” returns to the theme of how different historical periods judge 
each other differently. This time, however, it is not the past, and the Inquisition, that Nietzsche 
considers, but the way in which all present actions are stupid [dumm] considered from the 
perspective of the future. Yet before humanity gives into despair, it is important to remember 
that such pain was the pain of the creation of new values: 
The butterfly wants to get out of its cocoon, it tears at it, it breaks it open: then it is 
blinded and confused by the unfamiliar light, the realm of freedom. It is in such men as 
are capable of that suffering - how few they will be! - That the first attempt will be made 
to see whether mankind could transform itself from a moral to a knowing mankind.228  
 
Nietzsche’s claim, that everything is necessary, that even egoism, vanity, and cruelty have as 
“their finest flower, the sense for truth and justice in knowledge,” and that therefore everything is 
innocent, reads like a counterpoint to Wagner’s Parsifal, the “holy fool” of purity, innocence, and 
vegetarianism.229 Yet while Parsifal began his journey to Wagnerian purity and innocence after 
having shot a swan with his bow and arrow, it was Nietzsche himself who felt struck by the 
“curare-arrow of knowledge.” The paralysis was not muscular, but was a paralysis of 
accountability brought about by the knowledge of what was necessary in nature. With this 
realization Nietzsche’s “holy fools,” the intellectually vivisecting, comparing free spirits were 
developing: 
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a new habit, that of comprehending, not-loving, not-hating, surveying is gradually 
implanting itself in us […] and will in thousands of years’ time perhaps be strong enough 
to bestow on mankind the power of bringing forth the wise, innocent (conscious of 
innocence) man as regularly as it now brings forth - not his antithesis but necessary 
preliminary - the unwise, unjust, guilt conscious man.230  
 
This is a very different image of innocence from the one found in Parsifal, or in Weber’s Torture 
Chambers of Science. Not only did it develop out of Nietzsche’s changing thoughts about genius 
in the context of the vivisectionist controversies, but it highlighted his thought about the kinds of 
actions that were possible and meaningful for those who were not part of a moral, but of a 
knowing humanity.  
 
  Zöllner’s Psychological Vivisection 
 
 Nietzsche arrived at his understanding of the the close relationship between necessity, 
knowledge, cruelty, and innocence from how he applied the methods of physiological vivisection 
to his own particular form of psychological vivisection. His understanding of psychological 
vivisection also had precedence in the writings of the astrophysicist and antivivisectionist 
Friedrich Zöllner. However, rather than being a form of analysis and reflection, Zöllner’s version 
of psychological vivisection largely amounted to personal attacks and invectives against 
vivisectionists themselves. He argued that such cruel rhetoric was necessary, since it was the 
only language that vivisectionists could understand. Initially, Nietzsche supported Zöllner as a 
fellow outsider intellectual whose attacks on reductionism complemented Nietzsche’s own early 
attacks on historical reductionism. Yet when he broke with Wagner’s circle he also broke with 
Zöllner. Zöllner claimed that there was a close, pathological, relationship between vivisection, 
nihilism, and immorality. Nietzsche would invert Zöllner’s assessment to argue that 
antivivisectionism was closer to a pathology. Likewise, Zöllner argued that vivisection could 
never be part of a systematic science and had more in common with what he considered to be the 
haphazard and non-theoretical practice of alchemy. Nietzsche countered this by arguing that 
moralizing was a pre-scientific form of psychology, and that just as alchemy was a necessary 
precursor to chemistry, moralizing would give way to psychology.   
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 Nietzsche was not just rejecting Wagner’s and Schopenhauer’s sense of holism, genius, 
and innocence with his renewed interest in vivisection, he was also responding to the continued 
influence of the Bayreuther Blätter, the anti-Semitic antivivisectionists in his own family, and to 
the writings of Zöllner. Zöllner died a year before Wagner, but both continued to influence the 
polemics surrounding vivisection throughout the 1880s, and both were praised as some of the 
most important artistic and scientific opponents of vivisection. Zöllner trained in Berlin before 
moving to Leipzig in 1872 to take up a position at Leipzig University. He became known for the 
improvements he made to the spectroscope, which allowed him to prove that the Doppler effect 
applied to the apparent red shift of stars, as well as for his invention of the Zöllner illusion, 
which will be discussed further in chapter four. He counted among his friends the well-known 
physiologist and experimental psychologists Wilhelm Wundt and Gustav Fechner (1801-1887). 
However, he was most infamous for his anti-Semitism, his support of spiritualism, and for his 
frequent polemics against “foreign” influences in German science. Helmholtz and du Bois-
Reymond were frequently the target of these attacks. Zöllner charged them with enthroning the 
naive empirical approaches of England (Helmholtz) and France (du Bois-Reymond) into German 
science. Robin Small, in his Nietzsche in Context has observed the influence that Zöllner had on 
Nietzsche’s early thought about the structure of space and the scientific method, and describes 
Nietzsche’s early sympathy for the astrophysicist as a fellow outsider scholar and educational 
reformer.231 Nietzsche was likely first introduced to Zöllner’s ideas through On the Nature of 
Comets. 
Nietzsche enthusiastically read Zöllner’s On the Nature of Comets when it was first 
published in 1872, and borrowed it from the Basel University library several times in 1872, 
1873, and 1874. The main point that Nietzsche praised during this time was Zöllner’s critique of 
the “endless experiments and the lack of logical-deductive force” that he claimed haunted the 
historical sciences just as much as the natural.232 Here, Nietzsche cited the historian Leopold von 
Ranke (1795-1886), now considered the father of modern, source based history, as an example of 
this trend. He complained about: “The faulty developmental logic! It is atrophied through 
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historical studies. Zöllner, too, complains.”233 This interest is in keeping with Nietzsche’s early 
critiques of the scholarly vivisector, Bildungsphilister, or theoretical man who was unable to see 
the whole of life, but only its parts. Zöllner made his only appearance in Nietzsche’s published 
writings in “On the Uses and Disadvantages” (1874) in his Untimely Meditations where 
Nietzsche sought to show how the dramatist, unlike the historian, was able to “think of all things 
in relation to all others and to weave the isolated event into the whole.”234 The unity that he 
described here was not in the historical events themselves, but was lent to them through the 
creative imagination of the dramatist. While generalizations were what made laws possible in 
other sciences, historians only showed the weakness of their science through their 
generalizations, for what they produced was completely familiar and trivial: “To incommode 
whole nations and expend years of wearisome toil on it, however, is merely to pile experiment 
upon experiment long after the law intended to be extracted from them has been amply 
demonstrated: a senseless excess of experimentation which has in fact plagued the natural 
sciences since the time of Zöllner.”235 Indeed, in his early notes Nietzsche almost exclusively 
refers to Zöllner in the context of his own attacks on historical reductionism. As we have already 
seen, this was the same line of reasoning that led him to equate historical criticism with 
vivisection in “Schopenhauer as Educator” (1874). Zöllner’s critique of the “excess of 
experimentation” would likewise be picked up by Weber in the context of the antivivisectionist 
debates.236  
 After On the Nature of Comets appeared in 1872 Zöllner wrote a series of essays from 
1878 to 1881 that were eventually collected together and titled Scientific Papers. One of these 
papers, “On the Freedom of Science and the Necessity of a Moral Rebirth of the German Spirit” 
appeared in 1878 and was cited by Weber in Torture Chambers of Science. In 1880 Zöllner’s 
major antivivisectionist work On the Scientific Abuse of Vivisection also appeared. It is 
noteworthy that On the Scientific Abuse of Vivisection did support some forms of vivisection, 
                                                 
233 Friedrich Nietzsche, “eKGWB/NF-1873,29[200] — Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer–Herbst 1873. 29[200],” 
Nietzsche Source, accessed November 5, 2015, http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1873,29[200]. See 
also, Friedrich Nietzsche, “eKGWB/NJ-1 — Ein Neujahrswort: [Text]. Erste Veröff. 17/01/1873 ,” Nietzsche Source, 
accessed November 5, 2015, http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NJ-1; Friedrich Nietzsche, “eKGWB/NF-
1873,29[92] — Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer–Herbst 1873. 29[92],” Nietzsche Source, accessed November 5, 
2015, http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1873,29[92]. 
234 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages,” 91. 
235 Ibid., 92. 
236 Weber, Die Folterkammern der Wissenschaft, 28. 
 93 
what Zöllner called the “psychological vivisection” (psychologischen Vivisectionen) of personal 
polemics.237 Zöllner admitted that there was something unpleasant in every polemical exchange 
"like the sight of a battle or a bloody battlefield.” It was unpleasant because it reminded people 
of the “imperfections and infirmities” of humanity’s earthly form of existence.238 He insisted that 
his readers should not turn away from such unpleasantness, because the struggle was worth it for 
the creation of a new culture. Zöllner couched this discussion in the rhetoric of the military 
sacrifices made during the Franco-Prussian War for the founding of Germany, implying that he, 
too, was fighting for the honour of the fatherland. This led him to believe that future generations 
would forgive him for the vitriol of his polemics. He had already argued that such polemics were 
necessary in On the Nature of Comets because scientists were also part of a social structure that 
was susceptible to moral and intellectual corruption.239 This meant that in order to expose the 
corruption of a specific clique of scientists, it was necessary to target the major representatives of 
the group. Here he cited the physicist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-1799), who had 
written that: “It is a kind of duty to make the weaknesses of great people known, so that you set 
thousands right without harming them [the great people].”240 By 1880 Zöllner had begun turning 
this form of psychological vivisection against physiologists themselves. He argued that the only 
way to combat the “generally recognized intellectual and moral defects” of German society was 
to target their “outstanding personal supporters.”241 Yet even here he was referencing what he 
had already written in On the Nature of Comets, where he made the claim that: “I consider such 
psychological vivisection no less morally permissible in the service of truth and knowledge than 
the more painful physiological [vivisection] and even necessary, if it can not be done in any 
other way.”242 Although Zöllner was more amenable to the idea of physiological vivisection 
when necessary in the early 1870s, by the end of the decade he was calling for it to be severely 
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restricted, if not outright abolished.243 The idea of psychological vivisection was a rhetorical tool 
that he used to justify his heated polemics against proponents of physiological vivisection and 
those, like Helmholtz or du Bois-Reymond, who he took to be corrupting influences on German 
science.  
 Zöllner explored a further psychological dimension of vivisection in On the Scientific 
Abuses: the relationship between nihilism, psychology, and vivisection. Here he had in mind 
what he called the politically radical and subversive “Russian” nihilism of figures like Karl 
Nobiling (1848-1878), the German liberal who made an attempt on the life of Kaiser Wilhelm I 
in 1878. Political nihilism in Russia was understood as a branch of anarchism that refused to 
acknowledge external authorities, especially those imposed by the nation state. There were 
figures who identified themselves as nihilists in Russia, such as the radical socialist and 
materialist philosopher Nikolay Chernyshevsky (1828-1889). However, like the term anarchist, 
nihilist was often used as a broad term of abuse. Despite the fact that Nobiling does not appear to 
have identified himself as a socialist or anarchist, Bismarck used his attempt on the Kaiser’s life 
to pass antisocialist legislation. In 1884 Bismarck gave a lecture in front of the Reichstag where 
he associated the rise of political radicals, broadly construed as socialists, communists, 
anarchists, and nihilists with the rise of Russian nihilism among Russian and German students:  
The nihilists are composed of the Abiturproletariat [sic] [proletariat who had passed their 
final secondary-school examinations], that surplus that the scholarly instruction at the 
[Russian] Gymnasium supplies to a society unable to digest them [...]. The Russian 
authorities find that university students, who in their last years of secondary school 
dreamed of a future at the apex of public affairs as governors and high dignitaries, are 
happy after their stipends expire to find a position as a night watchman. It is this 
overproduction of half educated people that leads to nihilism.244 
 
Zöllner claimed that certain forms of education, like a background in physiology, ensured the 
training of political radicals by instilling a poverty of socially acceptable moral feeling and a 
disrespect for authority. He argued that Nobiling’s “nihilism” was largely a product of the fact 
that he studied medicine and likely witnessed several vivisections. Zöllner argued that 
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vivisection led to this kind of socially harmful nihilism and described a series of heated 
exchanges he had had with the physiologist Carl Ludwig to prove his point.245  
 As Small has observed, there are several similarities between Zöllner’s polemical approach 
and Nietzsche’s, many of which are attributable to the general style of German academic 
polemics at the time.246 Zöllner and Nietzsche both employed rhetorical magnanimity alongside 
their personalized polemics. Like Nietzsche, Zöllner claimed that despite his vitriol he could say 
with a clear conscience that he had neither personal nor professional enemies.247 However, some 
of their rhetorical similarities are more specific. In particular, Zöllner argued that it was 
necessary to employ the rhetoric of nutrition, digestion, and violence if he wanted to be 
understood by vivisectionists and physiologists such as Ludwig and du Bois-Reymond.248 
Zöllner also cited the infamous passage in Bernard’s 1865 work Introduction to the Study of 
Experimental Medicine to demonstrate the kind of language used by vivisectors. He argued that 
it was representative of the kind of language antivivisectionists would have to also employ in 
order to make their case heard: 
the physiologist is not an ordinary man: he is a scientist [ein Gelehrter, in Zöllner’s 
translation], possessed and absorbed by the scientific idea he pursues. He does not hear 
the cries of animals, he does not see their flowing blood, he sees nothing but his idea, and 
is aware of nothing but an organism that conceals from him the problem he is seeking to 
resolve.249  
 
While current scholars such as Waite single out Nietzsche for the violence of his rhetoric, they 
do not realize that it was common at the time, and characterized both those in favour of, and 
those opposed to, the practice of vivisection at the end of the nineteenth century. Nietzsche 
rejected Zöllner’s physiological antivivisectionism and holism when he broke from Wagner, but 
her retained some of his strategies of rhetorical vivisection.  
 But going beyond Zöllner, Nietzsche came to believe that psychological vivisection was 
not just a way to dissect rhetorically one’s intellectual opponents through personal polemics. 
Properly understood as a form of psychological analysis it was an important resource for self-
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understanding and the understanding of where morals and values come from. Importantly, for 
Nietzsche this form of psychological vivisection presupposed a basis in physiological 
vivisection. Physiological vivisection grounded those interested in understanding psychology in 
how the brain and nervous system functioned, and how these functions related to the feeling of 
mind, consciousness, perception, and values, which were themselves objects of study suited to 
psychological observations and vivisection. In Nietzsche’s Nachlass in the early part of 1884 he 
explicitly listed Zöllner’s antivivisectionism as one of the astrophysicist’s failings:  
The courage of head and heart is what characterizes us Europeans: acquired through the 
wrestling of many opinions. The greatest flexibility in the struggle with religions that 
have become subtle, and a harsh rigour, indeed cruelty. Vivisection is a test: whoever can 
not withstand it, is not one of us. (And otherwise it usually gives us an indication that he 
does not belong to us, e.g. Zöllner.)250 
 
There was an element of necessary, methodological cruelty in psychological vivisection. It 
required the same kind of attention to intellectual honesty and realization that the truth was not 
necessarily comfortable that Nietzsche thought characterized its physiological counterpart. In 
this context Zöllner’s opposition to vivisection was a sign of his decadence, which also 
characterized Wagner, for it showed how the astrophysicist could not come to terms with what it 
took to learn how ideas, morals, individuals, or living things came in to existence. Yet nihilism 
and the pathology of decadence were not the only concepts that Nietzsche inverted from the 
heated polemical exchanges of the vivisection debates. He also employed Zöllner’s attack on 
alchemy to show how Zöllner’s moralizing was the antithesis of knowledge and science.  
 Just as in the case of Nietzsche’s use of the Inquisition, understanding the vivisection 
debates helps to shed light on the subtext of some of Nietzsche’s discussions of alchemy.251 For 
Zöllner and many antivivisectionists at the end of the nineteenth century vivisection was like 
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alchemy. Both were presented as senseless movements that sought to take things apart in the vain 
effort to understand them. In response to an anonymous article that emphasized that vivisection 
was hardly an arbitrary and goalless “cutting and destroying” of living beings, Zöllner replied 
that even alchemy had goals. However, that was not enough to prevent the alchemists from 
sacrificing untold amounts of time and money trying to achieve the impossible.252 While the 
alchemists had goals, they had no coherent overarching theory, in short, no Wissenschaft, that 
would let them know if those goals were attainable, and if so, how to attain them. Zöllner, like 
many of his contemporaries, equated alchemy with what he saw as haphazard empirical 
practices.253 In this regard his critique of alchemy was a corollary to his critique of the piling up 
of “useless” and immoral experiments that Nietzsche had found so attractive in his early work.  
But in 1881 Nietzsche challenged this alchemical rhetoric by turning it back around to those, 
like Zöllner, who thought about morality in absolute terms. In Daybreak, in the aphorism “There 
Are Two Kinds of Deniers of Morality” he insisted that moral judgments were not based on 
truth, but that instead they were really errors that brought about human actions. He claimed that: 
“I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny that there 
have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them.”254 
Morality and immorality were not in the world, so much as they were in the human need to form 
interpretations of the world, and it was a testament to a person’s degree of circumspection that 
they could tell the difference. A year later Nietzsche expanded upon this thought, implying that 
religion and morality themselves were the pre-scientific preludes to the actual science of 
psychology, much as alchemy was one of the preludes to the natural sciences.255 He asked in the 
aphorism “Preludes to Science [Wissenschaft]”: 
Do you really believe that the sciences would ever have originated and grown if the way 
had not been prepared by magicians, alchemists, astrologers, and witches whose promises 
and pretensions first had to create a thirst, a hunger, a taste for hidden and forbidden 
powers? Indeed, infinitely more had to be promised than could ever be fulfilled in order 
that anything at all might be fulfilled in the realm of knowledge.256  
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Just as these “preludes and preliminary exercises” were the basis of science, Nietzsche reasoned 
that religion and morality were likewise preludes and preliminary stages of the hunger for 
knowledge about the self, and in particular, how the self creates the objects of its own desires. He 
was implying that religion was the pre-scientific prelude to the “vivisection” of psychological 
observation. Previous accounts of morality never sought to study it, to take it apart, but only 
provide justification for preconceived ideas. Earlier moral commentators only approached 
morality:  
as the morality of their environment, their class, their church, the spirit of their time, their 
climate and part of the world— just because they were poorly informed and not even 
very curious about different peoples, times, and past ages— they never laid eyes on the 
real problems of morality; for these emerge only when we compare many moralities.257  
 
In a likely nod to physiological analysis, and possibly Bernard himself, Nietzsche concluded the 
passage with the comment that what was needed, instead of a justification for morality and the 
faith in morality, was “an examination, analysis, questioning, and vivisection” of the faith in 
morality itself.258 He continued this line of thought in the aphorism “The Wanderer Speaks,” in 
which he encouraged his readers to try and see European morality from a distance, measuring it 
against other moralities from the past and future: “‘Thoughts about moral prejudices,’ if they are 
not meant to be prejudices about prejudices, presuppose a position outside morality, some point 
beyond good and evil to which one has to rise, climb, or fly— and in the present case at least a 
point beyond our good and evil.”259 Nietzsche would later suggest that one of the key reasons 
why novelty was so often equated with evil was exactly because such novelty forced the 
members of a society to compare themselves with it, and thus begin to try and examine 
themselves critically.260 From within any system of morality comparison was necessarily a 
transgression because by definition in order to be a comparison instead of a prejudice about a 
prejudice it had to look beyond the limits of any given moral system. What was needed in order 
to understand morality, instead of exercising it, was a typology and comparison of different 
moral systems. Yet: 
What the philosophers called ‘a rational foundation for morality’ and tried to supply was, 
seen in the right light, merely a scholarly variation of the common faith in the prevalent 
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morality; a new means of expression for this faith; and thus just another fact within a 
particular morality; indeed, in the last analysis a kind of denial that this morality might 
ever be considered problematic— certainly the very opposite of an examination, analysis, 
questioning, and vivisection of this very faith.261  
 
Shortly after this critique he referenced the “almost venerable innocence” Schopenhauer 
displayed when he tried to describe the scientific standing of morality. Here he quoted 
Schopenhauer’s claim that:   
The principle, […] the fundamental proposition on whose contents all moral philosophers 
are really agreed— [Hurt no one; rather, help all as much as you can] that is really the 
proposition for which all moralists endeavour to find the rational foundation … the real 
basis of ethics for which one has been looking for thousands of years as for the 
philosopher’s stone.262  
 
It is no accident that this reference comparing moral philosophers’ quest to find a rational 
grounding for morality with the alchemists’ quest for the philosopher’s stone follows 
immediately after a discussion of psychological vivisection. They were intimately linked in the 
broader debates around vivisection and Zöllner’s rejection of it as a scientific practice. This point 
is reinforced by a section from Nietzsche’s Nachlass from 1882 in which he wrote: “Morality is 
a pre-scientific form of explanation to come to terms with our emotions and states. Morality 
relates to an erstwhile pathology of common sensibility [Gemeingefühle], as alchemy does to 
chemistry.”263 Nietzsche had a persistent interest in the relationship between sensibility and 
emotions; the relationship between emotional and physical feelings and what was believed about 
those feelings.264  
 The term Gemeingefühl is important here. It is a specifically physiological definition for 
the sensation of inhabiting one’s body that comes about from the interpretation of multiple 
different stimuli from around the body. Such sensations as thirst, hunger, fatigue, or lust, would 
be considered as the byproducts of “common sensibility.” Nietzsche borrowed Otto Funke’s 
(1828-1879) 1863-1866 work Physiology Textbook for Academic Lectures and for Independent 
Study from the Basel University Library in 1870. It contained a number of references to the 
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German physiologist Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795-1878), whose 1851 work The Doctrine of the 
Senses of Touch and Common Sensibilities Experimentally Established presented common 
sensibility as the vital, but illusory sense of wholeness that is inferred by an organism.265 While 
Funke’s was not the only work on sensibility that Nietzsche encountered during the 1870s, it was 
one of the few places where the term Gemeingefühle was mentioned. Nietzsche’s 1882 reference 
to the term likely signals his thoughts about the rhetorical debates that related alchemy to 
vivisection at the start of the 1880s and Zöllner’s place within those debates. By calling morality 
a pathology of common sensibility, like alchemy to chemistry, Nietzsche was implicitly invert ing 
Zöllner’s arguments about alchemy to argue that vivisection in all of its physical and 
metaphorical forms was in fact the very basis of Wissenschaft and not its antithesis. Indeed, in 
order to be a form of Wissenschaft, psychological vivisection required physiological vivisection. 
As he wrote in his Nachlass during the winter of 1883-1884: 
The belief in ‘affects’ [Affekte]. Affects are a construction of the intellect, a fabrication of 
causes that do not exist. All common sensibilities [Gemeingefühle] of the body, that we 
do not understand, are interpreted intellectually; that is, a reason to feel such or such is 
sought after, in persons, experiences, and so on. Thus something harmful, dangerous, 
strange is posited as if it were the cause of our displeasure: actually it is sought after in 
addition to the displeasure, to allow us to conceive our state. — Frequent influxes of 
blood to the brain, accompanied by a feeling of suffocation, are interpreted as anger. — 
The people or things that provoke us to anger are triggers of the physiological state. 
Subsequently, through long habit certain occurrences and common sensibilities are so 
regularly connected that the sight of certain occurrences produces that state of the 
common sensibilities and brings with it specifically that congestion of the blood, arousal 
of the semen, etc.: thus, we then say by proximity that “the affect is excited.” In 
“pleasure” and “displeasure” there are already judgments: the stimuli will determine 
whether they are conducive to the feeling of power or not.266 
 
In order to understand how humans interpret their sensations and judgments, one had to 
understand their physiological preconditions, which were in themselves a form of judgment. 
 Nietzsche grew to have much more overt respect for empirical methods and 
methodological reductionism in the 1880s than he had throughout most of the 1870s, and along 
with this came his reexamination of vivisection. He was not the only person talking in terms of 
psychological vivisection around the early 1880s. Even here, his rhetoric was shaped by German 
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academic norms and the vivisection controversy. Antivivisectionists accused vivisectors such as 
Bernard and du Bois-Reymond of pursuing the “impossible” and immoral goal of showing how 
living beings were like organic machines composed of basic chemical elements, and this brought 
the rhetoric of chemistry, and alchemy, into the debates. This may be one reason why Nietzsche 
often chose the word sublimieren over the more Hegelian sounding aufheben when describing 
the sublimation of “evil” things into “good” things.267 It was an explicitly chemical analogy that 
implicitly showed his support for the forms of analysis performed by vivisectionists and 
historians alike. Part of denying physiology’s status as a proper Wissenschaft involved likening it 
to other “unscientific” practices, such as alchemy. Yet in the face of these discussions Nietzsche 
rhetorically repositioned the value of alchemy, presenting it as a necessary precursor to 
chemistry, in just the way that religion and morality were pre-scientific precursors to 
psychological analysis or psychological vivisection. Even if vivisection was in some ways at the 
“pre-scientific” stage of alchemy this nevertheless did not destroy its value as a source of hunger 
and interest, spurring on humanity’s desire to understand itself, and from where its values came.  
 
The Bayreuther Blätter and the Brothers Förster 
 
Nietzsche developed his own form of psychological vivisection that inverted the moralizing 
direction of Zöllner’s ideology. He also inverted Zöllner’s claims that vivisection led to nihilism 
and degeneration, as well as the astrophysicist’s denial that vivisection could be part of a 
systematic science. However, the arguments that Wagner and Zöllner had made throughout the 
1870s lived on after them in the pages of the Bayreuther Blätter, propagated by Nietzsche’s 
brother in law Bernhard Förster, and Bernhard’s brother Paul Förster. When Nietzsche singled 
out Wagner in his published writings, he was also using him to target the remains of Wagner’s 
circle who were perpetuating the composter’s arguments about vivisection and science 
throughout the 1880s.  
In The Case of Wagner (1888) Nietzsche commented that the moral and intellectual 
dishonesty of Wagner’s circle in Bayreuth and in the Bayreuther Blätter were not exceptional, 
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but characterized a broader pattern of hypocrisy with a ‘good conscience’ that was typical of 
modern life. Harkening back to Zöllner’s approach to psychological vivisection that stressed the 
importance of targeting a movement’s “outstanding personal supporters,” Nietzsche set his sights 
on Wagner:268 
A diagnosis of the modern soul— where would it begin? With a resolute incision into this 
instinctive contradiction, with the isolation of its opposite values, with the vivisection of 
the most instructive case.— The case of Wagner is for the philosopher a windfall— this 
essay is inspired, as you hear, by gratitude.269 
 
Nietzsche’s resistance to the community surrounding the Bayreuther Blätter set the tone for his 
later critiques after the composer himself passed away in 1883. Wagner increasingly played a 
double role in Nietzsche’s writings. On the one hand, he was the composer who Nietzsche had 
admired in his youth and then come to see as human, all too human. On the other hand, he was 
the symbolic figurehead of a larger movement that Nietzsche outright opposed. In Ecce Homo 
(1888) Nietzsche further elaborated on the entanglement of Wagner with his followers. He 
claimed that he had special knowledge of their methods and follies: “I think I know the 
Wagnerians; I have experienced three generations, beginning with the late Brendel who 
confounded Wagner and Hegel, down to the ‘idealists’ of the Bayreuther Blätter who 
confounded Wagner and themselves.”270 It is thus important to understand something of the 
arguments made in the Bayreuther Blätter in order to understand Nietzsche’s larger intellectual 
project. His personal life continued to intersect with the concerns of the journal, most 
dramatically through his indirect relationship with the brothers Paul and Bernhard Förster.  
In the appendix to The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, Kaufmann comments on the odd fact that 
shortly before or during his 1889 collapse that left him in a semi-lucid condition until his death 
in 1900, Nietzsche sent off a page that he claimed was intended to appear in his commentaries to 
The Case of Wagner in Ecce Homo. However, instead of sending it to his publisher in Leipzig, 
he sent it to his sister, Elisabeth, and her husband, Bernhard Förster, who had been living in an 
Aryan colony in Paraguay. While many of Förster’s papers were destroyed, along with many of 
Nietzsche’s own papers that were critical of his sister and her husband, this one survived. 
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Nietzsche harshly criticized Förster in it, writing: “Shall I here divulge my ‘German’ 
experiences?— Förster: long legs, blue eyes, blond (straw head!), a ‘racial German’ who with 
poison and gall attacks everything that guarantees spirit and future: Judaism, vivisection, etc.”271 
Elizabeth’s marriage to Förster on May 22nd 1885 only increased the tensions between the 
siblings.272 Writing to his sister from Nice around the end of December 1887, Nietzsche asked: 
“Do you want a catalog of the sentiments to which I feel antipodal? You will find them quite 
neatly next to each other in your husband’s ‘Echoes of P[arsifal].’”273 Indeed, in many ways 
Förster was Nietzsche’s shadowy opposite. While Förster employed fiery rhetoric to support 
sweeping cultural and educational reforms based on an understanding of the life sciences, the 
reforms he sought ― vegetarianism, antivivisectionism, anti-Semitism, Christianity inflected 
with Schopenhauerian philosophy, and ultimately, an expansion of German power and culture 
throughout the world ― were the antithesis of Nietzsche’s vision of the future. Few Nietzsche 
scholars have commented on the intense relationship between Nietzsche’s extended family and 
the antivivisectionist movement in Germany. Not only were the Förster brothers fervent 
antivivisectionists, but Paul even went on to become the editor for the antivivisectionist Friend 
to Animals and Humans, as well as becoming the president of the New Berlin Animal Protection 
Society in 1888.274 Yet as Nietzsche’s barbs show, his critiques of Förster revolved around both 
his brother-in-law’s anti-Semitism and opposition to vivisection. 
Zöllner died on the 25th of April, 1882. Bernhard Förster’s memorial for the astrophysicist 
appeared in the May/June edition of the Bayreuther Blätter. In it, he highlighted Zöllner’s 
devout, though unorthodox Christianity and devotion to pity as well as his opposition to 
materialism and vivisection.275 Förster called vivisection the “shame of the nineteenth century 
[…] analogous to the witch trials and torture chambers of past centuries.”276 Not only was it 
supported by physiologists, but by a closed phalanx of medical professionals and educated elite. 
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Förster claimed that it was vital to the antivivisectionist cause that it had supporters of Zöllner’s 
intellectual pedigree. That same year, Förster had sharply criticized the outcome of the debates 
over vivisection in the German Reichstag. He insisted that the reformation of German Bildung 
required that there be limits to the “freedom of science [Wissenschaft]” that the vivisectionists 
were using to defend their activities.277 Science existed for the sake of morality, and not morality 
for science, and so the freedom of science could not be used to justify the cruelties that Förster 
saw in vivisection. Förster was not a particularly innovative thinker, and most of his arguments 
against vivisection could be found in the writings of Weber and others. When Bernhard left 
Germany in 1886, his brother Paul took over writing against vivisection and the freedom of 
science in the Bayreuther Blätter.       
Paul Förster began his 1886 attack on vivisection with a quotation from Wagner that 
emphasized that humans misunderstood their relationship with other animals, making themselves 
not only beastly, but devilish. They did not understand that there was an inverse relationship 
between truth and self-interest.278 Echoing Zöllner’s critique of the uselessness of experiment 
piled up upon experiment, Förster employed a sort of pessimistic induction, observing how 
vivisection was a very uncertain method of investigation. The results of such experiments were 
invariably superseded by subsequent studies. Thus, how could proponents of vivisection make 
arguments about the greater good, if each new theory produced with the help of vivisection 
eventually turned out to be false?279 Aside from that, how could they claim that vivisection was 
actually necessary if they had not really tried to perform their researches without it? Instead of 
actually trying to discover if it was necessary or not, they were merely attracted to the “forbidden 
fruit” of vivisection.280 It was wrong to believe that vivisection was only performed to improve 
medical therapies. More often it was only to satisfy the idle curiosity of physiologists.  
 The Försters repeated arguments that were made earlier by Wagner, Weber, and Zöllner 
(arguments that were very similar to those made by Nietzsche himself throughout the 1870s). 
In doing this, they kept these arguments in the public eye throughout the 1880s. The Bayreuther 
Blätter was one of their main organs of publication and lent Wagner’s credibility to their 
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political projects. This helps to explain Nietzsche’s persistent attacks on Wagner and Wagnerism 
well after Wagner’s death in 1883. Between them the Försters continued his arguments on a 
startling number of fronts: from specialization, pity, vegetarianism, anti-Semitism, vivisection, 
the limitations on the freedom of science, the relationship between truth and self-interest, to the 
belief that physiology was not a real science at all. They presented Nietzsche with living 
examples of a worldview that he had repudiated, so much so that his critiques of them often 
sound like self-critiques of his published works during the 1870s. This should be kept in mind 
when Nietzsche begins to explore the relationship between knowledge and cruelty from 1878 
onwards.  
 
 Knowledge as Cruelty 
 
 The persistence of a Wagnerian antivivisectionist presence on the edges of Nietzsche’s 
social circles throughout the 1880s helps to explain his continued vocal support for vivisection. 
However, by then it had also become an important aspect of his thought about the world in its 
own right. While Nietzsche perpetuated the antivivisectionist view that knowledge and morality 
could not be separated, he stressed that they did not exist in a straightforward relationship. He 
inverted the common antivivisectionist argument that immoral actions could never lead to an 
increase in knowledge about the world. Instead, since one of morality’s consequences was the 
maintenance of a socially acceptable status quo, knowledge was inherently subversive and 
immoral. The search for knowledge required the seeker to live beyond good and evil. While 
“good and evil,” moral evaluations, played a role in the history of knowledge, these moral 
evaluations were not themselves knowledge. This position can already be seen in Nietzsche’s 
critique of morality as a pre-scientific form of psychology. He eventually began to think of 
moralizing as another form of vivisection. Moralizing vivisection was the torture of the animal 
that was the human being; the suppression of their drives towards some moral end. While it did 
allow some kinds of moral doubt and self-reflection, moralizing vivisection was just as cruel as 
physiological vivisection. It was even crueler than psychological vivisection because it 
perpetuated human ignorance, self-loathing, and self-harm by encouraging moralizing 
vivisectors to hold it in higher esteem that knowing, living, growth, and understanding. While it 
contributed to the thirst for systematic and scientific forms of self-reflection, it eventually 
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confronted them as their antithesis. Nietzsche’s acceptance of the necessity of all three forms of 
vivisection, moralizing, physiological, and psychological, played an important role in the 
development of his ideas about the love of necessity, or amor fati and its relationship to the 
Übermensch. Yet his amor fati emerged initially out of the way he inverted the antivivisectionist 
arguments about the relationship between cruelty, necessity, and knowledge.  
 One of the common rhetorical charges leveled against vivisectionists by their opponents 
was that they were hard, stony, or cold hearted. Antivivisectionists like the Försters argued that 
this was likely a byproduct of their training and specialization, which was a kind of vivisected 
Bildung.281 At other times, vivisectionists were simply charged with being crueler than other 
people. Nietzsche antagonized antivivisectionists by inverting this evaluation and showing the 
important relationship between cruelty and knowledge.282 Cruelty came to serve many roles in 
his thought, yet they all developed against the backdrop of the debates over vivisection. 
Nietzsche’s rhetoric is best understood within this context.  
 In keeping with his critique of opposite values that he began in Human, All Too Human, 
Nietzsche argued that the highest fruits of culture developed out of the sublimation of cruelty. In 
Beyond Good and Evil (1886), he claimed that: “Almost everything we call ‘higher culture’ is 
based on the spiritualization of cruelty, on its becoming more profound.”283 The “savage beast” 
in the human had simply become more divine, but it was far from extinguished. Indeed, the very 
attempt to extinguish it was itself a less than subtle cruelty directed back towards the animal in 
the human being. He repeatedly emphasized these points in Daybreak (1881), Beyond Good and 
Evil (1886), and the Genealogy of Morals (1887).284 Nietzsche ascribed to a psychological and 
material understanding of spirit, or mind [Geist]. Generally, when he talks about a psychological 
force becoming more spiritualized, he means that it has become sublimated into a subtler and 
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more intellectual form. Since there was no pre-established harmony between truth and human 
comfort, the search for knowledge was itself one of the highest and most sublimated forms of 
cruelty to emerge from the human psyche. The drive for knowledge actually worked against 
human comfort and contentment. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche asked his readers to 
consider that: 
even the seeker after knowledge forces his spirit to recognize things against the 
inclination of the spirit, and often enough also against the wishes of his heart—by way of 
saying No where he would like to say Yes, love, and adore—and thus acts as an artist and 
transfigurer of cruelty. Indeed, any insistence on profundity and thoroughness is a 
violation, a desire to hurt the basic will of the spirit which unceasingly strives for the 
apparent and superficial—in all desire to know there is a drop of cruelty.285 
 
Seen against the backdrop of the antivivisection debates, Nietzsche’s understanding of the 
relationship between knowledge and cruelty helps to elucidate the seemingly shocking rhetoric 
behind some of the comments about vivisection in his Nachlass. This is evident in the case of the 
passage that Waite used to brand Nietzsche an “esoterrorist,” which reads:  
Vivisection - that is the point of departure! Many are now becoming conscious of the fact 
that it is going to hurt many beings if knowledge is going to occur! As if it has ever been 
different! And what pain!! Cowardly feeble rabble!286  
 
As has already been shown, Nietzsche increasingly turned to the methods of psychological 
vivisection or analysis for insight into the human condition. This was one of the main tools he 
used to probe the limits of human knowledge. As a profoundly unsettling, but profoundly 
fruitful, method of investigation, it was also a sublimated form of cruelty. Importantly, Nietzsche 
considered it to be a more profound form of cruelty than the festivals of pity and self-
mortification promoted by the supporters of the Bayreuther Blätter in their appreciation of 
Wagnerian art and opposition to vivisection.  
 In his later writings Nietzsche discussed three kinds of vivisection, physiological 
vivisection, psychological vivisection, and moralizing vivisection. He characterized moral 
vivisection as the cruelty towards the human animal. While the supporters of the Bayreuther 
Blätter were quick to call out their opponents for their cruelty to animals, Nietzsche turned the 
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charge back around to them, stressing that they were obsessed with being cruel to the human 
animal itself. Nietzsche sought to show the continuity between the cruel festivals performed by 
the Romans at the expense of Christians, the Christian celebration of the sufferings of Christ, the 
Spanish celebrations of auto-da-fés or bullfights, and, in particular, the ways in which 
Wagnerians witnessing Tristan and Isolde gave themselves over to tragedy and the religion of 
pity. He argued that all of these were celebrations of cruelty, at first turned in innocence to the 
things outside of oneself, and then turned inwards, towards oneself. Unlike in antiquity, now 
there was an abundance: 
over-abundant enjoyment at one’s own suffering, at making oneself suffer— and 
wherever man allows himself to be persuaded to self-denial in the religious sense, or to 
self-mutilation, as among Phoenicians and ascetics, or altogether to desensualization, 
decarnalization, contrition, Puritanical spasms of penitence, vivisection of the conscience, 
and sacrifizio dell’intelletto à la Pascal, he is secretly lured and pushed forward by his 
cruelty, by those dangerous thrills of cruelty turned against oneself.287 
 
This form of vivisection, like the vivisection of psychological observation, was an attempt to 
gain mastery over oneself, but unlike psychological observation, it greatly increased the amount 
of suffering in the world without increasing the amount of knowledge. In the aphorism “Misuse 
of the Conscientious” in Daybreak (1881), Nietzsche commented: “Oh, how much superfluous 
cruelty and vivisection have proceeded from those religions which invented sin! And from those 
people who desire by means of it to gain the highest enjoyment of their power!"288 The 
puritanical, moralizing vivisector was far crueler than the physiological or psychological 
vivisector because the pleasure they took in it was far greater.  
 It is likely that when Nietzsche described this form of moralizing vivisection as “torture,” 
he was referencing Weber’s Torture Chambers of Science and Wagner’s support of it. In On The 
Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche wrote that: “We modern men are the heirs of the conscience-
vivisection and self-torture of millennia.”289 In the same work he wrote that: “our attitude 
towards ourselves is hubris, for we experiment with ourselves in a way we would never permit 
ourselves to experiment with animals and, carried away by curiosity, we cheerfully vivisect our 
souls.”290 Nietzsche often used the term “sorcerer” when he sought to indirectly reference 
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Wagner and the alluring effects of his legacy and influence.291 In The Genealogy of Morals he 
described how the secrets of the torture chamber were used to serve the interests of the sorcerer’s 
ascetic ideal: 
Every painful orgy of feeling, everything that shattered, bowled over, crushed, 
enraptured, transported; the secrets of the torture chamber [Folterstätten], the 
inventiveness of hell itself— all were henceforth discovered, divined, and exploited, all 
stood in the service of the sorcerer, all served henceforth to promote the victory of his 
ideal, the ascetic ideal.292 
 
Moral vivisection was the only form of vivisection sanctioned within the ascetic ideal, and 
Nietzsche had in mind Wagner and Weber as two of its representative proponents. The presence 
of these ideas in The Genealogy of Morals in particular also points to how Nietzsche’s 
genealogical method partially developed out of his thinking about vivisection. Whereas 
physiological vivisectors turned their knives on creatures who could not refine their capacity to 
feel pain, and psychological vivisectors could further human understanding of the necessities of 
life, moralizing vivisectors and other ascetics actively cultivated the ways in which humans 
could suffer and actively sought them out for the sake of suffering.  
 Even Nietzsche’s attempts to soften the blow of his insight about the relationship between 
knowledge and cruelty speaks to his engagement with the debates surrounding vivisection and 
around how different creatures, and, importantly, different groups of humans, differed in their 
susceptibility to pain. As he wrote in On the Genealogy of Morals:  
Perhaps in those days [in prehistory]—the delicate may be comforted by this thought—
pain did not hurt as much as it does now; at least that is the conclusion a doctor may 
arrive at who has treated Negroes (taken as representatives of prehistoric man—) for 
severe internal inflammations that would drive even the best constituted European to 
distraction—in the case of Negroes they do not do so. (The curve of human susceptibility 
to pain seems in fact to take an extraordinary and almost sudden drop as soon as one has 
passed the upper ten thousand or ten million of the top stratum of culture; and for my 
own part, I have no doubt that the combined suffering of all the animals ever subjected to 
the knife for scientific ends is utterly negligible compared with one painful night of a 
single hysterical bluestocking [Bildungs-Weibchens]).293 
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In his comments about a racial, gendered, and class based hierarchy of pain tolerance Nietzsche 
was repeating nineteenth-century conventions.294 His comparison between the suffering of the 
animals subjected to vivisection and to educated women was a direct provocation to the 
antivivisectionist movement, in which educated women played a major role. Yet in some ways, it 
also hid his implicit approval of some aspects of moralizing vivisection. 
 Nietzsche took note of both the perils and promises of moralizing vivisection and the acetic 
ideal. From the time of his aphorism on “Unaccountability and Innocence” in Human, All Too 
Human (1878), to his later writings he consistently described both as a kind of sickness, but a 
“sickness as pregnancy;” namely, the necessary pain that came before the creation of new 
values.295 While humans ultimately lived in an immoral and ungodly world, the Abrahamic 
religions interpreted it through the errors of the godly and moral, which, while errors, were in 
many ways invaluable. As Nietzsche stressed in his Nachlass: “Nor should we forget the positive 
gains: the refinement of the exegesis, the moral vivisection, the pangs of conscience have 
increased the falsity of the human being to the utmost and made them spirited [geistreich].”296 
That same year he had also written a note contemplating: 
The beginning of the end. To what extent this self-destruction of morality is still a piece 
of its own power. We Europeans have the blood of those who have died of their faith 
within us; we have taken up the fear and seriousness of morality and there is nothing we 
have not at some point sacrificed for it. On the other hand: our spiritual refinement has 
essentially been achieved through the vivisection of conscience.297  
 
Upon reflection, each form of vivisection, physiological, psychological, and moralizing, were 
part of a larger movement from the “no” saying and boundary setting of religious, moral, and 
later methodological forms of thought to the “yes” saying of knowledge, gay science, and amor 
fati.   
 While the curare arrow of knowledge provided insight at the cost of not being able to judge 
things in any absolute way, Nietzsche later claimed that: “I would like to know how to meet my 
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fate (vivisection) and my pain with the silent gaze of a dog.”298 In this note Nietzsche identified 
himself with the curare-paralyzed dog being experimented on to explore its nervous physiology. 
His self-identification with dogs, their relationship to vivisection and amor fati also helps to shed 
some light on the curious character of the leech, or the “the conscientious in spirit” in book four 
of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1885). Van Tongeren has observed that the character of the leech is 
how Nietzsche presented the purely objective individual who abstained from, or ignored, their 
own personality to become a mirror of the world.299 However, it is likely that the leech was a 
vivisector. In the scene Zarathustra compares himself and his interlocutor to both a leech and a 
dog. Both of these animals were charged symbols of the debates over vivisection. In his 
experiments that proved that curare was a paralytic and not an anesthetic, Bernard had employed 
leeches to show how the poison acted on the nervous system. This public demonstration was 
widely discussed in the periodical press.300 This controversial paralysis that did not spare the 
subject from pain thus involved both leeches, who were used to demonstrate how curare 
functioned, and dogs, upon whom curare was used to investigate the inner workings of the 
nervous system. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra the character of the leech is described as a specialist 
on the brains of leeches and honest to the point of cruelty, qualities that could have just as well 
described a practicing physiologist and vivisector. Nietzsche also includes his own brand of 
psychological vivisection or dissection when he has the character of the leech comment that he 
had managed to catch Zarathustra “the great conscience-leech” with his blood.301 Nietzsche 
extends the comparison between vivisectors, the paralysis of curare, leeches, and dogs, from the 
very first moment of the scene, when Zarathustra physically stumbles over the character of the 
leech and apologizes with an allegory about sleeping dogs. He compares both himself and the 
leech to dogs, and says that like dogs they were both in danger of senselessly fighting to the 
death. This is in keeping with Nietzsche’s early public attacks on vivisection, as well as his latter 
support for it. Vivisectionists had to contend with both the animals in their laboratories, and the 
opprobrium and personal polemics of the antivivisectionist. When Zarathustra notices the blood 
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running down the leech’s arm, he replies by saying: “It has gone badly, you poor wretch, in this 
life of yours: first the beast bit you, and then— the human stepped on you!”302 Treating the 
character of the leech as a vivisector also sheds light on Zarathustra’s response to seeing the 
leech, as he calls him a “torturer,” and asks: “shall I, just like a dog, / Roll over for you? / So 
yielding, inspired beyond myself, / And— wag my love to you?”303 Later the leech claims that it 
was Zarathustra’s teaching that “[s]pirit is the life that itself cuts into life” that seduced him to 
his teaching.304 Zarathustra was thus also something of a vivisector, but he was not paralyzed by 
the knowledge this gave him, nor did he stop vivisecting just at the level of the flesh.  
 Vivisection was central to the understanding of the sublimation of cruelty and the paralysis 
of moral evaluations that Nietzsche came to feel were inherent in the search for knowledge. His 
Nachlass shows that near the end of his productive life he related vivisection to his idea of amor 
fati and ability to will that the world be nothing other than what it is. He claimed that he had 
come to a turning point where he felt that he could appreciate the necessity of history and singled 
out the isolation he felt in his own life; the importance of the Germans, of Bismarck, of the 
revolutions of 1848, of Kant, and even of Martin Luther’s Reformation. If to vivisect Wagner 
was to seek to understand the most instructive example of modern man, the ongoing vivisection 
of human history inherent in the past two thousand years was an experiment with life itself:     
The great cultural crimes of the Germans are justified in a higher economics of culture... I 
want nothing else, not even backwards, —I could want nothing else... amor fati... Even 
Christianity is necessary: the highest form, the most dangerous, the most tempting in the 
negation of life only provokes its highest affirmation— … What, finally, are these two 
millennia? Our most instructive experiment, a vivisection on life itself… merely two 
millennia!305 
 
After 1882 Nietzsche transformed the paralysis he felt in light of what he had earlier called “the 
curare arrow of knowledge” into the calmness and determination of amor fati.  
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Conclusion 
 
Vivisection played an important role in much of Nietzsche’s thought. His later 
“genealogical” method was a continuation of the project he began with his psychological 
observations in Human, All Too Human. Small has highlighted the pains that Nietzsche went to 
later in life to disassociate his own project from that of his onetime friend Paul Rée.306 Other 
scholars have observed the debt that Nietzsche’s psychological observations also owed to French 
moralists such as François de La Rochefoucauld, Jean de La Bruyère, and Pierre Louis 
Maupertuis.307 These moralists served as the inspiration for both Nietzsche’s and Rée’s early 
aphoristic works.308 Nietzsche’s interest in vivisection combined both of these lines of influence. 
In a section of his Nachlass from 1884, he observed that: “Maupertuis suggested that to 
investigate the essence of the soul, one would have to perform vivisections on Patagonians. 
Every really genuine moralist treats himself like a Patagonian.”309 While it is uncertain whether 
or not Nietzsche understood the moralists and acts of psychological observation in terms of 
vivisection in the 1870s, he certainly did so by the 1880s.  
Nietzsche sought to refute and antagonize the antivivisectionists that he encountered 
throughout the 1870s. This context sheds a new light on some of his more controversial 
rhetorical choices, including: his discussion of the Inquisition, alchemy, torture, and witch hunts; 
necessity, vivisection, the relation between cruelty and knowledge, and his concern over what 
was at stake in the definition of science (Wissenschaft). In each case, he was responding to the 
antivivisectionist rhetoric and arguments made by Wagner, Weber, Zöllner, the Förster brothers, 
and others associated with the Bayreuther Blätter. Yet Nietzsche did not wish to merely 
antagonize antivivisectionists. He came to believe in the interconnected necessity of 
physiological, moralizing, and psychological vivisection, which taken together showed the 
interconnection and necessity of the human experience of the world. Pre-scientific moralizing 
vivisection led to the human suppression of drives and feelings; the “spiritualization” of the 
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animal in the human that opened up a conceptual space for self-reflection and doubt. Even this 
form of vivisection was not lacking in cruelty, however, for it involved the self-righteous and 
vicarious enjoyment of self-suppression and of pity for others. Psychological vivisection, what 
Nietzsche often referred to as psychological observation, was moralizing vivisection made 
systematic and scientific, “beyond good and evil.” However, it could not reach this level of 
sublimation and clarity without physiological vivisection, for physiological vivisection showed 
the basic components, or atoms, of perception, sensation, and feelings upon which psychological 
life depended. 
The debates about the necessity of vivisection were also closely related to the question of 
whether or not life, or the study of life, could even be a form of Wissenschaft. Detractors claimed 
that life could never be studied systematically, or through reductionist methods, because it was a 
fundamentally living whole, not a mechanical collection of modular parts. While Nietzsche also 
shied away from mechanical reductionism, he increasingly came to believe that reductionism as 
such was one of the primary methods for understanding the natural and the human. Yet even 
here, his adherence to reductionism was predicated on a different understanding of holism than 
the one he had embraced as Wagner’s propagandist. It was a non-dualistic holism of monistic 
origins, in which forces became differentiated through various kinds of sublimations in the 
universal process of becoming. One could not begin to understand the ways in which life could 
be creatively sublimated, however, without first understanding how it could be taken apart and 
reduced to its component parts.  
This form of reductionism involved the important “no” saying of his critiques, and of 
physiological, moralizing, and psychological vivisection. These methods were invariably painful 
and not lacking in cruelty, but Nietzsche described this pain as the vital pain of birth, growth, or 
metamorphosis. Understanding these forms of vivisection allowed one access to the study of life 
itself, conceived as an organic, historical, and personal processes. Vivisection in all of its forms 
revealed the contingencies that lay behind the innocent necessities of life. Nietzsche came to 
believe in a very different definition of innocence than the one showcased by Wagner in the 
figure of Parsifal. Nietzsche’s innocence was the playful, cruel, childlike innocence of necessity, 
which one could neither absolutely praise nor blame, but only seek to understand. This belief 
emerged from his encounter with the debates over vivisection, in which questions about the 
necessity of vivisection took central stage. Coming to terms with how one could understand the 
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seeming contingencies of life, and affirm them as necessary, became the basis of Nietzsche’s 
amor fati. This understanding of necessity is what could lead to the “yes” saying of the gay 
science, fröhliche Wissenschaft, which was the creative end result and reward of the systematic 
exploration and “no” saying of Wissenschaft. The question for Nietzsche then became, how 
could such “yes” saying be taught to others, and what did it imply about the the nature of organic 
and psychological life?  
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Chapter 3: A Vision of Self-Regulation 
 
A vision – [E]very day as it were a festival of attained and attainable dignity of human 
reason: a new and fuller efflorescence of the ideal of the teacher, in which the priest, the 
artist and the physician, the man of knowledge and the man of wisdom, are fused with 
one another, with a resultant fusion of their separate virtues into a single total virtue 
which would also be expressed in their teaching itself, in their delivery and their methods 
– this is my vision: it returns to me again and again, and I firmly believe that it lifts a 
corner of the veil of the future.310  
 
~Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 1878. 
 
 
Nietzsche did more in Human, All Too Human than argue that future educators would have to 
understand the physiological tendencies of their students in order best to help them learn. He also 
began to consider how education itself was a physiological process whose end goal was 
ultimately the freedom of the individual relative to their society. This line of thought would 
eventually lead him to the Übermench, and their freedom relative to the determinism of the 
cosmos; however, in the early stages of his thinking he focused on the relationship between how 
organisms attained a degree of relative freedom from their physical environment, and how an 
analogous process also took place in the way that free spirits were able to facilitate their own 
self-fashioning and education. Chapter one explored the historical trajectory of Nietzsche’s 
critiques of Schopenhauer’s and Wagner’s visions of genius and the role that Nietzsche’s interest 
in physiology played in these critiques. Chapter two positioned his criticism in the context of the 
vivisection debates of the late nineteenth century. This chapter will explore the alternative model 
of genius that Nietzsche developed after his break from Wagner, and how that vision consisted of 
a radicalization of many of the themes of education and dynamic self-regulation that could also 
be found in the writings of physiological thinkers and proponents of vivisection such as Justus 
von Liebig and Claude Bernard. 
The new idea of the teacher that Nietzsche envisioned in 1878 took as its model priests, 
artists, and physicians because he felt that they were all manifestations of different forms of 
dynamic self-regulation; the emulation of which would allow students to become free to shape 
themselves, as well as the world around them. Nor was Nietzsche alone in this interest. Dynamic 
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self-regulation occupied the thoughts of many nineteenth-century commentators. In mechanics, 
the centrifugal governor that regulated the speed of steam engines became a driving symbol of 
this fascination. The governor that emerged in the context of the development of the first and 
second law of thermodynamics also served as a frequent metaphor for the regulation of life itself. 
In a paper that was read before the Linnean Society in 1858, Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) 
observed that the evolutionary principle was, in effect, like “the centrifugal governor of the 
steam engine.”311 The physician and physiologist Carl Ludwig commented twelve years later that 
the centrifugal governor provided the first example of: 
a self-acting mechanism in which the interplay of forces took shape transparently enough 
to discern the connection between the heat generated and the motion produced. The great 
puzzle of the vital force was also immediately solved for the physiologist in that it 
became evident that it is more than a mere poetic comparison when one conceives of the 
coal as the food of the locomotive and the combustion as the basis for its life.312 
 
Claude Bernard, in his Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine (1865) also observed 
that all living things were organic machines that could be understood as complex steam engines. 
Like self-regulating machines, living machines were: “created and constructed in such a way 
that, in perfecting themselves, they become freer and freer in the general cosmic 
environment.”313  
 Vivisection was one of the only methods available to physiologists for studying the various 
mechanisms of self-regulation in living organism. This included the study of nutrition and 
digestion, the regulation of heat, the functions of the nervous system, and of sensation. It was 
also one of the practices that caused the most public outrage and demands that physiologists’ 
“academic freedoms” be limited. Nietzsche was deeply embroiled in the debates over 
vivisection, necessity, and freedom, as well as over the definition and meaning of genius and the 
purpose of education. These interests all converged in the idea of dynamic self-regulation. 
 The chapter will begin with an overview of Nietzsche’s interest in the idea of organic 
unity. He maintained that any abstract, or absolute unities were not possible because nature was 
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in a constant state of flux. The idea of an absolute unity itself was symptomatic of the tyrannical 
excesses of the Wagnerian genius. However, the collective action of competing “wills” or parts 
of the organism did create the relative unity of the individual as they self-organized towards ever 
more elaborate forms of self-regulation. This is one reason why Nietzsche placed so much 
emphasis on the internal environment of an organism, as opposed to its external conditions. 
While this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought borrowed much from non-Darwinian evolutionary 
thinkers such as William Rolph (1847-1883), Wilhelm Roux (1850-1924), and, Carl Nägeli 
(1817-1891), he was thinking about forms of dynamic self-regulation well before he ever came 
in contact with them.   
Liebig and Bernard were exploring how organisms achieved their independence from their 
environments in the 1830s and 1840s. Both the organic chemist and the physiologist were also 
prominent public figures who were the subject of debates in the Wagner circle over the funding 
and methods of science. This included how funding was spent on the training and education of 
scientists. The focus of Nietzsche’s interest in the purpose of education changed over time. He 
initially maintained that the goal of education was the eventual independence of the student. 
Later, under Wagner’s influence, he renounced this position and argued that the purpose of 
education was to allow the student to appreciate the works of genius. Independence was an 
impediment to education. However, when he broke with Wagner, he returned to and developed 
his initial position. There are many parallels between how Nietzsche described how an individual 
achieved a state of independence from their culture, age, and society, and how Bernard described 
an organism achieved a state of independence from its cosmic environment.  
While Nietzsche only made one direct reference to Bernard in his extant corpus, there are a 
number of striking similarities between the two thinkers. They both defended ideas of 
“meaningful freedom” within a deterministic framework, explored the limits of knowledge, the 
meaning of genius and freedom of mind (or spirit), and stressed the inevitability and importance 
of experimentation. There were also many parallels between their arguments about individual 
and organic independence. In some of his earliest published works, Nietzsche described 
education and the assimilation of culture by the individual as a process that turned what had been 
learned into “blood” that provided them a “limiting horizon” within which they could have 
greater freedom within their cultural context. His references to how an individual could arrive at 
a “transfigured physis” continued this line of thought, albeit in a form that downplayed its 
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similarities with the ideas of Bernard and other vivisectors throughout most of the 1870s, when 
he still wished to be part of Wagner’s circle. After his break with Wagner, Nietzsche largely 
seems to have returned to his earlier ideas about education, and even expanded on them in his 
discussions of the free spirit. 
The free spirit was Nietzsche’s early answer to Wagner’s idea of genius. Importantly, the free 
spirit was the product of their ability to steer the direction of their own education, as opposed to 
being the product of their inborn talents, as was the case with the Wagnerian genius. Nietzsche’s 
emphasis on how an individual’s philosophical worldview was inevitably an artefact of their own 
biographical and physiological histories meant that one free spirit could not directly teach 
another person how to become a free spirit. However, he did think that it was possible for one 
free spirit to perform or demonstrate how such a state of independence was achieved. Nietzsche 
understood himself as participating in this form of mutual education by exploring the various 
ways that it was possible to form a second nature out of one’s given, or first natures, and how 
Nietzsche himself was involved in a process of self-fashioning. This process was not without its 
elements of hypocrisy and artifice, but it also involved an acknowledgment of one’s own history 
and an affirmation that there were viable competing interpretations of the world. While 
Nietzsche distanced himself from Wagner and his circle, he also often referenced them as part of 
his own process of self-fashioning. This is one reason why Nietzsche was critical of the 
traditional understanding of “self-knowledge,” since it assumed that the individual was static and 
unchanging. In contrast, Nietzsche argued that individuals became individuals by actively 
willing and experimenting with themselves, their limits, needs, and desires.    
 Both Bernard and Nietzsche argued for the importance of active intervention in life in 
order to understand the limits of knowledge, and how those limits could be used creatively to 
serve individual needs and goals. Experimentation was the activity that allowed humans to 
become ever freer relative to their own cosmic environment. This process was comparable to the 
ways in which organisms assimilated elements from their physical environments in order to 
preserve and expand the powers of their milieux intérieurs. Nietzsche explicitly made this 
comparison when he described the spirit as a stomach in Beyond Good and Evil. The spirit was a 
stomach that took in experiences from its environment and assimilated them into itself. In this 
way it allowed the individual to create a “limiting horizon” within which they gained greater 
forms of freedom relative to that environment. This freedom within limits took on many forms, 
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and Nietzsche often described it as a kind of travelling. At various points in his writings he 
described it as the freedom of spirit that was produced by travelling in terms of physical distance, 
cultures, and historical epochs. However, it also required more abstract forms of travel, including 
into different states of health and different philosophical systems. Bernard once speculated that it 
would someday be possible to experiment with good and evil themselves in an effort to promote 
good and subdue evil. Nietzsche took this a step further, arguing that the breaking of taboos, 
what societies tended to call evil, were necessary experiments if one wished to understand the 
limits of human knowledge, and give humans the freedom to become more humane no matter 
what stage of their journey they were in.  
 
Nietzsche, Organic Unity, and the Importance of the Internal Environment 
 
While Nietzsche abandoned the idea of any absolute unities in nature when he split with 
Wagner, he nevertheless maintained a focus on the relative unity of individuals’ “inner” 
experience and inner environments. However, it is not always clear what he thought constituted 
the individual. Given the shifting pressures of an individual’s cultural, social, and physical 
surroundings, their individuality seemed to be in constant danger of being either an illusion, or a 
fluctuating and ephemeral epiphenomenon. Nietzsche came to accept the idea that the unities 
humans perceived in nature, and in themselves, were the very things that they projected into 
nature, as well as back onto themselves. In truth, neither the external environment nor the 
internal physiological or psychological environment were stable or whole. As he stated in a note 
found in his Nachlass there is always a “mass of consciousness and wills in every complex 
organic being.”314 These “wills” and the structure of society were reflections of each other 
insofar as the various cells, tissues, and organs, as well as instincts and drives of the human body 
existed in a hierarchically arranged state of tension. A person’s individuality was the sum total of 
these fluctuating hierarchies.  
Nietzsche was just as influenced by metaphors of cell states and social organisms as his 
contemporaries, such as Hertwig, Haeckel, and Virchow, and these broader assumptions came to 
play a role in how he thought about organic growth and development. In an organism certain 
complexes of drives and organic functions would come to predominate within the hierarchies 
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that constituted the individual, and make their subordinate functions more consistently and subtly 
reflect the expressions of their own drives. This domination was the source of the apparent 
stability of the individual that Nietzsche characterized as the self-regulative capacity of the 
human being. There was no super-instinctual “I” that governed an individual’s drives and 
passions. Even the aspect of the individual that sought to regulate the drives and passions was 
itself a drive, or collection of drives. Many of these regulating functions had been ingra ined 
within the human organism through the process of evolution. Nietzsche described the brain and 
nervous system as the vast centralizing organ that was largely the byproduct of this process of 
self-regulation. Yet the brain and nervous system could only be understood through examining 
the moral and psychological instincts that revealed “the history of self-regulation and 
arrangement of functions within a whole.”315 Even the brain and nervous system were in a state 
of flux, and did not represent the “completion” of the processes of self-regulation, but only one 
stage in its continued development.  
Nietzsche recognized that evolution was largely responsible for organisms’ tendency to 
develop toward self-regulating systems. Yet he went to lengths to stress that the driving force of 
evolution was not the pressures of an organism’s external environment. It was how the 
organism’s internal environment actively employed material from its surrounding to further its 
own ends. Writing in 1886/7, he observed that: “Darwin overestimates the influence of ‘external 
circumstances’ to a ridiculous extent; what is essential in the vital process is precisely the 
tremendous shaping force which creates forms from within and which utilizes, exploits the 
‘external circumstances.’”316 Stack and Moore have observed that Nietzsche’s rejection of 
Darwinian evolution, but acceptance of evolution in general, was characteristic of the German 
response to the publication of The Origin of Species in 1859, and was part of what Bowler has 
described as the “non-Darwinian Revolution” in which Darwin was merely one among many 
evolutionary thinkers of the mid- to late-nineteenth century.317   
Moore shows how as early as 1884 Nietzsche’s rejection of Darwinian evolution drew from 
his readings of such works as the entomologist William Rolph’s Biological Problems (1882), the 
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embryologist Wilhelm Roux’s The Struggle of the Parts in an Organism (1881), and the botanist 
Carl Nägeli’s Mechanico-Physiological Theory of Descent (1884).318 Like Nietzsche, all of these 
authors espoused evolutionary principles that minimized the role of Darwinian natural selection 
in the evolutionary process. Nietzsche would go on to support Rolph’s claim that Darwin’s use 
of Malthusian scarcity had caused him to exaggerate the role of survival in evolution.319 Instead, 
Rolph argued that scarcity was a rare condition that tended to favour average individuals and not 
exceptional ones. Even when not experiencing scarcity, organisms strove to assimilate far more 
resources from their environment than they could ever need for survival alone. The so-called 
instinct for self-preservation was actually a special instance of a much more important “principle 
of insatiability” or the drive for an intensification of life.320 Roux held that Darwin and his 
supporters placed too great an emphasis on the external environment in which organisms found 
themselves. While external pressures did play a role in evolutionary change, the much more 
profound struggles took place within the organism itself. “The struggle for existence” actually 
tended towards the average, and tended to kill not the unfit, but the more complicated and 
differentiated organisms; the very organisms with the most potential to bring about a change in 
the species. Moore claims that Nietzsche’s reception of Roux involved Nietzsche’s wholesale 
absorption of Roux’s ideas about self-regulation. While it is true that Nietzsche took up many 
diverse challenges to natural selection, it is also important to note that well before he read any of 
these authors he was already exploring many of the same ideas. This is particularly the case 
when one considers his interest in education and self-regulation in relation to Claude Bernard, 
and the role that Justus von Liebig’s work played in supporting chemical education.   
 
 Liebig, Bernard, and Nietzsche on Individual and Organic Independence   
 
 Much recent scholarship on Nietzsche has focused on his interest in the contingent and 
fluid unity of organic beings and how this unity was achieved by forces internal to the organism 
over and against those of its external environment. Nietzsche’s exploration of self-regulation was 
part of a much broader nineteenth-century focus on how organic matter maintained its 
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independence from its inorganic surroundings. This focus was in part spurred on by the public 
celebrity, and economic utility, of physiological and chemical researches into the specific 
mechanisms of organic self-regulation. For instance, Nietzsche’s own environment was replete 
with references to figures such as Liebig and Bernard who publicly championed the idea of 
dynamic self-regulation.    
 In his 1844 Familiar Letters on Chemistry the German chemist Justus von Liebig 
commented that: “All living creatures, whose existence depends upon the absorption of oxygen, 
possess within themselves a source of heat, independent of surrounding objects.”321 Liebig 
became a household name thanks to the marketing of his beef extract in 1865.322 In a note from 
1877 Nietzsche prescribed himself a quarter teaspoon of Liebig’s beef extract a day.323 It is hard 
to imagine that Nietzsche was unfamiliar with Liebig’s work, considering his general interest in 
chemistry, and the number of times he references Liebig, or, in particular, Liebig’s beef extract, 
positively in his letters.324 In a letter to his friend Franz Overbeck, Nietzsche observed that:  
We work too much: that is likely the reason why our machine must periodically break 
down. It crossed my mind these last few days that in three years I have written 
“Daybreak,” “The Gay Science,” and “Zarathustra”: considering that this literature 
belongs under the head of “Liebig’s Extract of Meat,” I ought not be annoyed about my 
“health” – but rather amazed! And it is quite the same with your enormous 
industriousness.325  
 
Nietzsche once wrote in a draft for “Why I Write Such Good Books” that unlike most 
philosophers, his writing had to be diluted instead of condensed in order not to upset his reader’s 
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digestion.326 He likely had Liebig’s extract of meat in mind when he made the comment. Moore 
has observed how Nietzsche’s interest in physiology was connected to his interest in 
understanding and managing his own ailments.327 While it may seem banal that Nietzsche used 
Liebig’s extract of meat to try and settle his stomach issues, even this connected him to 
contemporary theories of both dynamic self-regulation and education. This included how 
Nietzsche sought to regulate himself, and to Liebig’s own work in directing funding for 
education in Germany away from the arts and towards the chemical sciences.  
 Wagner’s antipathy for chemistry and the funding that was being directed towards it in his 
attack on Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human takes on a new dimension when considered in 
light of institutions such as Liebig’s teaching laboratories in Giessen and Munich. In his popular 
writings, Liebig went to great lengths to demonstrate the utility of chemistry, and chemical 
education, to natural philosophy, medicine, and agriculture, and the general wealth of the nations 
that pursued it. In this he enjoyed considerable success. His teaching laboratories were funded by 
Maximilian II of Bavaria (1811-1864). Maximilian II was the father of Wagner’s main patron, 
Ludwig II (1845-1886), whom Liebig had tutored as a child. Wagner’s attacks on atomistic 
reasoning reflected his attempts to stress the importance of his own, unifying, holistic and artistic 
approach to knowledge. Nietzsche’s broader interest in chemistry cannot be understood without 
also understanding how the popular discourses surrounding the chemistry of his age was 
increasingly organic, and physiologically oriented. These discussions also stressed the 
importance of more and better funding for educational institutions to train future chemists and 
physiologists in the hopes that their labours would contribute to the prosperity and independence 
of the nation through the invention of novel products and medicines, and by decreasing the need 
to trade with foreign nations.328 Despite his many successes, however, Liebig’s celebrity was 
vastly eclipsed by Bernard later in the century. 
 Bernard is sometimes described as the Einstein of the nineteenth century because of his 
prominence in the intellectual and cultural life of his age.329 During his career he became the 
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symbolic representation of the ideal scientist. He was referenced, directly or indirectly, in a range 
of popular works, including the writings of Émile Zola (1840-1902) and Fyodor Dostoyevsky 
(1821-1881). In 1889 the French realist painter Leon Augustin L'hermitte (1844-1925) painted 
“The Lesson of Claude Bernard (1813-78) Or, Session at the Vivisection Laboratory.” Bernard’s 
scientific prominence was also matched by his infamy in antivivisectionist circles. Bernard had 
studied physiology under François Magendie in Paris. He achieved his medical reputation for his 
description of how the liver secreted sugar into the blood regardless of whether or not the 
organism had consumed sugar, as well as his description of the role of the vaso-motor nerves in 
the regulation of body temperature. But it was his description and defence of the methods of 
science, contained in his Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine (1865), that brought 
him to the attention of a broader public. Today he is most celebrated for how he articulated the 
concept of the milieu intérieur, or how organisms possess dynamic inner environments that exist 
in a complicated state of independence and interdependence with their external environments.  
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“The Lesson of Claude Bernard (1813-78) Or, Session at the Vivisection Laboratory” 
(1889) by the French painter Leon Augustin L'hermitte (1844-1925). Accessed through 
the Wellcome Library, London.  
 
 Armin Wildermuth has recently argued that it is likely that Nietzsche encountered 
Bernard’s “Lectures on the Phenomena of Life Common to Animals and Plants” when it was 
first published in 1878.330 There is considerable circumstantial evidence linking Nietzsche with 
Bernard. There were ubiquitous references to Bernard in many of the physiological works that 
Nietzsche read in the late 1860s and 1870s, and, as indicated in Cosima Wagner’s diaries for 
August 16th 1879, Bernard was a topic of conversation in the Wagner household.331 Bernard was 
also much discussed in the antivivisectionist literature of the time. Zöllner mentioned him 
frequently in On the Scientific Abuse of Vivisection (1880) and provided a translation of a section 
from Frances Power Cobbes’ essay “Bernard's Martyrs, a Comment on Leçons de physiologie 
opératoire” (1879) that featured a list of purported historical accounts of human beings being 
vivisected in Italy during the sixteenth century. While there is no direct evidence that Nietzsche 
read any of Bernard’s major works, he is known to have been a reader of both the Philosophical 
Journal of France and Abroad and especially The Review of the Two Worlds, both of which 
featured references to, or articles by Bernard in which he presented arguments nearly identical, 
or similar to those he made in The Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine.332   
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 Despite the abundant circumstantial evidence of Nietzsche’s familiarity with Bernard’s 
work, however, there is only one extant reference to Bernard in Nietzsche’s Nachlass. In a 
fragment from the Spring of 1888 he wrote: 
Heath and disease are not essentially different [...] Actually there exist between these two 
types of existence only differences of degree: the exaggeration, the disproportion, the 
disharmony of normal phenomena constitute the pathological condition. Claude Bernard.  
 
Just as evil may well be considered as exaggeration, disharmony, disproportion, so can 
the good be a dietary regiment against the danger of exaggeration, disharmony, and 
disproportion.333 
 
Genius for Schopenhauer was a kind of hypertrophy and imbalance; Nietzsche came to 
conceptualize sickness in similar terms. This time, tellingly, he cited Bernard. Indeed, Bernard 
had many of the same interests as Nietzsche―from the limits of knowledge; through the role of 
determinism or fatalism in life, genius, freedom of the mind and opposition to systems; to the 
freedom of complex beings in their cosmic environment, and how it was the act of 
experimentation that allowed humans to become even freer within their environments.  
 Bernard’s earliest interest in the relationship between an organism’s internal and external 
environment is generally dated to a notebook entry from 1850-51 in which he wrote: “In 
physiology there are always two things to consider. 1. The organism, 2. The milieu.”334 As 
Holmes notes, however, Bernard was not the only physiologist thinking in these terms in the 
1850s. His friend and colleague Charles Robin had already published the idea that organisms 
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were divided into an internal and external environment in his 1853 Treatise on Anatomical and 
Physiological Chemistry. Bernard only later came to his developed idea of milieu intérieur by 
thinking about the parallels between the relationship of the tissues with their surrounding fluids 
and the relationship of the whole organism with its external environment. Cells and tissues could 
have direct contact with all of the elements required to sustain life. However, this was not the 
case for the organism as a whole. The various systems (digestive, circulatory, nervous, etc.) of an 
organism are all indirect means through which it maintains a distinction between its inner 
condition and that of its environment. In 1854 Bernard argued that blood was the primary point 
of contact between the organism and its environment, for it “contains all of the substances which 
surround the individual and which must nourish it” such as oxygen and the byproducts of 
digestion.335 Instead of being an ineffable vital force, life was the result of the relationship 
between an organism and its environment. By 1859, thanks to talks he had given at the Sorbonne 
and at the Collége de France, Bernard’s developed idea of the milieu intérieur and how it 
maintained the independence of the organism became increasingly widespread throughout 
physiological and public circles across Europe.336  
  
 Connections Between Nietzsche and Bernard  
 
 Nietzsche’s interest in dynamic self-regulation was reflected in the broader cultural 
attention given to figures such as Liebig and Bernard. Bernard in particular explored many of the 
same topics as Nietzsche in ways that Nietzsche would continue to develop as he moved further 
away from Wagner’s circle. These topics included, but were not limited to: the role of 
independence and freedom in education and organic life, the belief that causal determinism was a 
necessary component of meaningful freedom, the necessity of epistemic limits and the 
inaccessibility of absolutes, the distrust of systematizers, an understanding of genius as a 
methodology, and the importance of experimentally intervening in the world and in oneself. 
 Liebig and Bernard both stressed the vital “independence” (Selbständigkeit, or 
indépendance) of living organisms, while also stressing the fundamental chemical similarities 
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between living and nonliving matter. Bernard increasingly identified this vital independence as a 
kind of freedom. Questions about the meaning of independence and freedom played a major role 
in debates surrounding the purpose of education at the end of the nineteenth century. They were 
ideas that Nietzsche attacked while acting as Wagner’s propagandist. However, as with his 
writing in the Untimely Meditations, it is also possible to see evidence of the two Nietzsches in 
his early work On the Future of our Educational Institutions (1872).  
 On the surface, the image of education that Nietzsche presented in his lectures On the Future 
of our Educational Institutions was very much in keeping with Wagner’s understanding of 
genius and how non-geniuses were supposed to relate to them. He presented the lectures in the 
form of a narrative featuring himself and a friend as they sought to fulfill a pact to meet at a 
specific point in time in a specific place to discuss their shared vision of education. However, 
they soon take to target practice, and end up disturbing an old philosopher, “a great man,” and 
his student who had also made arrangements to meet someone at the very same place. 
Eventually, Nietzsche and his friend were allowed to listen in on the philosopher’s conversation 
as he talked about how to reform German education. The philosopher’s arguments caused them 
to abandon their earlier beliefs about education and accept that it should be structured around the 
“instinct to remain loyal to the sceptre of genius.”337    
 The way in which Nietzsche characterized his earlier beliefs in On the Future of our 
Educational Institutions (1872) betrayed something of the “mutual education” and drive to 
independence that he would propose in Human, All Too Human seven years later. Nietzsche 
claimed:  
It even seems to me,’ I said, ‘that everything that you have surely rightly blamed on the 
Gymnasium is only the necessary means required to produce, at such a young age, a kind 
of independence [Selbständigkeit] and at least the belief in it. The teaching of German 
ought to be in the service of this independence: early on the individual must become glad 
of his plans and intentions in order to be able to go alone without crutches. […] In short, 
we believe that it may be the tendency of the Gymnasium to prepare the student and 
accustom him to thereafter live and learn independently, as he had to previously under 
the pressures of the Gymnasium's regime.   
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However after this his narrator is admonished by the “great man,” who claimed that culture 
[Bildung] began with the opposite of academic freedom and independence.338 
The philosopher laughed at this, but not exactly good-naturedly and replied: 'Here you 
have just given me such a beautiful example [Probe] of this independence. And this very 
independence is what dismays me so, and makes the company of the student of the 
present always so unedifying for me. [...] Never was a time so rich in the most beautiful 
independences [Selbständigkeiten], never was every slavery so intensely hated, and of 
course even the slavery of education [Erziehung] and culture [Bildung].339 
 
The purpose of education was not to produce independent individuals, nor should it be. The 
philosopher in the narrative admonishes Nietzsche and his friend, claiming that while much was 
made of independence, students were really just being taught how to listen to other people 
lecture. The philosopher would rather see students learn how to subject themselves to the 
tutelage of great men who could perceive the unity of things.  
 This argument about the importance of submitting to geniuses that could see the unity of 
nature also featured an antivivisectionist edge. As opposed to growing up in “metaphysical 
unity” with nature, the “great man” complained that youth were learning “how to subdue nature.” 
This prevented them from seeing its unities and forced them to fight in the struggle for existence 
(Lebenskampfe), for the sake of utility: “Here every naive metaphysics comes to its end: and the 
physiology of plants and animals, geology, and inorganic chemistry forces their disciples into an 
entirely altered view of nature.”340 The fragmentary approach to knowledge typified by these 
disciplines had come to influence the historical style so much “that even the living body of 
language has been abandoned to anatomical studies: however right here is the beginning of 
culture (Bildung): that you understand how to treat the living as living.”341 Passages such as these 
in Nietzsche’s early writing highlight the ways in which debates about physiology, vivisection, 
independence, self-development, education, and genius where thoroughly connected.342 It also 
suggests that he would have more than a passing interest in Bernard’s writings, which touched on 
all of these themes.   
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 Bernard argued that a belief in causal determinism was a precondition for knowledge of the 
natural world. Given the same causes the same effects must necessarily follow. This was why he 
resisted the application of statistical reasoning to medicine, for it only revealed the 
incompleteness of medical knowledge. Causal determinism also served as the basis for his 
criticism of vital forces, which would be a disruption of material causation. He accepted that 
many would resist the application of deterministic reasoning to the study of life because of its 
implications for the freedom of the will. However, he also stressed that determinism was 
different from fatalism. Deterministic reasoning was what allowed humans to make predictions 
and act in their environments trusting that cause will follow from effect, while fatalism was the 
belief in humanity’s inability to meaningfully intervene in its surroundings.343 A belief in causal 
determinism was required for individuals to be meaningfully free because it was causal 
determinism that allowed them to intervene in the course of their lives. This closely mirrored 
how Bernard understood the freedom of complex organisms relative to their environments. 
Holmes has explored the ways in which Bernard’s popular articles reveal how he came to an 
understanding of the conditions under which the milieu intérieur maintained the “free and 
independent life” of complex organisms. Yet this freedom and independence was achieved in the 
context of the interdependence of the organism with its environment. In his 1878 article 
“Lessons on the phenomena of life common to animals and plants” Bernard observed that:  
The fixity of the milieu presupposes a perfection of the organism such that the external 
variations are at each instant compensated for and equilibriated. Consequently, far from 
being indifferent to the external world, the higher animal is, on the contrary, in a tight and 
informed relationship with it, of such a nature that its equilibrium results from continual 
and delicate compensation, established as if by the most sensitive balances.344   
 
Bernard’s emphasis on meaningfully intervening in one’s surroundings in a deterministic 
framework was both a physiological and epistemic position. It had consequences for his 
understanding of the meaning of genius, education, and the limits of knowledge.  
 Bernard’s understanding of living beings meant that there were epistemic limits to what an 
organism could and could not know about its environment. Since life was an emergent property 
of the relationship between an organism and its environment, there needed to be things outside of 
the organism in order for it to be alive in a meaningful sense. Complete, certain, or absolute 
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knowledge of any phenomena would require complete or absolute knowledge of the cosmos as a 
whole. Bernard held that such “absolute” knowledge of the organism would only be possible if 
there was nothing outside of that organism. However, this too was an impossibility, for that 
would mean that the conditions of absolute knowledge would rule out the very possibility of life 
itself, since organic life depended on its cosmic environment. The same also held true for any 
system of knowledge that claimed to be complete and finished, or presented an existential 
answer to “why” existence was one way instead of another. At best it was only possible through 
experimentation to have some sense of “how” the world worked, not why it worked in the way 
that it did. Bernard criticized his intellectual opponents such as Zöllner for their dogmatism and 
their “scholastic” claims about absolute knowledge:   
[K]nowledge of the inmost nature or the absolute, in the simplest phenomena, would 
demand knowledge of the whole universe; for every phenomenon of the universe is 
evidently a sort of radiation from that universe to whose harmony it contributes. In living 
bodies absolute truth would be still harder to attain; because, besides implying knowledge 
of the universe outside a living body, it would also demand complete knowledge of the 
organism which, as we have long been saying, is a little world (microcosm) in the great 
universe (macrocosm). Absolute knowledge could, therefore, leave nothing outside itself; 
and only on condition of knowing everything could man be granted its attainment. Man 
behaves as if he were destined to reach this absolute knowledge; and the incessant why 
which he puts to nature proves it.345  
 
Yet while absolute knowledge was impossible, with the right experimental methods individuals 
could nevertheless find ever more nuanced ways to intervene in their environments and 
meaningfully increase their freedom to act within them. At this point Bernard’s views on genius, 
freedom, and education start to align quite closely with Nietzsche’s.   
 Nietzsche would come to champion the idea of the free spirit (Freigeist). One of the 
distinguishing characteristics of the free spirit was their distrust of philosophical systems. 
Writing in Twilight of the Idols in 1888 Nietzsche commented that: “I mistrust all systematisers 
and I avoid them. The will to system is a lack of integrity.”346 Bernard was cautioning his readers 
against the tendency to adhere too closely to philosophical systems much earlier than that, and 
also stressed the importance of a free mind/spirit (liberté d'esprit). He argued that experimental 
medicine was itself not a system of medicine, but the “negation of all systems,” being merely the 
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“regular and logical coordination of facts furnished by experience.”347 Bernard considered the 
experimental method to be the method that “proclaims the freedom of the mind and of thought” 
over and against the tyranny of fixed ideas (Idée fixe) and “the taste for systems.”348 Like 
Nietzsche, he claimed that “the best philosophic system consists in not having any.”349 This is 
because systems were not found in nature, “but only in the mind of man.”350 This position was 
diametrically opposed to the deductive science proposed by Zöllner and the Wagnerian 
detractors of vivisection.  
 Bernard’s distrust of dogmatic systematizers and absolute truth claims meant that his vision 
of genius shared many similarities with Lange’s vision of genius. While Lange’s geniuses self-
consciously created unities in nature in order to make possible the scientific method, Bernard’s 
geniuses generated novel hypotheses, which they then tested against nature through 
experimentation.351 Just as life was creation, the act of genius was the generation of a creative 
idea.352 In this way Bernard inextricably linked genius with method and creativity, claiming that 
creative genius “may be diminished or even smothered by a poor method, while a good method 
may increase and develop it.”353 Appeals to authority, even the authority of a genius, could never 
replace a good method. Bernard stressed the dangers of “a mistaken respect for personal 
authority,” for: “Great men, indeed, are precisely those who bring with them new ideas and 
destroy errors. They do not, therefore, respect the authority of their own predecessors, and they 
do not expect us to treat them otherwise.”354 Bernard held that even “great men” were inevitably 
creatures of their own particular environments and histories.355 It was important to understand 
them, and appreciate them, in order to understand where the science of the present came from, 
but they were not to be slavishly followed.356 Indeed, Nietzsche and Bernard would come to 
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agree on this point in particular: “Great men often teach us by their errors as much as by their 
discoveries.”357  
 The philosopher in Nietzsche’s On the Future of our Educational Institutions (1872) 
criticized the education system for only teaching students how to listen to lectures and read 
books, instead of how to live. Bernard similarly stressed that in order to teach the scientific 
method it was vital to teach students that active experimental science could only take place in 
laboratories, and could not be merely taught through readings and lectures.358 In a telling passage 
Bernard laid out his vision of education:  
I think a teacher’s role should be limited to clearly showing his pupil the goal that a 
science sets itself and to pointing out all possible means at his disposal for reaching it. 
But a teacher should then leave his pupil free to move about in his own way and, 
according to his own nature, to reach his goal, only coming to his aid if he sees that he is 
going astray. I believe, in a word, that the true scientific method confines the mind 
without suffocating it, leave it as far as possible face to face with itself, and guides it, 
while respecting the creative originality and the spontaneity which are its most precious 
qualities. Science goes forward only through new ideas and through creative or original 
power of thought. In education we must, therefore, take care that knowledge which 
should arm the mind does not overwhelm it by its weight, and that rules, intended to 
support weak parts of the mind, do not atrophy the strong and fertile parts. [In contrast] 
sciences submitting to [systems] would lose their fertility and would abandon the 
independence and freedom of mind [liberté d'esprit] essential to the progress of 
humanity.359 
 
In each of its instantiations, from education and the experimental enterprise, to organic 
functioning, Bernard presented freedom as a form of dynamic self-regulation. Education was the 
process of giving students the means for regulating themselves, without limiting their creative 
abilities. This was not just limited to the freedom of the individual. More than this, with the 
experimental method humans could further their freedom well beyond that which was possible 
for other species.  
 In the Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine Bernard drew an analogy 
between living systems and the process of experiment. He argued that: “Living machines are 
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[…] created and constructed in such a way that, in perfecting themselves, they become freer and 
freer in the general cosmic environment.”360 He argued that experimenters became freer in a 
strikingly similar fashion: “With the help of these active experimental sciences, man becomes an 
inventor of phenomena, a real foreman of creation; and under this head we cannot set limits to 
the power that he may gain over nature through future progress in the experimental sciences.”361 
Experiment was inextricably linked with experience and trials. Bernard observed how the French 
word expérience, meant experiment, attempt, and experience, and defined an experimenter as: “a 
man who produces or induces, in definite conditions, observed facts, to derive from them the 
instruction which he wishes,— that is, experience.”362  
 There were a range of practices that counted as experimentation in this expanded sense for 
Bernard. While morality forbade experimenters from doing harm, and actively demanded that 
they experiment on their fellow humans and themselves if it was to save a life, or cure a patient, 
“in everyday life men do nothing but experiment on one another.”363 A person’s most banal 
activities, those that produced structured experience of the world, were all experiments. As long 
as they led to some kind of structured experience, there were never any unsuccessful 
experiments.364 Only certainty could make an experiment unproductive, for doubt was the 
precondition of the experimenter’s mastery: “The experimenter […] who always doubts and who 
does not believe that he possesses absolute certainty about anything, succeeds in mastering the 
phenomena that surround him and in extending his power over nature.”365 Whether it happened 
inside the laboratory or in daily life, nothing was outside of the experimental enterprise. Bernard 
makes this clearer in a section from his article on “The Problem of General Physiology” where, 
in a turn that sounds almost like Nietzsche, he observed that it was even desirable to experiment 
with good and evil:   
Modern civilization, by conquering the science of inorganic and organized nature, has 
found itself in entirely new conditions, unknown to ancient civilizations. This is why it is 
perhaps not always logical to invoke the history of ancient peoples to speculate on the 
destiny of new peoples. Today humanity seems to have realized that its aim is no longer 
passive contemplation, but process and action. These ideas penetrate more deeply into 
society, and the active role of the experimental sciences does not stop at the physico-
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chemical and physiological sciences; it extends to the historical and moral sciences. One 
understands that it is not enough to remain a passive spectator of good and evil, enjoying 
one and preserving ourselves against the other. Modern morality aspires to a greater role: 
it investigates causes, wants to explain and act on them, it wants to dominate the words 
"good" and "evil", to give birth to one and develop it, to fight with the other to eradicate 
and destroy it. Therefore one can see, that it is a general trend and the modern scientific 
breath that animates physiology is its most eminent conqueror and ruler.366  
 
In a review of the Introduction that ran in The Review of the Two Worlds in 1866, the author Paul 
Janet (1823-1899) took this implication a step further, describing the French Revolution as a vast 
social experiment that tried to establish a society based on the law of reason. Janet attributed the 
revolution’s disastrous results to the comparative difficulty of experimenting on living societies, 
as opposed to living bodies or inorganic nature. Despite this, he reasoned that such things as the 
division of powers, free trade, and equal rights were experiments that society was running on 
itself, parallel to the work being done on steam, electricity, magnetism, or the chemical action of 
light.367 This passage resonates with Nietzsche’s reflections on the past two thousand years being 
an experiment, or vivisection of human history. For both Bernard and Nietzsche, these 
experiments had the effect of increasing human freedom (humanity’s ability to regulate itself) 
within the deterministic system of nature.  
 
 Hiding in the Realm of a Transfigured Physis 
 
 While Nietzsche’s interest in dynamic self-regulation, education, and genius paralleled and 
reflected the work of such figures as Liebig, Bernard, and Lange, Nietzsche obscured these 
parallels up until the publication of Human, All Too Human in 1878. Throughout most of the 
1870s he strove to maintain good relations with Wagner and his circle. Courting Wagner’s good 
graces also meant that if he wanted to express any ideas that might be seen as sympathetic to 
physiologists or vivisection he had to do so in an oblique and coded manner. Yet this manner 
became more and more transparent over time. Examining Nietzsche’s changing discussion of 
culture and of how education and genius involved the development of a second nature, or a 
“transfigured physis,” throughout the 1870s shows this pattern of oblique references. Borrowing 
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the Aristotelian language of a transfigured physis allowed Nietzsche to explore ideas that would 
have been antithetical to Wagner or Schopenhauer without appearing to be directly contradicting 
them.   
Physis was a consistent theme in Nietzsche’s writing, especially when he dealt with the 
parallels between organic development, self-regulation, and education in the 1870s. In The Gay 
Science (1882), in the aphorism “Long Live Physics!,” Nietzsche claimed that it was physics that 
allowed individuals to give laws to themselves, to become what they were, by giving them the 
materials they need to create their own tables of good and sense of taste.368 The Nietzsche 
scholar Kaufmann was puzzled by Nietzsche’s use of the term physics in this aphorism and 
vaguely gestured to some possible solution in the word’s relationship to the Greek physis. 
Nietzsche’s use of the term gains a new dimension when one considers the way in which Bernard 
sought to ultimately ground physiological research and education in physics through a common 
emphasis on causal determinism. Bernard claimed that understanding the relationship between 
physiology and physics was vital if the next generation of physiologists were going to contribute 
to how humans meaningfully acted in a causally determined natural world. Nor is this the only 
time when Nietzsche’s use of the term physis echoed points found in Bernard’s thought. 
Nietzsche’s language of a transfigured physis largely articulated thoughts similar to Bernard’s or 
Lange’s in a kind of Aristotelian or classical language that was calculated to avoid alienating 
Wagner or the Wagnerian circle. 
 In On the Use and Disadvantages of History for Life (1874) Nietzsche explored the 
relationship between individuals and their contexts. While he was specifically referring to 
problems of education, history, and psychology, he did so with language that was highly 
reminiscent of Bernard’s discussion of the increased refinement of organisms’ milieu intérieur: 
The stronger the innermost roots of a man’s nature, the more readily will he be able to 
assimilate [aneignen] and appropriate [anzwingen] the things of the past; and the most 
powerful and tremendous nature would be characterized by the fact that it would know no 
boundary at all at which the historical sense began to overwhelm it; it would draw to 
itself and incorporate into itself all the past, its own and that most foreign to it, and as it 
were transform it into blood.369 
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In this early work, Nietzsche described the psychological and cultural equivalents of 
assimilation, digestion, excretion, healing, and growth as taking place within the milieu extérieur 
of history and experience. In this case the individual’s strength and complexity was determined 
by their ability to employ these external circumstances to the advantage of their own milieu 
intérieur without being thrown off balance by the fluxuation of their surroundings. It is no 
accident that Nietzsche described this process as an individual’s ability to take things that were 
most foreign to them and transform them “into blood.” In Bernard’s earlier writings, he 
described blood as the primary agent that maintained the dynamic equilibrium of organic life, 
and allowed warm-blooded organisms a much greater range of environmental freedoms than 
their cold-blooded counterparts. In Nietzsche’s terminology, an individual’s “horizon” played the 
role of a kind of psychological and cultural milieu intérieur. Like Bernard, here Nietzsche also 
highlighted the role of destruction, dis-assimilation, or forgetting as the vital predicates upon 
which organic or cultural life depended.370   
 In “Schopenhauer as Educator” (1874) Nietzsche offered a different definition of culture 
from his previous two meditations. Instead of defining culture as the inherent unity of a folk’s 
artistic style, he claimed that culture was a kind of personal liberation.371 The desire for culture 
emerged from “each individual’s self-knowledge and dissatisfaction with himself,” and had as its 
goal the production of geniuses from the longing each person had to be reborn as a genius.372 
Here Nietzsche was articulating a much more egalitarian alternative to Schopenhauer’s vision of 
genius. Even non-geniuses could feel sympathy for the genius and recognize in nature the 
“immeasurable longing to become whole.”373 Notably, however, this longing did not necessarily 
correspond to an ability to objectively see into the deepest depths of objective reality, but a 
desire for the perfection of their own nature, and the achievement of a state of self-knowledge 
through the transfiguration of their physis.374  
 Physis is a term that appears most frequently in Nietzsche’s published writings between 
1870 and 1876. On the surface of it, it was the ancient Greek word for nature, from which 
English draws both physics and physiology. It also had connotations of growth and of essence. 
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Aristotle discussed physis in several places in his collected writings from his Physics and 
Metaphysics to his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. Ward has commented on the various, and 
sometimes contradictory, ways in which Aristotle used the term physis. When he discussed 
physical nature, Aristotle used physis to distinguish between the motions of natural things from 
the motions of artifacts. Organic growth and decay, and the motion of the elements were due to 
the inner telos, or potential, in their nature becoming manifest, whereas artifacts and violent 
motion occurred when some external force acted upon something natural. This definition is 
echoed in some of his writings on human nature, when Aristotle described the hierarchy in which 
men, women, and slaves participated based on their inborn abilities to rule. However, in sections 
of the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics where he discusses education and virtue, he presents a 
far more plastic view of human nature, arguing that: “Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to 
nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made 
perfect by habit.”375 In these texts Aristotle presented a view of human nature that was defined 
by how individuals re-defined themselves, and their first nature, into a second nature, through the 
process of education.376 As Brobjer has shown, Nietzsche had a persistent interest in Aristotle’s 
writings and purchased his collected works in 1868.377 Nietzsche’s use of physis was far more 
evocative of Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between education and ability than 
Schopenhauer’s. Given the fact that for most of the 1870s his Wagnerian context would have 
made it very difficult for him to express ideas that could be considered sympathetic to Bernard 
and other vivisectors, the language of a transfigured physis also allowed him to appear to be 
supporting Wagner’s views of nature and education, even while he was increasingly moving 
away from them. 
 During the mid-1870s Nietzsche described modern philosophers (and here it may be safe 
to include Bernard) as the mightiest promoters of life who argued for the importance of a 
“transfigured physis” or second nature. In doing so he also emphasized that life was a physical, 
time bound process.378 It was only after this process of unification that one could truly be said to 
                                                 
375 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2001), 952. 
376 Julie K. Ward, "Aristotle on Physis: Human Nature in the Ethics and Politics,” Polis: Journal of the Society for 
Greek Political Thought 22 (2005): 287-308, 299. 
377 Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, 51, 57. 
378 Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 145. 
 140 
become what one is. In “Schopenhauer as Educator” he argued that this was what Schopenhauer 
was supposed to have achieved:   
The longing for a stronger nature, for a healthier and simpler humanity, was in 
[Schopenhauer’s] case a longing for himself; and when he had conquered his age in 
himself he beheld with astonished eyes the genius in himself. The secret of his being was 
now revealed to him, the intention of his stepmother age to conceal his genius from him 
was frustrated, the realm of transfigured physis was disclosed.379  
 
Yet while Nietzsche claimed that he was describing Schopenhauer and the process whereby the 
philosopher became a genius in “Schopenhauer as Educator,” what he was really doing was 
beginning to undermine the entire edifice of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.  
Even in 1874 Nietzsche presented a model of self-knowledge that was predicated upon 
paying attention to the little things of an individual’s habits and context, including their 
friendships and enmities, their facial expressions and way of shaking hands, their memories and 
the things they wished to forget, their books and handwriting.380 Even the genius could be 
understood by paying attention to such seemingly fragmentary details. Mirroring Schopenhauer’s 
own metaphor of the painting, Nietzsche subverted its original meaning by claiming that “[t]o 
understand the pictures one must divine the painter.”381 While here he apparently echoed 
Schopenhauer in complaining about the tendency of the whole “guild of the sciences” to busy 
itself uselessly with “the canvas and the paint” of genius, he also made it clear that in divining 
the origin and works of the genius “painter” it was necessary to understand the biographical 
process of self-formation which the genius underwent. This was the very thing that 
Schopenhauer had derided as “attending only to the style of [the] frame” of genius. Nietzsche 
was actually presenting an argument about how genius was defined by the individual’s ability to 
make a harmonious whole out of the heterogeneous elements of their psychological, cultural, and 
physiological circumstances, even as he claimed that he was defending Schopenhauer’s views.  
Nietzsche cited the Italian Renaissance polymath and autobiographical writer Benvenuto 
Cellini (1500-1571) as an example of this kind of genius in “Schopenhauer as Educator.”382 He 
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described Cellini as a “harmonious whole” who arrived at his inner harmony from the 
“simultaneous sounding of many voices in one nature.” Nietzsche claims that he was an 
individual “in whom everything, knowledge, desire, love, hate, [strove] towards a central point, a 
root force, and where a harmonious system [was] constructed through the compelling domination 
of this living centre.”383 In emulation of Cellini, Nietzsche argued that understanding the “higher 
laws of motion” of the individual would allow the educating philosopher to understand how their 
pupils’ heterogeneous natures could be transformed into harmonious wholes akin to a living 
solar and planetary system in a state of dynamic equilibrium.384 This is why Nietzsche placed 
such importance on the fashioning of a second nature or transfigured physis in “Schopenhauer as 
Educator.”  
Nietzsche’s accounts of genius as a form of self-consciously transfigured physis more 
closely resembles Lange’s creative and self-aware genius, as well as Bernard’s experimental 
vision of education, than it resembled Schopenhauer’s arguments about genius and education. 
Nietzsche expressed his hopes that the philosopher could derive an organic and historical method 
for unifying the disparate parts of the human mind and body while also lending the contingencies 
of life greater purpose and meaning. Instead of being able to see into the depths of the thing- in-
itself, Nietzsche explicitly presented the genius as a creative and social individual who could 
shape contingencies into unities that did not exist outside of their shaping of them:  
[T]he striving after [normally] valued things acquired meaning only through an exalted 
and transfiguring overall goal: to acquire power so as to aid the evolution of the physis 
and to be for a while the corrector of its follies and ineptitudes. At first only for yourself, 
to be sure; but through yourself in the end for everyone.385  
 
Nietzsche’s discussion of a transfigured physis was a re-articulation of the “second nature” that 
he described in “On the Uses and Disadvantages” (1874). This time he presented the idea with an 
even more explicit emphasis on the human being as an active creator and regulator of itself and 
its values. In a statement that would not have been out of place in Human, All Too Human, he 
even claimed that: “it is only an illusion that a spirit can be free and independent if this achieved 
unlimitedness –which is at bottom creative self-limitation– is not demonstrated anew from morn 
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till night through every glance and every gesture.”386 Genius was a process of recognizing one’s 
limitations and creatively setting limitations on one’s self that helped one create new values and 
goals.  
Nietzsche would continue to develop and reflect on these relationships between genius, 
education, freedom, and physiology until the end of his productive career. It is worthwhile to 
explore how his work came to perform the very processes of self-fashioning that he was 
attempting to teach his readers. When he finally broke from Wagner in 1878, he became even 
more explicit about this alternative form of education.  
 
 The Free Spirit’s Mutual Education  
 
 Nietzsche began openly contradicting Wagner in Human, All Too Human (1878). What he 
had previous expressed obliquely in the language of a second nature or transfigured physis he 
began to explicitly describe as his own vision of genius and education. Nietzsche’s alternative 
genius required an alternative educational trajectory than that which Nietzsche had defended as 
Wagner’s propagandist in On The Future of Our Educational Institutions (1872). He returned to 
his earlier notion of education as a form of mutual education; a process that he tried to exemplify 
as he described his own attempts to fashion himself. It was a development that may have started 
out as hypocrisy, but became the basis of personal growth and transformation. In 1878 Nietzsche 
claimed to be seeking the genius of humanity as a whole, a state in which the health of a culture 
was determined by the diverse number of free spirits, or experimenters, that it could support. He 
attributed qualities to the free spirit that were directly opposed to Wagner’s or Schopenhauer’s 
models of genius. Whenever he spoke positively of genius in Human, All Too Human, he also 
attributed different qualities to it that set it apart from Wagner’s ideal. When he critiqued genius 
and great men as tyrannical, unhealthy, or destructive, however, he did so with Wagner 
specifically in mind.  
 The free spirit was a subspecies of genius, but it was a particularly liberatory model of 
genius. The aphorism “The Glory of the Great” typifies this point. In it Nietzsche claimed that: 
“Of what account is genius if it does not communicate to him who contemplates and reveres it 
such freedom and elevation of feeling that he no longer had need of genius! - Rendering 
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themselves superfluous – that is the glory of all great men.”387 In a number of passages in 
Human, All Too Human he presented a very different sense of genius than Wagner’s or 
Schopenhauer’s. Yet this family resemblance can be seen in the relationship between the free 
spirit and tradition, similar to, but also notably different from, that of Schopenhauer’s genius: 
Compared with him who has tradition on his side and required no reasons for his actions, 
the free spirit is always weak, especially in actions for he is aware of too many motives 
and points of view and therefore possesses an uncertain and unpracticed hand. What 
means are there of nonetheless rendering him relatively strong, so that he shall at least 
make his way and not ineffectually perish? How does the strong spirit […] come into 
being? This is in the individual case the question how genius is produced.388  
 
The free spirit was created from themselves without negating their awareness of the multiplicity 
of “points of view” that could be brought to bear on any given subject, and they did not seek to 
destroy their own history, but only overcome it. Nietzsche clarified: “The term ‘free spirit’ here 
is not to be understood in any other sense; it means a spirit that has become free, that has again 
taken possession of itself.”389 The reflective or retroactive moment of self-recognition that 
characterized the free spirit constituted both an acknowledgement of history and an overcoming 
of it, not by rejecting its necessities, but by crafting their appearance and the effects they 
produced. By not simply acknowledging, but by embracing their origins and limitations, the free 
spirit overcame the tendency to see themselves as an end or final product. Unlike Wagner’s or 
Schopenhauer’s genius, a free spirit recognized the value of alternatives and the resistances they 
faced in their own process of development. They thus required a greater store of energy than 
those thinkers who found themselves grounded in traditions, whether they were imitating, 
destroying, or outdoing those traditions. The free spirit, much like Bernard’s experimenter, was a 
genius with a history, with an awareness of their own inevitable partial-perspective. They were 
capable of rejoicing in alternatives and in their capacity to help produce alternatives.  
 Nietzsche argued that the coercive and dogmatic educational system as it existed in the 
nineteenth century was not equipped to bring about free spirits. Like Bernard, Nietzsche was 
concerned with how many educators seemed only capable of producing students and followers, 
not geniuses, and free-spirited educators. In the aphorism “Girls as Grammar-School Pupils,” he 
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warned: “For heaven’s sake don’t let us transmit our grammar-school education to girls! An 
education that so often takes spirited, knowledge-thirsty, passionate young people and makes of 
them – images of their teachers!”390 In a particularly moving passage from Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra (1883-1885), which he later quoted verbatim in Ecce Homo (1888) as an example of 
how he wished to be read, he cautioned his readers from following any teacher too closely, for: 
“Perhaps he has deceived you. / […] One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil. […] 
You had not yet sought yourselves when you found me. […] Now I bid you lose me and find 
yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you.”391 In many cases the 
recalcitrance of a student was what demonstrated their value, and their ability to derive new 
values for themselves. He expressed this thought in “Disloyalty, Condition of Mastership” that 
“every master has only one pupil – and he becomes disloyal to him – for he too is destined for 
mastership.”392 In “Joy in Recalcitrance” he argued that it was an awareness of what was human, 
all too human, in an educator that allowed them to take joy in the obstinacy of their pupils: “A 
good educator knows cases in which he is proud of the fact that his pupil remains true to himself 
in opposition to him: in those cases, that is to say, in which the youth ought not to understand the 
man or would be harmed if he did understand him.”393 Nietzsche would later expand upon this 
idea when he described the ways in which a philosopher’s system was a conceptual mirror of 
their own physiological and personal history.  
“Gradually it has become clear to me,” Nietzsche wrote in 1886 at the beginning of 
“Beyond Good and Evil,” “what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal 
confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir.”394 Philosophical 
systems could only claim to be universal systems because of this bad consciousness about their 
own origins. They were always grounded in the given drives and moral pretensions of their 
creators. Even the drive to have one’s philosophical system taken to be a universal truth was 
merely a fragmentary aspect of the individual philosopher that sought to present themselves as 
the whole person. Just like the tyrannical genius every single one of a person’s drives, “would 
like only too well to represent just itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate 
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master of all the other drives[,] and it attempts to philosophize in that spirit.”395 Thus there was 
nothing impersonal about philosophy. The philosopher’s “morality bears decided and decisive 
witness to who he is—that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in 
relation to each other.”396 This means that while philosophers might be able to develop systems 
that were vital for their life and wellbeing, these systems were likely to harm others who sought 
to emulate them too closely. A more libratory approach to education would involve the student 
understanding something about the human, all too human, qualities of the people from which 
they hoped to learn and how their own philosophies emerged from their attempts to refashion 
themselves.  
The approach to the “little things” of a philosopher’s person was vital, Nietzsche argued 
in Ecce Homo (1888), for: “All the problems of politics, of social organization, and of education 
have been falsified through and through because one mistook the most harmful men for great 
men—because one learned to despite ‘little’ things, which means the basic concerns of life 
itself.”397 In this we hear a definite echo of his critiques of the cult of genius and education’s role 
in the perpetuation of the cult. Instead: “these small things – nutrition, place, climate, recreation, 
the whole casuistry of selfishness—are inconceivably more important than everything one has 
taken to be important so far. Precisely here one must begin to relearn.”398 Nietzsche’s ideal of 
the free spirit brought with it an alternative sense of the meaning and purpose of education. It 
was one that imparted to the student the capacity to resist the freedom quashing aspects of 
education, and resist it in ever more creative and challenging ways.  
 Nietzsche suggested in Human, All Too Human that the solution to the normalizing and 
coercive tendencies of education was to break down the student/teacher relationship into a kind 
of mutually instructive friendships: 
Now that self-education and fraternal education are becoming more general, the teacher 
must, in the form he now normally assumes, become almost redundant. Friends anxious 
to learn who want to acquire knowledge of something together can find in our age of 
books a shorter and more natural way than ‘school’ and ‘teacher’ are.399 
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Importantly, this mutual education was exactly the same idea that Nietzsche and his friend were 
supposedly discussing in On The Future of Our Educational Institutions (1872) before being 
converted to the “great man’s” Wagnerian educational philosophy, as noted above. This form of 
education implied a challenge to the cult of genius with its top-down approach to learning and 
offered instead a process of collaborative self-fashioning through texts and conversation. 
Nietzsche would only slightly complicate this image of education later on with his assertion that 
“there are no educators.” However, he did so with much the same narrative direction:   
As a thinker one should speak only of self-education. The education of youth by others is 
either an experiment carried out on an as yet unknown and unknowable subject, or a 
leveling on principle with the object of making the new being, whatever it may be, 
conform to the customs and habits then prevailing: in both cases therefore something 
unworthy of the thinker […]. – One day, when one has long since been educated as the 
world understands it, one discovers oneself: here begins the task of the thinker; now the 
time has come to call on him for assistance- not as an educator but as one who has 
educated himself and who thus knows how it is done.400 
 
This is part of the self-referential aspect of Nietzsche’s emerging understanding of education. 
One free spirit could further the education of another. However, it was not through teaching them 
their own systems of thought and ways of living, but by sharing with them how they arrived at 
those things for themselves. Nietzsche was arguing that the personalization of philosophy served 
an important didactic purpose. Beginning with the text Human, All Too Human, he sought to 
enter into a different kind of relationship with his “students” as a friend who could benefit from 
understanding how Nietzsche himself was attempting to become free. This effort was not without 
its artifice, however, and it is sometimes difficult to tell where Nietzsche was trying to fashion 
himself and where he was merely trying to distance himself from his ties to Wagner and his 
circle. His arguments about the cult of genius, of the non-universality of music, and even his 
caution that when approaching any idea “the little word ‘probably’ does us good, because it 
breaks the personally burdensome tyranny of the unconditional” were all in the service of this 
goal.401  
Nietzsche’s account of his own self-fashioning and the “genius” against whom he 
positioned himself thus served a didactic purpose. In the Gay Science, published in 1882 and 
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significantly expanded in 1887, Nietzsche acknowledged his own history and relationship to 
Wagner in an aphorism entitled “Schopenhauer’s Followers.” In it he discussed the genealogical 
connection of how the free spirit emerged out of his ideas of genius as well as the role Wagner 
played in helping him to come to an understanding of the educator as a fellow self-fashioner. 
Nietzsche also explicitly identified himself as a “disciple” of Wagner: 
Let us remain faithful to Wagner in what is true and authentic in him—and especially in 
this, that we, as his disciples, remain faithful to ourselves in what is true and authentic in 
us. Let him have his intellectual tempers and cramps. Let us, in all fairness, ask what 
strange nourishments and needs an art like this may require to be able to live and grow. It 
does not matter that as a thinker he is so often wrong; justice and patience are not for him. 
Enough that his life is justified before itself and remains justified--- this life which shouts 
at everyone of us: ‘Be a man and do not follow me—but yourself! But yourself!’ Our 
life, too, shall remain justified in our own eyes!402  
 
This acknowledgement echoed Zarathustra’s message to his disciples in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
It was also one way that Nietzsche performed what he had earlier said in Human, All Too Human 
about the free spirit’s capacity to affirm competing schools of thought, to take joy in them and 
recognize how they too contributed to their strength and ability to flourish. Nietzsche identified 
the ability to coexist with competing viewpoints as one of the features that defined the health of 
the free spirit. He also associated it with the health of society itself.   
In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche contrasted the cult of genius to what he called the 
cult of culture. The cult of culture was the commitment to a culture that could recognize the 
needs of a healthy, intellectually diverse society just as Nietzsche claimed that individuals 
required diversity, and a diversity of challenges, for their own wellbeing and growth. He argued:  
For the system of all that which humanity has need of for its continued existence is so 
comprehensive, and lays claim to so many and such varying forces, that humanity as a 
whole would have to pay heavily for any onesided [sic] preference, whether it be science 
or the state or art or trade, to which these individuals [geniuses] would entice it. It has 
always been the greatest fatality for culture when men have been worshipped […] – Next 
to the cult of the genius and his force there must always be placed, as its complement and 
palliative, the cult of culture: which knows how to accord the material, humble, base, 
misunderstood, weak, imperfect, onesided [sic], incomplete, untrue, merely apparent, 
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indeed to the evil and dreadful, a proper degree of understanding and the admission that 
all this is necessary; for the harmonious endurance of all that is human.403  
 
He reinforced this position four years later in The Gay Science, where he observed in the 
aphorism “The Failure of Reformations” that: “we may always infer that a civilization is really 
high when powerful and domineering natures have little influence and create only sects.”404 The 
source of this “height” came from the diversity of natures able to thrive in a given culture. Failed 
wholesale reformations of a society were one of the most effective ways of judging the diversity 
and health of that society; the number of free spirits, as opposed to geniuses it is able to support. 
He drew this conclusion from a consideration of ancient Greek religious and philosophical 
practices; those of the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Aristotelians, Epicureans, Stoics, Cynics, and 
others, in comparison to Christianity: 
Among the Greeks several attempts to found new Greek religions failed—which speaks 
for the higher civilization of the Greeks even in rather early times. It suggests that there 
must have been in Greece at an early time large numbers of diverse individuals whose 
diverse needs and miseries could not be taken care of with a single prescription of faith 
and hope.405 
 
Nietzsche’s emphasis on the diversity of needs and sources of sufferings in a society reflected his 
larger concern about the relationship between an individual’s physiological responses and ability 
to regulate themselves and how this was reflected in larger political and philosophical systems. If 
the health of a culture or society could be measured in terms of the diversity of the needs and 
miseries present within in, then the fact that “Luther’s Reformation” was able to claim most of 
northern Europe was a sign of the north’s declining health in contrast to the south. The north was 
more susceptible to the cult of genius, and less able to tolerate diversity. In this particular 
passage Nietzsche named the event after its founder, implying that in a freer and healthier 
cultural context that is what it would be called, not the “Protestant Reformation.” Nietzsche 
attributed the widespread acceptance of Christianity to the degeneration of Europe into an 
essentially homogenous entity with only a limited number of “needs and miseries.” Seen in this 
light, as an organized religion Christianity itself behaved and thrived in much the same way as 
the cult of genius. Nietzsche drew a much larger critique of western civilization out of an 
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autobiographical reflection on his relationship to Wagner. It was not the only alternative that he 
sought to provide during this time. 
Despite Nietzsche’s claims about the autobiographical nature of philosophy in “Beyond 
Good and Evil” (1886), he expressed a contrary sentiment in Ecce Homo (1888). He wrote there: 
“I am one thing, my writings are another matter.”406 This apparent inconsistency stems from the 
interaction of the autobiographical with the autodidactic elements of Nietzsche’s work. There 
was an element of self-regulation in his writings that led to a persistent dissonance between 
Nietzsche, the author, and Nietzsche the person who was trying to shape himself through his 
works. He wrote in order to become what he was. His interest in hypocrisy as a necessary stage 
of self-regulation and self-fashioning stemmed from this dissonance.  
 Nietzsche argued that consistent hypocrisy was an early stage of conscious self-
fashioning. He first made this argument in the aphorism “How Appearance Becomes Being” 
(1878) in relationship to how one trains for a profession:   
The hypocrite who always plays one and the same role finally ceases to be a hypocrite; 
for example priests, who as young men are usually conscious or unconscious hypocrites, 
finally become natural and then really are priests without any affectation […]. The 
profession of almost every man, even that of the artist, begins with hypocrisy, with an 
imitation from without, with a copying of what is most effective.407   
 
In the preface to the second book of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche laid out how the origin 
of his project of self-fashioning was grounded in a kind of hypocrisy. He was acutely aware of 
this, writing that in the first book of the text:  
I spoke only of things that had nothing to do with me but did so as though they had 
something to do with me. It was then I learned the art of appearing cheerful, objective, 
inquisitive, above all healthy and malicious – and this, it seems to me, constitutes ‘good 
taste’ on the part of an invalid. A subtler eye and empathy will nonetheless not fail to see 
what perhaps constitutes the charm of this writing – that here a sufferer and self-denier 
speaks as though he were not a sufferer and self-denier.408 
 
Just as Zarathustra would caution his disciples to leave him, so that they may find him, here 
Nietzsche described his own process of leaving himself, so that he could “become what he is: 
which means to discharge it in works and actions.”409 As he concluded the preface he mentioned 
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the paradoxical reward of self-fashioning, for through such measures and attention to 
appearances: “our reward is the greatest of life’s gifts, perhaps the greatest thing it is able to give 
of any kind – we are given our task back.”410  
 Nietzsche described the retroactive process of getting one’s task back in organic terms. In 
the aphorism “Dissimulation as Duty” in Daybreak, he wrote how even the virtues of honesty 
and goodness that society most values emerged from hereditary aristocracies in which the: “long-
standing practice of dissimulation [turned] into, at last, nature: in the end dissimulation 
[canceled] itself out, and organs and instincts [were] the hardly anticipated fruits in the garden of 
hypocrisy.”411 This was evocative of the very first aphorism from Human, All Too Human, where 
he described the "Chemistry of the History of the Moral.” Likewise, in the aphorism “What We 
Are Free to Do,” he returned to the same metaphor of the garden: 
One can handle one’s drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate the shoots 
of one’s anger, pity, musing, vanity as fruitfully and advantageously as beautiful fruit on 
espaliers; […] We are free to do all this: but how many actually know that they are free to 
do this? Don’t most people believe in themselves as completed, fully grown facts? 
Haven’t great philosophers, with their doctrine of the immutability of character, pressed 
their seal of approval on this presumption?412 
 
Whether Nietzsche employed the educational metaphors of treating the self as a work, as a 
consistent hypocrite, or as a garden that needed self-conscious tending, one of the most puzzling 
necessities was how drives and values tended to emerge from their opposites in the process of 
becoming what they were. What Nietzsche called his “chemistry of the history of the moral” was 
part of his attempt to answer the question of how human passions and institutions could emerge 
from their opposites. Just as he would look for the origins of reason in unreason and selflessness 
in selfishness, he often described the origin of the individual in terms of its emergence from the 
“baseness” of hypocrisy into a state of conscious self-fashioning. Just as in Lange and Bernard, 
the individual crafted the unity of their own character, it was not given. This chemistry of the 
history of the moral was also part of Nietzsche critique of absolutes, unchanging organisms, 
cultures, and individuals. For instance, in the aphorism “Will a Self,” he critiqued the finality of 
traditional statements of self-knowledge: 
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Active, successful natures act, not according to the dictum “know thyself,” but as if there 
hovered before them the commandment: will a self and thou shalt become a self. – Fate 
seems to have left the choice still up to them; whereas the inactive and contemplative 
cogitate on what they have chosen, on one occasion when they entered into life.413  
 
Nietzsche saw in the standard approach to self-knowledge a kind of passivity, a weariness and 
desire to only engage with things that promised to be conclusive, absolute, and final. This 
emphasis on activity, and activity as a remedy for absolutist thinking, was very much in keeping 
with Bernard’s account of experimental knowledge and training, and served as the basis of 
Nietzsche’s interest in the idea of experimentation.  
 
 Nietzsche and Experimentation 
 
 Nietzsche began his public work on new models of genius and education in Human, All 
Too Human (1878). He felt that his growing awareness of the importance of mutual education 
and self-fashioning revealed the diverse needs of humanity as a whole and the ways in which the 
free spirit could become free through a self-reflective process of dynamic self-fashioning. In 
order to do this, however, they would have to continually experiment with and test themselves 
and their relationship to their individual contexts. Both Bernard and Nietzsche argued that 
experimentation led humans to meaningful independence and the freedom. Experimentation 
allowed people to both recognize their own limitations while also providing them with the ability 
to act creatively within those limitations. Bernard largely had in mind the limitations of an 
organisms’ physical environment. However, Nietzsche’s philosophy of experimentation also 
included how society and history were part of the free spirit’s limitations. Understanding and 
experimenting with these broader cultural and personal constraints required that any potential 
free spirits had a robust sense of themselves. This kind of philosophical experimentation required 
that they travel through many different cultures (both historical and contemporary), moral 
systems, states of health, and philosophies. In this way the free spirit could increasingly take 
control of their own life paths with a greater understanding of the diversity of possible ways of 
being active in the world and ability to fashion themselves in relation to them. 
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 Nietzsche explicitly linked philosophy and experimentation in “Beyond Good and Evil” 
(1886), claiming that:  
A new species of philosophers is coming up: I venture to baptize them with a name that is 
not free of danger. As I unriddle them, insofar as they allow themselves to be unriddled- 
for it belongs to their nature to want to remain riddles at some point— these philosophers 
of the future may have a right— it might also be a wrong— to be called attempters 
[Versucher]. The name itself is in the end a mere attempt [Versuch] and, if you will, a 
temptation [Versuchung].414  
 
Versuch also means experimentation or to try something out and preserves the ambiguity of 
Bernard’s own word play with the French expérience and the relationship between 
experimentation and experience. One of Nietzsche concerns in “Beyond Good and Evil” was to 
“experiment” with the extent to which truth could “endure incorporation” in order to test the 
limits of knowledge.415 Like Lange, Helmholtz, and du Bois-Reymond, Bernard was concerned 
with the limits of knowledge and the role that experimentation played in determining these 
limits.416 Bernard critiqued any sort of fatalistic skepticism that simply stopped at the limits of 
knowledge, in favour of the kind of skepticism that was active and creative and which united 
experience and experimentation. In the aphorism “Truthfulness,” Nietzsche stressed that he 
favoured: “any skepsis to which I may reply: ‘Let us try it!’ But I no longer wish to hear 
anything of all those things and questions that do not permit any experiment. This is the limit of 
my ‘truthfulness’; for there courage has lost its right.”417 This statement echoes Bernard’s 
distinction between doubt and skepticism, and how the skeptic merely stopped at believing in 
nothing.418   
 Understanding Nietzsche’s relationship to Bernard also helps elucidate the way that 
Nietzsche united experimentation and discovery with evil and the breaking of taboos, even while 
he claimed that such taboo breaking could help make humans more humane. Nietzsche came to 
see a close association between knowledge and cruelty, and, as was shown in chapter two, this is 
best understood in relationship to his connection to the vivisection debates of the 1870s and 
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1880s. This was not just limited to physiological experimentation. In Daybreak, in an aphorism 
entitled “Research and Experimenters,” he claimed that: 
There is no one and only scientific method that leads to knowledge! We must proceed 
experimentally with things, be sometimes angry, sometimes affectionate towards them 
and allow justice, passion, and coldness toward them to follow one upon the other. One 
person converses with things like a policeman, another as father confessor, a third as a 
wanderer and curiosity seeker. Sometimes one wrings something from them through 
sympathy, sometimes through violent force; reverence for their mysteries leads one 
person forward and eventually to insight, whereas another employs indiscretion and 
roguery in the explanation of secrets. Like all conquerors, discoverers, navigators, 
adventurers, we researchers are of a daring morality and have to put up with being 
considered, on the whole, evil.419 
 
In “Beyond Good and Evil” Nietzsche explicitly related this kind of experimental breaking of 
taboos to vivisection, the taboo that Bernard was so often accused of breaking.420 Nietzsche also 
acknowledged Dionysus as the god of experimenters (or tempters), whose “genius of the heart” 
made “people stronger, more evil, more profound, more beautiful, more humane.”421 Testing the 
limits of knowledge also involved testing the limits of what was socially acceptable. Nietzsche 
seems to have shared Bernard’s sentiment that experimentation was inevitable, and that the 
diversity of human actions could all be understood as experimental case studies. This 
experimental view of life itself informed how human beings could make more self-conscious 
experiments out of their own individual lives. This took on an increasingly central role in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy. It unified his interests in genius, education, freedom, physiology, 
morality, society and culture, and revealed the ways that a kind of milieu intérieur existed at each 
level of human experience.  
 Nietzsche explored the experimental and organic dimensions of his philosophy in “Beyond 
Good and Evil.” He described the “spirit” as an organism or organ, more specifically like a 
stomach, that assimilated experiences, grew, and, importantly, made a distinction between itself 
and the world via a “limiting horizon.”422 While the text was first published in 1886, Nietzsche 
made many claims in it that recalled the ways in which he talked about horizons as early as “On 
the Uses and Disadvantages” (1874) and Human, All Too Human (1878).423 Both Nietzsche and 
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Bernard stressed that experimentation led humanity to an understanding of its limitations, and yet 
also of its freedoms. However, Nietzsche emphasized the importance of self-experimentation as 
a form of growth and individual development. In Daybreak (1881) he claimed that: “We are 
experiments: let us also want to be such!”424 In The Gay Science (1882) he reaffirmed that: “We 
ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs [Versuchs-Thiere].”425 By the time 
Nietzsche wrote “Beyond Good and Evil” in 1886 self-experimentation had become one of the 
main agents of self-fashioning in his larger educational agenda.  
One has to test [Proben] oneself to see that one is destined for independence and 
command— and do it at the right time. One should not dodge one’s tests, though they 
may be the most dangerous game one could play and are tests that are taken in the end 
before no witness or judge but ourselves. Not to remain stuck to a person— not even the 
most loved— every person is a prison, also a nook. Not to remain stuck to a fatherland— 
not even if it suffers most and needs help most— it is less difficult to sever one’s heart 
from a victorious fatherland. Not to remain stuck to some pity— not even for higher men 
into whose rare torture and helplessness some accident allowed us to look. Not to remain 
stuck to a science— even if it should lure us with the most precious finds that seem to 
have been saved up precisely for us. Not to remain stuck to one’s own detachment, to that 
voluptuous remoteness and strangeness of the bird who flees ever higher to see ever more 
below him— the danger of the flier. Not to remain stuck to our own virtues and become 
as a whole the victim of some detail in us, such as our hospitality, which is the danger of 
dangers for superior and rich souls who spend themselves lavishly, almost indifferently, 
and exaggerate the virtue of generosity into a vice. One must know how to conserve 
oneself: the hardest test of independence.426 
 
As has already been shown, this emphasis on independence unites Nietzsche’s educational 
concerns with Bernard’s thinking about education, freedom, and the organic milieu intérieur. 
This remained Nietzsche’s public position until the end of his productive life. Writing in Twilight 
of the Idols in 1888, he described the freedom of the free spirit as the will to assume 
responsibility for oneself, to maintain “the distance which separates,” and to have gained an 
independence from one’s environment.427 The multiple forms of independence also serves as the 
background of many of Nietzsche’s metaphors surrounding comparison, travel, and travellers.   
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Emden has observed that: "the comparative methods that lie at the heart of much nineteenth-
century anthropology, linguistics and psychology turn out to be a prominent feature of 
Nietzsche's own genealogical approach.”428 Nietzsche’s own ideas emerged in the context of the 
works of those like Bernard, Lange, and even those of the British utilitarian John Stuart Mill. 
Bernard’s geniuses were adept at comparison. For Bernard comparison was a fundamental 
element of experimental medicine. Experimental judgment was fundamentally based on “the 
comparative method,” either through the comparison of normal with abnormal bodies, or of the 
effects of substances within, and on, the normal or abnormal body.429 Active comparative 
experimentation allowed the researcher to reduce even the most complex investigation into a 
conceptual “unity.”430 Comparison was also important to the first generation of neo-Kantians, 
like Lange, particularly when it came to his interdisciplinary approach to epistemology, and 
interest in the comparative anatomy and physiology of the sense organs, nervous system, and 
muscle reflexes.431 In 1831 Mill published a series of essays on “The Spirit of the Age.” In them 
he concluded that that spirit of the nineteenth century was the spirit of comparison: “The idea of 
comparing one’s own age with former ages, or with our notion of those which are yet to come, 
had occurred to philosophers; but it never before was itself the dominant idea of any age.”432 
Nietzsche echoed this sentiment in 1878. 
Nietzsche argued in the aphorism “Age of Comparison” in Human, All Too Human that the 
increased ability to travel in space, brought about my modern technology, and time, brought 
about by modern scholarship, was loosening the hold that the idea of a fixed folk or homeland 
had on the cultures of Europe:  
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Such an age acquires its significance through the fact that in it the various different 
philosophies of life, customs, cultures can be compared and experienced side by side; 
which in earlier ages, when, just as all artistic genres were attached to a particular place 
and time, so every culture still enjoyed only a localized domination, was not possible.433 
 
In The Gay Science Nietzsche referenced the spirit of the age, or the “sixth sense” of the 
nineteenth century, as the historical sense. This ability to quickly determine “the order of rank of 
the valuations according to which a people, a society, a human being has lived” was cultivated in 
Europe through the “semi-barbaric mixing of classes and races.”434 This mixing meant that 
certain aesthetic forms would not be able to survive in the new age of comparison, yet they 
would not die out entirely, since they would still form the basis of how individuals would 
experiment with, or “live through” a range of aesthetic sensibilities before they could pass 
judgment on them. Nietzsche stressed that this was not comparison for its own sake, but for the 
sake of selecting. One had to experience in order to choose and affirm, as well as deny. In this 
way the ability to compare was both the source of the age’s good fortune, as well as of its 
suffering.435 This sentiment was not limited to Human, All Too Human. Earlier Nietzsche had 
noted that: “The advantage of our culture is the ability to compare. We bring together the most 
diverse products from older cultures and evaluate them; to do this well is our task. Our strength 
should reveal itself in how we choose; we should be judges.”436 He would also continue this line 
of thought in Daybreak and The Gay Science. In Daybreak he stressed the importance of “living 
through” evaluations in order “to have the right to let them fall through the sieve.”437 Even 
without the intention to experiment, the impatience of the age, its polemical swinging between 
the extremes of ideology and climate, would have a similar effect as a measured comparison of 
experiences. Nietzsche called this tendency to err extravagantly and to wander a character flaw 
that nevertheless became “a school for genius.”438  
 Just as Bernard stressed the relative freedom of organisms with complicated milieux 
intérieurs as they acted within their larger cosmic environment, Nietzsche described travellers in 
similar, homeostatic terms. In the aphorism “Grades of Traveller,” he observed that there were 
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five species of traveller, ranging in complexity from those who were “purely passive” to those 
who absorbed and reshaped all of their experiences:   
The fourth [species] absorb into themselves what they have experience and bear it away 
with them; lastly there are a few men of the highest energy who, after they have 
experienced and absorbed all they have seen, necessarily have to body it forth again out 
of themselves in works and actions as soon as they have returned home. - It is like these 
five species of traveller that all men travel through the whole journey of life, the lowest 
purely passive, the highest those who transform into action and exhaust everything they 
experience.439 
 
The highest species of traveller also had implications for the future of discrete nation states. 
Nietzsche observed that in their travels Europeans were becoming increasingly detached from 
the conditions under which they originated (such as race, climate, and class). This travelling was 
making them “increasingly independent of any determinate milieu [bestimmten milieu].” “Thus 
an essentially supra-national and nomadic type of man is gradually coming up, a type that 
possesses, physiologically speaking, a maximum of the art and power of adaptation as its typical 
distinction.”440 Nietzsche claimed that this was a physiological process, and indeed, that the 
“most comprehensive men” or free spirits of his century were preparing the way for it and 
anticipating “experimentally the European of the future.”441 Philosophers travelled through 
different kinds of relationships with the societies in which they were born, and ultimately freed 
themselves from them to a greater or lesser extent. In a section of his Nachlass from 1881 
Nietzsche described how strong and free “experimental individuals” (Versuchs-Individuen) could 
come about historically from individuals who were originally merely organs or functions of their 
larger society. Eventually, they acquired key organic functions of their own, those of self-
regulation, superabundant reserves of energy and metabolic force, a refined ability to assimilate 
and excrete, and the ability to regenerate as individuals, as opposed to as merely component parts 
of a society. Like the free spirit, Nietzsche stressed that this was a process, and that these people 
were “freigewordener Mensch,” or those who have become free to create and choose values.442 
This freedom also reflected the health of the individual.  
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 The philosopher also travelled through several states of health and transfigured these states 
into philosophies. In his preface to the second edition of The Gay Science, which appeared in 
1887, he observed that:  
A philosopher who has traversed many kinds of health, and keeps traversing them, has 
passed through an equal number of philosophies; he simply cannot keep from transposing 
his states every time into the most spiritual form and distance: this art of transfiguration is 
philosophy. […] We are not thinking frogs, nor objectifying and registering mechanisms 
with their innards removed: we constantly give birth to our thoughts out of our pain.443  
 
Philosophy was the practice of transfiguring physiological states into philosophical systems by 
which individuals created a distinction between themselves and the world. It also facilitated their 
activities within that same world. Since physiological states varied over time, so too would these 
systems. Indeed, it was possible to review and compare the varied systems produced by these 
differing physiological states. The relationship between thought and suffering was open to 
psychological or physiological experimentation.444 These comments about physiology and 
philosophy echoed Nietzsche’s early reflections on the relationship between physiological rates 
of life and the philosophical tendency to view either being or becoming as primary in nature. 
They also highlight the ways in which he linked experimental practice with freedom and 
physiology. The distinction he made between the philosopher and “thinking frogs” or 
“registering mechanism” also hints at the physiological underpinnings of this idea. Bernard 
called the frog, “the Job of physiology,” the animal most “maltreated by experimenters,” but also 
the one most closely associated with their “labors and their scientific glory.”445 Instead of being 
detached from the experimental subject, setup, and recording, philosophers were simultaneously 
experiment and observer.  
Nietzsche reflected in a letter to Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche shortly before she moved to 
Paraguay in 1886 that all of life was an experiment, regardless of what individuals wanted from 
it.446 One would have experiences, or experiments, whether one willed them or not. This speaks 
to the close relationship Nietzsche saw between experimentation and amor fati. The best 
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travellers were those who could make their lives into self-conscious experiments, rather than 
accidental ones, and fashion their past errors and contingencies into sources of knowledge, 
energy, and direction. Nietzsche had already laid down this pattern of thought in Human, All Too 
Human, where he told the reader:  
You have it in your hands to achieve the absorption of all you experience - your 
experiments, errors, faults, delusions, passions, your love and your hope - into your goal 
without remainder. This goal is yourself to become a necessary chain of rings of culture 
and from this necessity to recognize the necessity inherent in the course of culture in 
general.447 
 
Like Bernard’s approach to the relationship between determinism and experimentation in 
science, Nietzsche stressed that experimentation revealed the necessities of existence while also 
revealing what people were able to do in the face of those necessities. Actively engaging with 
these limits was the basis of individual growth, independence, and freedom.  
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the most rewarding and challenging aspects of reading Nietzsche is how almost 
nothing in his thinking is pure; almost nothing is unmixed or unqualified. The epigram of 
Human, All Too Human as “a book for free spirits” can be read equally as a statement of its 
suggested audience as a well as marking it off as an attempt towards a new kind of educational 
manual and vision for education. Despite his aristocratic tendencies, there is a strong sense of 
community in Nietzsche’s writings, a sense of himself and his audience, yet not of himself or his 
audience as they currently are, but as they could be. The experimental dimensions of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy are best understood in the context of nineteenth-century concerns about dynamic self-
regulation, and in particular Bernard’s contributions to these discussions. The relationship 
between independence and dynamic self-regulation also helps to reveal the common thread 
linking Nietzsche’s interest in a wide array of topics. His changing relationship to the question of 
how to facilitate an individual’s independence, whether from an environment, culture, 
contingency, or history, unites his concerns about genius, education, freedom, physiology, and 
morality. 
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Moore is right to highlight the influences of non-Darwinian evolutionary thinkers such as 
Roux, Rolph, and Nägeli on Nietzsche’s post 1880s approach to how organisms regulate 
themselves into a coherent unity from what would otherwise be a state of cellular chaos. 
However, Nietzsche’s interest in self-regulation as a broader principle goes back to at least the 
late 1860s. Considering Nietzsche’s many connections to the vivisection debates, it is likely that 
his interest in physiology more generally, and his interest in figures like Bernard, Liebig, and 
Lange, influenced how he understood dynamic self-regulation as the process by which organisms 
and individuals achieved a state of independence relative to their environment. It is thus likely 
that the one mention that Bernard receives in Nietzsche’s Nachlass under-represents the 
influence that the physiologist had on him. There were many works written by and about Bernard 
in The Review of the Two Worlds, as well as the antivivisectionist literature with which Nietzsche 
was familiar.  
The role that Nietzsche gives to the educational importance of forgetting and of maintaining 
one’s horizon closely echoes broader discussions about the role of organic self-regulation 
discussed by Liebig and Bernard. It is also likely that Nietzsche’s focus on what he called the 
“transfigured physis” served as an Aristotelian cipher for ideas about education and genius that 
were in fact far more in keeping with Lange’s and Bernard’s understanding of self-regulation, 
genius, and organic development than with Schopenhauer’s or Wagner’s. This is particularly 
prominent in Nietzsche’s discussion of physis in “Schopenhauer as Educator.”  
Bernard drew parallels between how the complexity of an organism’s milieu intérieur 
dictated how free it was in relation to its environment and how through experimentation humans 
also became freer in relationship to their own cosmic environments. Nietzsche radicalized 
Bernard’s arguments about the relationship between experimentation and self-regulation. All 
forms of independence, whether they were philosophical, psychological, or physiological, were 
arrived at through processes analogous to experimentation. Nietzsche’s concern with self-
fashioning, mutual education, and tending the “garden of hypocrisy” from 1878 to around 1885 
is grounded in his performative attempt to experiment with and regulate himself.  
The relationship between independence and dynamic self-regulation as a process that 
involved both the organic and human worlds is a keystone of much of Nietzsche’s thought. As 
Moore has observed, the process of progressive individuation that emerges from self-regulation 
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“culminates […] in the shadowy figure of the Übermensch.”448 Nietzsche considered his own 
philosophy to be a kind of experimental method more so than a philosophical system, and 
strongly implied that the creative freedom of the Übermensch was the freedom that followed 
from a more refined form of dynamic self-regulation that was only achievable through self-
experimentation. However, even this freedom was only a kind of relative freedom. It involved 
the individual’s ability to engage creatively with their own physiological and environmental 
limitations in order to determine their own goals and systems of meaning. 
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Chapter 4: Physio-aesthetic Epistemology and the Freedom of the Übermensch 
 
 
And you say to me, friends, there is no disputing over taste and tasting? But all of life is a 
dispute over taste and tasting! […] Taste: that is weight and at the same time scales and 
weigher; and woe to anything living that would live without disputes over weight and 
scales and weighers!449 
 
 ~Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 1883 
 
 
Nietzsche’s interest in the intersection of physiology and aesthetics connected him to two 
parallel traditions that have been identified by the scholarly literature. The tradition of 
physiological or evolutionary aesthetics focused on the conflicting forces that drove the 
biological evolution of aesthetic and moral judgments. While these forces were often in conflict, 
the sum total of their interactions tended to bring about the establishment of contingent, 
hierarchical, dynamic self-regulating systems, such as those seen in the organic life of living 
beings, the psychological life of individuals, and the collective life of societies. While this 
tradition gets its name from Grant Allen’s (1848-1899) 1877 work Physiological Aesthetics, it 
was also representative of a range of evolutionary thinkers that Nietzsche was familiar with, 
including Paul Rée, William Rolph, Carl Nägeli, and Wilhelm Roux.  
However, there was another tradition that was also influential for Nietzsche. For want of a 
better term, this tradition of neo-Kantian “physio-aesthetic epistemology” sought to ground 
epistemic judgments in the physiological limitations set on perception by the organization of the 
human brain and nervous system. Yet because of this grounding, epistemic judgments were 
themselves the byproduct of aesthetic sensibilities that were relative to the physiological 
organization of the individual. While “matters of taste” were individual, they were far from 
arbitrary, and were based upon the physiological organization of the individual. While 
evolutionary thinking was a part of this tradition, it was not its driving force to the same extent as 
in Grant Allen’s physiological aesthetics. Some of the more influential thinkers in this tradition 
for Nietzsche included Schopenhauer, the physiologist Johann Nepomuk Czermak, Zöllner, the 
philosopher and psychologist Gustav Fechner, Helmholtz, the physicist and philosopher Ernst 
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Mach, and the philosopher Harald Høffding. These thinkers were particularly interested in what 
physiological illusions taught about the limits of perception, and the role that experience played 
in perception. This line of thought also explored notions of physiological relativism and dynamic 
self-regulation, for the limits of perception were regulating and structuring limits. Some of these 
limits were inborn while others were learned. Nietzsche became particularly interested in how 
the limits of perception were creative limitations. Indeed, he came to believe that creativity 
within limitations was what characterized life itself. In this context the greatest acts of creativity 
involved the acceptance of the greatest limitations of all: the acceptance of the relativity of 
knowledge, the eternal return, and necessity of all things.   
Nietzsche’s physio-aesthetic epistemology emerged from his early interest in the 
physiological dimensions of genius. Following Lange, the genius was able to create relative 
unities by perceiving them in nature. These unities could only be subjective, not objective. Yet 
the question remained of how the genius created these unities. In part, genius participated in a 
process of creativity within limitations that was common to all living things; organisms were 
themselves relative unities formed from out of the chaotic material of their environment and their 
perceptions and sensations already imposed structure and unity on their experience of the 
external world. The education of genius, the free spirit, and Übermensch represented further 
refinements of this process. Ideas, beliefs, and other aesthetic judgments were built up from the 
way individuals consciously and unconsciously compared, selected, experimented with, and 
assimilated their experiences. A consequence of this was that while there was no one path to 
genius, or the Übermensch, there were certain common features, particularly related to how 
individuals created their own unities. This line of thinking ultimately culminated in how 
Nietzsche described the relationship between the Übermensch and the eternal return of the same.      
This chapter will begin with an attempt to separate out what has been called Nietzsche’s 
physiological aesthetics from his “physio-aesthetic epistemology” and show how this aspect of 
his thought was influenced by his encounters with Schopenhauer, Czermak, Zöllner, and 
especially Helmholtz. Helmholtz sought to strike a balance between what aspects of perception 
were learned, but deeply ingrained through the process of unconscious experimentation, and 
those that were innate. He employed metaphors of reading that were very much like those that 
Nietzsche would later use. 
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The second section of this chapter will explore how Nietzsche came to define both learning 
and creativity as increasingly self-imposed limitations. Artistic skills and conventions as well as 
scientific and scholarly methodologies were all refinements that lent the individual greater 
freedom to achieve certain specific goals in the world even as these methods limited their 
avenues to these goals. Nietzsche’s early reflection on Chladni sand figures had him thinking of 
how seemingly free and aesthetically pleasing images could nevertheless be produced by law-
bound natural processes. This was also the case with the actions of human beings. Importantly 
though, the physiological limits of human beings could change over time, showing the ways in 
which different kind of limits produced different, not necessarily better or worse, results. In this 
context innovation did not consist of doing away with limitations, but in mastering new ones that 
opened up new ways of acting in and evaluating the world.  
The third section will explore an intriguing line of thought that Nietzsche followed in 
Høffding, in which the Danish philosopher considered the role of perception in the psychological 
and physiological dynamic self-regulation of the human organism. For Høffding ideas were like 
blood. Just as blood was the main medium that helped organisms maintain their relative 
independence from their environment, ideas were the medium that helped consciousness 
maintain its independence from being lost in external perceptions and sensations. Nietzsche 
described a very similar process through which an organism’s ideas of the world emerged from 
and then were changed and projected back out into that organism’s experience of the world 
around it. In both cases education and experimentation served as a sentient being’s conceptual 
diet and sustenance, and provided the material for its independent life relative to its 
surroundings.  
The necessity of all things was the most rarified and complicated limitation. The final section 
of this chapter will provide an overview of the origin of the Übermensch from Nietzsche’s earlier 
thinking about genius, education, self-fashioning, and dynamic self-regulation. It will then show 
how the Übermensch’s relationship with the eternal return of the same made them the most 
rarified example of the idea of “independence through interdependence” that Nietzsche drew 
from his encounter with physiological research and the educational debates of the 1870s and 
1880s. The way that Nietzsche described the Übermensch mastering contingency by willing the 
necessity of all things was the culmination of his thinking about dynamic self-regulation as it 
played out on a cosmic scale.  
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Nietzsche on Perception: Physiological Aesthetics and Physio-aesthetic Epistemology 
 
The study of aesthetics has been bound up with the study of perception and sensation since 
Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762) changed the meaning of the term in his 1750 work 
Aesthetica. Before this time aesthetics was largely a synonym for sensation, but Baumgarten 
redefined it to its present usage as a way of talking about the philosophy of taste and beauty. This 
was the sense in which Kant employed it in his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. Aesthetics as 
“matters of taste” involved both value judgments of the beautiful and the ugly, or pleasant and 
painful, and considerations of what the perceiving subject brought to the object of their aesthetic 
judgments. This trend persisted throughout the nineteenth century, and became increasingly 
based in the physiology of perception and sensation.  
Robert Brain has recently explored the rise of physiological aesthetics. It was a rise that saw 
experimental physiology become one of the most high profile, prestigious, and well-funded 
disciplines of the late-nineteenth century.450 Physiology’s rising authority brought with it both 
great promise and great anxiety. While major proponents of physiological research such as 
Claude Bernard sought to make a distinction between art and science with his claim that “art is I, 
science is we,” physiology also contributed to the blurring of the two.451 This blurring was 
brought about by the efforts of physiologists and artists to translate the practice, culture, results, 
and experimental systems of physiological laboratories into the studios and lofts of artists and 
writers. The anxieties came from concerns about just what effect the artistic works produced by 
this union would have upon science, society, and the individuals within it. While he does not 
study Nietzsche exhaustively, Brain points out that the philosopher was well ahead of this curve, 
writing: “Nietzsche immediately grasped that the new physiological studies of art might give 
many contemporary artists stronger purchase on their Wagnerian ambitions to shape society with 
their work.”452  
There has been a growing interest in Nietzsche’s physiological aesthetics in the past twenty 
years. Yet it is important to keep in mind that Nietzsche never used the term physiological 
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aesthetics in his own writing. He not only did not use the term “physiologische Ästhetik,” he 
seldom even commented on the “Physiologie der Kunst.” The “physiology of art” appears only 
eight times in his collected writings and Nachlass, and even then it appears first as a possible 
chapter title for his unfinished Will to Power between 1886 and 1887, and then as the header for 
a list of judgments passed on a series of composers that included Wagner. In contrast, in his 
notes for 1888 the physiology of art is listed alongside more epistemic concerns such as “the 
criteria for truth,” and “why truth?”453 Indeed, while Nietzsche mentions the relationship 
between physiology and art often in his corpus, the term “the physiology of art,” appears only 
once in his published works, in “The Case of Wagner.” There, Nietzsche promised his readers a 
chapter in an upcoming (never completed) project that was going to be called “Toward a 
Physiology of Art.” In this discussion he described Wagner as a “perfect decadent,” and in that 
way a genius who represented “an innovation in principles” and “crisis in taste.” Nietzsche’s 
goal in that chapter would be: “To show in more detail how this over-all change of art into 
histrionics is no less an expression of physiological degeneration (more precisely a form of 
hystericism) than every single corruption and infirmity of the art inaugurated by Wagner.”454 
Nietzsche was evoking the physiology of art when he used Wagner as a case study of 
degeneration and decadence.  
Moore does an excellent job of situating Nietzsche’s understanding of decadence in the 
context of late nineteenth-century fears of evolutionary degeneration. These fears also revolved 
around the intersection of aesthetics, physiology, and society. Moore situates Nietzsche’s thought 
within the context of nineteenth-century attempts to ground the origin and function of art in 
terms of evolutionary biology. He explores Nietzsche’s understanding of moral self-regulation, 
and his view of the ego as a nexus of often competing drives, in particular how: “The interior 
world of our instincts and their relationship to one another is a microcosm of the relationship 
between the parts of the social organism.”455 Both society and the organism arrive at a kind of 
dynamic equilibrium through the contentious process of establishing orders of rank and 
hierarchies. Nietzsche’s physiological aesthetics also played an important role in how he 
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understood this process, and here Moore points to the work of Grant Allen as a historical 
precursor to Nietzsche’s thought.  
 Allen was a Canadian-born British popularizer of science and disciple of the evolutionary 
naturalist and philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Allen’s Physiological Aesthetics (1877) 
examined the evolutionary underpinnings of aesthetic sensibilities. He sought to explain the 
human sense of the beautiful and the ugly in terms of the pleasures and pains most likely to bring 
about the health and evolutionary fitness of the organism. Basing his work on Spencer’s 
evolutionary philosophy, Allen’s work contributed to a boom of interest in physiological 
aesthetics that spanned the turn of the century. Moore suggests that Nietzsche probably did not 
know about Allen’s Physiological Aesthetics; however, there are a number of points that indicate 
that he may have had at least a passing familiarity with the text.456  
 Nietzsche made the acquaintance of George Croom Robertson, the editor of the journal 
Mind, while he was in Rosenlauibad in Switzerland in 1877. Nietzsche was quite taken with the 
conversation that the two had during their stay.457 Scholars have already observed that it was 
likely during this meeting that Nietzsche became aware that he was going to be mentioned in 
Wundt’s October 1877 article in Mind.458 Allen’s Physiological Aesthetics was published that 
same year. The July 1877 issue of Mind ran a review of Physiological Aesthetics written by the 
British psychologist James Sully (1842-1923). Sully had trained under such prominent German 
physiologists as Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), du Bois-Reymond, and Helmholtz. He gave the 
work a mixed review. Sully was critical of Allen’s lack of empirical examples and how he 
seemed to sidestep how pain could be the result of unfulfilled desires. He concluded by 
suggesting that Allen should have paid more attention to Helmholtz’s work on Physiological 
Optics.459 Based on a letter he wrote to Paul Rée in August of 1877, it is likely that Nietzsche 
encountered Sully’s review shortly after it appeared. Nietzsche praised Mind in his letter to Rée 
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and lamented that while France had the Philosophical Review, there was nothing quite like it in 
Germany. He also spoke very highly of Darwin’s “A Biographical Sketch of an Infant" and 
specifically stated that it was in the seventh (July 1877) issue of the journal. This was the same 
issue that ran the review of Allen’s Physiological Aesthetics. Furthermore, if Nietzsche did not 
encounter Allen’s work in 1877, there was a reference to it on an annotated page of Harald 
Høffding’s Psychology Defined on the Basis of Experience that Nietzsche likely read in 1887 
(though the annotation does not relate directly to Allen’s text).460 
Moore observes that Nietzsche’s interest in the relationship between physiology, aesthetics, 
and epistemology goes back much earlier than the appearance of Allen’s text. This is important 
to keep in mind. While it is valuable to situate Nietzsche’s thinking within the broader culture of 
physiological aesthetics, an over-close attention to Allen’s work and language prevents us from 
asking larger questions about the origin and direction of Nietzsche’s engagement with the 
epistemic dimensions of physiology and aesthetics. There is an important evolutionary 
dimension to Nietzsche’s understanding of physiology and aesthetics. However, the prehistory of 
his engagement with this tradition emerged from the importance that Schopenhauer, Lange, 
Helmholtz, Bernard, and others gave to the active and creative dimensions of perception, that 
were at once physiological, aesthetic, and epistemic. Nietzsche’s evolutionary aesthetics may be 
more appropriately juxtaposed to his relativistic physio-aesthetic epistemology.  
Crary has noted that an important change took place in what it meant to be an observer in the 
early nineteenth century. He describes this change as the movement from an understanding of 
observation that went from having the camera obscura as its primary metaphor to one that was 
more characterized by the stereoscope. In the eighteenth century observation was conceptualized 
as a kind of ideal spectatorship in which there was a clearly delineated inside and outside of the 
theatre of observation. Following Newton, light was largely understood as an external force 
moving in straight lines that set up a stable sensorium or backdrop of vision in which objects 
were situated. In contrast, following the work of such figures as Johannes Müller, Maine de 
Biran (1766-1824), Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Helmholtz, nineteenth-century discussions of 
vision and observation became increasingly dominated by accounts of “subjective vision.” This 
understanding of observation changed the focus of vision from a detached observation to an 
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embodied organic process. This change in understanding also began to break down the 
previously stable boundaries between the observer and the observed. The stereoscope’s principle 
of design was based upon an understanding of how the sense of binocular vision was processed 
by the brain.461 This understanding of the body as the site of observation, and therefore of 
knowledge extended to the physiological study of all the senses and had important philosophical 
implications. In Crary’s words it was nothing short of: “the discovery that knowledge was 
conditioned by the physical and anatomical functioning of the body.”462 While Daston and 
Galison have traced out a somewhat different trajectory for the history of objectivity in the 
nineteenth century, they too characterize the period as one that was increasingly concerned with 
what the observer brought, physiologically and psychologically, to the act of observation. Not 
only did the body condition knowledge, but there was also an element of arbitrariness about how 
the body conditioned it, specifically, in the arbitrary relationship between stimulus and 
perception.  
Müller provided evidence for the existence of specific nerve energies [spezifische 
Sinnesenergien] in his 1833 Handbook of Human Physiology. When stimulated, sensory nerves 
could only produce one specific kind of sensation, with optic nerves producing visual sensation, 
cochlear nerves auditory sensation, and so on. This was of great importance because it 
demonstrated how a uniform cause, in this case the electricity or nervous energy of organic 
processes, could produce radically different sensations regardless of any external referent or 
source of sensation: “It is an account of a body with an innate capacity […] to misperceive — of 
an eye [or ear, or hand] that renders differences equivalent.”463 This discovery brought with it a 
range of skeptical and relativistic implications that would only be somewhat tempered with 
physiologists’ appeals to unconscious inferences that reasserted a somewhat arbitrary, but still 
stable and coherent, epistemic grounding for sensory impressions.464 This is the context from 
which Nietzsche’s physio-aesthetic epistemology emerged. In order to understand how it differs 
from what has been called his evolutionary aesthetics, it will be helpful to consider Nietzsche’s 
interest in Schopenhauer’s colour theory.  
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Schopenhauer claimed that his theory of colours was based on Goethe’s Theory of Colours, 
which was first published in 1810. While Goethe considered it to be the crowning achievement 
of his intellectual career, the work’s anti-Newtonian tone and subjective analysis of colour led 
many commentators to dismiss it as romantic speculation rather than as a substantial contribution 
to the science of light or colour. Goethe considered the chemical, physical, and physiological 
aspects of colour. His study of such phenomenon as afterimages, the density of coloured liquids, 
the effect of light and darkness on the perception of colour, as well as colour contrasts and 
boundary colours played into his larger project of showing the importance of experimentation as 
the mediator between object and subject. Goethe claimed nothing happened that was not 
connected to the whole of nature in some way. The experimenter had to perform many different 
experiments on both the phenomenon they wished to study and the phenomena that were 
immediately connected and related to it if they wished to understand it. An important adjacent 
phenomenon to any object of study was the experimenter themselves, and thus experimenting on 
the external world also involved the study and testing of the self.465  
Schopenhauer first met Goethe through the salons that his mother, Johanna Schopenhauer, 
frequently hosted in her home.466 In 1813 the two became better acquainted and Goethe urged 
the young Schopenhauer to take up his theory of colours. They corresponded frequently on the 
topic for several years until the appearance of Schopenhauer’s own work On Vision and Colours 
in 1816. Schopenhauer repeatedly revised it up until his death, and the final version only 
appeared in 1870. Yet before its original release, there was already a great deal of evidence to 
show that Goethe was not comfortable with the intellectual trajectory taken by his young 
protégé.  
Goethe felt that it was important to understand the physiological dimensions of the 
perception of colour, but he wanted to be a realist about colour’s objective existence in the 
external world. However, for Schopenhauer colour was only the physiological perception of 
colour. It was not a quality of existence, but a quality of perception. Schopenhauer did not see 
himself as beholden to Goethe’s original theory of colours. In a letter dated November 11 th 1815, 
he wrote to Goethe claiming that: “I am absolutely certain that I have produced the first true 
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theory of the colors, the first in the history of science. If I compare your theory to a pyramid, 
then my theory is its topmost point.”467 Goethe was not impressed by this. In light of Nietzsche’s 
later meditations on the relationship between students and teachers, it is noteworthy that 
Schopenhauer published the poetic aphorism that Goethe wrote to express his dissatisfaction 
with his young protégé in a later edition of On Vision and Colour. In the aphorism Goethe 
lamented: “I would like to bear the teacher’s burden still longer, / If only students would not 
become at once teachers.”468 Nietzsche would later describe Goethe’s contributions to colour 
theory as one of the “fundamental errors” of the older philosopher’s life, but he expressed a 
persistent interest in Schopenhauer’s self-described “improvement” on Goethe’s colour theory.469  
Schopenhauer considered the focus of his treatise On Vision and Colour to be physiology; 
however, he also stressed that he considered the physiology of colour to be an important 
component of a broader theory of the faculty of cognition and of epistemology.470 He argued that 
the study of physiology demonstrated the subjective and active nature, not only of the perception 
of colour, but of all perception. This study also refuted the “clumsiest form of realism” arrived at 
by contemporary chemists and physiologists, reminding them that: “between them and the real 
nature of things stands their brain.”471 Schopenhauer’s theory of colours was in keeping with his 
larger philosophical project. In the second half of the last edition of The World as Will and 
Representation (1859) he reaffirmed that knowledge itself was an act of representation, and 
representation was: “A very complicated physiological occurrence in an animal’s brain, whose 
result is the consciousness of a picture or image.”472 Just as the human body served as the 
intersection of the objective thing- in- itself and subjective experience, colour was the qualitative 
side of the quantitative partitioning of the retina’s activity. This activity, in both its qualitative 
and quantitative facets was mediated through the understanding of the brain. Among other 
examples, Schopenhauer cited inverted and binocular vision to demonstrate that all perception 
was intellectual.473 It was not merely given to the senses, but structured by the brain and intellect 
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before it even reached conscious awareness. In both inverted and binocular vision the unities and 
forms that humans perceive in nature, seeing one image when they have two eyes and an erect 
form when what they see is actually inverted, are brought about by the intellect’s, or brain’s, 
structuring of perception in terms of cause and effect, time, and space.474  
Schopenhauer acknowledged that these “laws of understanding” that structured perception 
could adapt to pathological conditions. This could happen in the case of those who were cross-
eyed for an extended period of time, in which case: “the understanding tries to correct its 
apprehension through a correct interpretation of the external cause, and tries to produce an 
agreement between the perception along different ways, such as between seeing and 
touching.”475 However, despite this limited ability to correct for pathological conditions, the 
majority of physiological illusions, such as seeing a stick broken in water, the size of the moon 
on the horizon, or the illusion of depth in painting, were inescapable. This is why he made a 
distinction between illusion, which was a deception of the understanding and its relationship to 
reality, and error, which was a deception of reason and its relationship to truth. Importantly, 
while errors could be eliminated, illusions could not, for they were artifacts of the intellectual 
nature of perception.476 Nietzsche would echo this statement in “Twilight of the Idols,” where he 
asserted that the senses never lie: “What we make of their testimony, that alone introduces lies; 
for example, the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence.”477 For 
Schopenhauer, the inescapability of these illusions served as further proof of his theory of 
perception, for they showed the ways in which sense perceptions were never entirely passive, but 
instead acted upon and structured the human experience of stimuli.478 
There was also a creative and aesthetic dimension to Schopenhauer’s view of knowledge. 
Like perception more broadly, aesthetic observations were also about “how the brain relates to 
the object.”479 The form and size, texture, irritability, and blood flow of the brain could influence 
the aesthetic appeal of observations. Aesthetic appreciation, like artistic abilities, were relative, 
even when the eyes of the observers were equally keen.480 Yet Schopenhauer argued that not all 
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aesthetic observations were equally valid. The objectively beautiful was also what was 
objectively true for the species. This objectivity was only accessible to genius:  
The highest degree [of perception] is genius, in which the comprehension of the external 
world becomes so pure and objective that to it even more is directly revealed in the 
individual things than these things themselves, namely the true nature of their whole 
species […]. This is conditioned by the fact that the will here vanishes entirely from 
consciousness. This is the point where the present consideration, starting from 
physiological foundations, is connected with […] the metaphysics of the beautiful. Really 
aesthetic comprehension, in the higher degree peculiar only to genius, is fully considered 
there as the state or condition of pure, that is to say wholly will-less, knowledge, which 
on this account is completely objective.481 
 
While not what Kant had intended, Schopenhauer claimed that he was in fact corroborating 
Kant’s transcendental aesthetic by grounding it in physiology.482 Crary has commented that 
before Schopenhauer: “Never has an idealist been so immersed in the details of corporeality or 
alluded to such a large range of texts about human physiology, repeatedly situating his most 
central ideas in relation to the specific anatomy of the brain, the nervous system, and the spinal 
cord.”483 This also helps to explain why physiologists were so interested in Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy.  
 Nietzsche does not directly refer to Schopenhauer’s treatise on vision and colour in his 
extant Nachlass. Yet on April 12th 1870, he sent the Wagners a copy of the physiologist Johann 
Nepomuk Czermak’s “On Schopenhauer’s Theory of Colour: A Contribution to the History of 
the Theory of Colours” which he was excited about because it claimed that Schopenhauer had 
“philosophically” discovered the Young-Helmholtz theory of colour vision in 1816.484 The 
Young-Helmholtz theory of colour vision was independently discovered by the British 
physiologist Thomas Young in 1802 before being re-discovered and developed by Helmholtz in 
1850. It established that the retina of the eyes contained three different kinds of light receptors 
for different wavelengths of light: red, green, and blue. The excitation or suppression of these 
receptors could account for all the colours humans perceive. Czermak was a student of the 
experimental physiologists Carl Ludwig and Ernst Brücke, who were part of Helmholtz’s circle 
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and were defenders of vivisection. Weber would later condemn Czermak for his experiments on 
the nervous physiology of dogs in Torture Chambers of Science (1879); however, Nietzsche had 
already expressed positive interest in Czermak and his work in 1870.485  
 Czermak began “On Schopenhauer’s Theory of Colour” by stressing the uniqueness of 
Schopenhauer’s theory. The physiologist cited the same aphorism by Goethe that Schopenhauer 
referenced in “On Vision and Color” about the troubled relationship between student and 
teacher. He did this to argue that while Schopenhauer thought of himself as Goethe’s closest and 
most trusted student, Goethe did not think that this was the case. Goethe was right.486 
Schopenhauer’s colour theory was his own. Czermak then excused his colleagues for their lack 
of attention to Schopenhauer. It was understandable, given the philosopher’s tendency to dismiss 
whole swaths of scientific research out of hand, such as the discovery of Fraunhofer lines.487 He 
nevertheless applauded Schopenhauer’s contributions to epistemology and the physiological 
theory of colour, claiming that he was the most powerful thinker since Kant, who had 
“philosophically anticipated” the Young-Helmholtz theory of colour that would only be 
empirically demonstrated decades later.488 His essay quotes Schopenhauer at length, and argued 
that despite Schopenhauer’s anti-Newtonian furor, his theory was compatible with Newtonian 
optics more broadly. Nietzsche discovered Czermak before his 1872-74 reading of Zöllner’s On 
the Nature of Comets where the astrophysicist cited Czermak’s essay to highlight the novelty of 
Schopenhauer’s colour theory. Zöllner drew up a schematic list of the points in Schopenhauer’s 
and Helmholtz’s works on colour and perception to corroborate Czermak’s claims for the 
novelty of Schopenhauer’s colour theory, and to argue for the older philosopher’s priority in the 
discovery of the “Young-Helmholtz theory of colour.”489 Nietzsche’s continued interest in 
Zöllner was partly due to his continued interest in Schopenhauer’s physio-aesthetic 
epistemology.  
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 In his 1860 article “On a New Kind of Pseudoscopy and its Relationship to the Movement 
Phenomenon Described by Plateau and Oppel,” Zöllner introduced the optical illusion 
(Gesichtsbetrug) that would come to be called the Zöllner Illusion, or Zöllner Lines. In this 
illusion lines that are parallel are made to look non-parallel by the inclusion of shorter lines 
crossing the parallel lines at an oblique angle. Zöllner’s discussion of this illusion served to 
support Schopenhauer’s argument about the nature of perception. The ideas (Vorstellungen) of 
rest and motion were relative, and based on the constancy or change in the distance between two 
points.490 While it seemed at first glance that the comparisons that made such judgments possible 
were established by external spatial relationships, Zöllner argued that the two points being 
compared were ultimately within the mind of the individual making the observations. Likewise, 
in the case of parallel or non-parallel lines, the impression of stability or motion was indirectly 
created through the movement of an imagined line connecting the distance of any two points 
along their lengths by which they were compared.491 This act of perception was a fully embodied 
process. An observer’s body was always in a kind of motion, and their eyes moved in relation to 
their bodies.  
 Zöllner lines. Friedrich Zöllner, Annalen der Physik, 675. 
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 Zöllner argued that comparison was vital to perception, and yet simultaneous comparison 
was not possible. There could only be successive comparisons. The illusion of the Zöllner Lines 
was caused by the eye rapidity trying to process what it was seeing as it moved around the 
image.492 This was because the comparative activity of the understanding took place at the level 
of unconscious inferences as they pieced together discrete sensory impressions:   
The idea [Vorstellungen] of parallelism or non-parallelism of two straight lines, on the 
one hand, and of the rest or motion of a body, on the other, are not the results of 
immediate sensory perception, but instead result from the logical conclusions, which we 
derive through the given observational data of the eye with the help of the reflective or 
comparative activity of our understanding. Only the great speeds of these mental 
operations following one another in rapid succession prevents them from individually 
coming to consciousness.493 
 
Zöllner stressed that the illusion was “purely” the result of the psychological/physiological 
organization of the viewer, as their brain made an unconscious calculation from effect to cause of 
the movement of objects in space.494 This was in the same class of physiological illusions as the 
size of the moon seeming larger on the horizon, or the forced perspective of seeing insects up 
close.495 Nietzsche employed this line of thinking in The Gay Science to argue for the primacy of 
description over explanation in science, writing that: “we perceive motion only as isolated points 
and then infer it without ever actually seeing it.”496 What human’s perceive has only an apparent 
unity that is constructed by their brain and nervous system out of unconscious inferences 
working with fragmentary sense impressions. While the relationships of these apparent unities 
can be described, their apparent effects, relationships, dimensions, etc., they cannot be explained, 
for their apparent causes are wrapped up in how they are perceived by the human organism. 
Zöllner would continue exploring how unconscious inferences created the unities of perception 
in On the Nature of Comets, particularly where he explored its application to facial perception.  
 Nietzsche’s interest in figures such as Zöllner, Czermak, and Schopenhauer cannot be 
divorced from his broader interest in the intersection of experience or education, unconscious 
inferences, and the physiology of perception.497 This is particularly the case with  
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Nietzsche’s interest in Helmholtz. Nietzsche is known to have read Helmholtz’s essay “On the 
Interaction of Natural Forces” and borrowed his Treaties on Physiological Optics in 1873. He 
also had many opportunities to read about Helmholtz's work in the writings of Lange and 
Zöllner. Helmholtz’s concerns in his debates with the physiologist Ewald Hering (1834-1918) 
over the empiricist and nativist models of vision were relevant to Nietzsche, for they raised the 
question: Given that everything that humans perceived was a consequence of their physiological 
organization, what was the relationship between perception and education?498 Humans may take 
from nature exactly what they put into it, but they could not put just anything into nature, and 
even this practice of “putting in” was different for different individuals. Helmholtz sought to 
answer this question by clarifying the distinction between simple sensations and perceptions 
(Anschauungen). In doing so he argued that while simple sensations were innate limitatio ns on 
experience, perceptions (such as spatial perceptions) were learned. Perceptions were readily 
apparent to the conscious mind, and yet they were made up of simple sensations that were much 
more difficult to isolate. In one example Helmholtz described the perception of wetness being 
produced by a unity of the simple sensations of cold and smooth. Yet while perceptions were 
made up of simple sensations, experience actually made it more difficult to recognize what was 
or was not a simple sensation.499 This difficulty is caused by the fact that simple sensations are 
unified into perceptions through unconscious inferences. Helmholtz explained that these 
inferences were not different in kind from conscious conclusions drawn from induction and 
analogy.500 However, unlike conscious conclusions, once established they could not simply be 
dismissed by an act of will or through a clearer understanding of their origins.501 This was 
because memories and perceptions blur into each other to form the bulk of human experience, 
and they do so more seamlessly the more frequently a person is subject to a given experience.502 
This blurring could be disrupted in ways, for instance, when a person started wearing glasses for 
the first time, or when someone who was born blind had their vision restored through an 
operation.503 It could also be disrupted by a change of perspective that placed the observer’s 
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sensory organs in an unusual orientation.504 These considerations led Helmholtz to conclude that: 
“Whatever […] can be overcome by factors of experience, we must consider as being itself the 
product of experience and training.”505 This greatly expanded the range of what kinds of 
experiences could be understood as being composites of simpler sensations. It also made 
experience identical to an act of unconscious scientific experimentation:  
It is only by voluntarily bringing our organs of sense in various relations to the objects 
that we learn to be sure as to our judgments of the causes of our sensations. This kind of 
experimentation begins in earliest youth and continues all through life without 
interruption.506 
 
Experimentation was an organic process. Just as it was a function of the eye to see light, it was a 
function of the intellect to consciously and unconsciously experiment and form a growing 
reserve of general conceptions about the appearance of causal connections drawn from 
experience. Indeed, as Helmholtz observed: “The law of sufficient reason is really nothing more 
than the urge of our intellect to bring all our perceptions under its own control. It is not a law of 
nature.”507 This could have been written by Nietzsche.  
 However, since this “urge of the intellect” was not a law of nature per se, but of 
understanding, the connections formed by it did have something arbitrary about them. For 
Helmholtz, all perceptions were not essentially different from the “illusions of the senses” that 
Schopenhauer described in “On Vision and Colors.” Yet while illusions were a false idea 
produced by perception, Helmholtz argued that even “true” perceptions were only “practically 
true.”508 Their practical truth was intimately tied to their relationship with action, 
experimentation, and self-regulation:  
Our ideas of things cannot be anything but symbols, natural signs for things which we 
learn how to use in order to regulate our movements and actions. Having learned 
correctly how to read those symbols, we are enabled by their help to adjust our actions so 
as to bring about the desired result; that is, so that the expected new sensations will 
arise.509 
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While the natural signs for things did not have a necessary relationship to the world outside of 
the observer (as Helmholtz argued in his discussion of colour vision and colour blindness) what 
mattered was how the symbols were then compared and related to each other in such a way that 
they could serve as the basis of action. Helmholtz likened this process to reading and writing:  
A writing is correct when he who knows how to read it forms correct ideas by it. And so 
the idea of a thing is correct for him who knows how to determine correctly from it in 
advance what sense-impressions he will get from the thing when he places himself in 
definite external relations to it.510 
 
As a former philologist Nietzsche also understood the relationship between experience, 
perception, and the “true world” to be like a kind of reading whose rules were both arbitrary and 
yet necessary for an understanding of the anthropocentric “text” of nature. Like with Bernard’s 
understanding of experimentation, this form of literacy allowed individuals greater relative 
freedom to act upon and within their environments, even as they built up more elaborate—
though in some ways arbitrary—conceptual lexicons. Recognizing the arbitrary quality of 
perception and yet also how the internal consistency of perceptions nevertheless made action 
possible was also reflected in Nietzsche’s thinking about the relationship between self-imposed 
creative limitations and meaningful freedom.  
 
The Dancer: Nietzsche on the Physiological Dimensions of Creative Limitations 
 
 From Schopenhauer to Helmholtz, Nietzsche encountered several thinkers who claimed 
that perception not only modified and structured experience, but that experience could likewise 
modify and structure perception. If the limits of perception were regulating limits then self-
consciously experimenting with and choosing one’s own experiences was a way to creatively 
regulate one’s self, mirroring in a conscious way what the brain already did unconsciously. For 
Nietzsche this was a physiological, aesthetic, and educational principle that showed how 
meaningful freedom required not only an acceptance of limitations, but that it was defined by the 
ability to self-consciously choose one’s individual limits.  
 While in his early support for Wagner Nietzsche defended the idea that absolute freedom 
was the precondition of creativity, he later argued that there could be no creativity without limits 
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that were either externally or internally imposed. In Human, All Too Human he described this 
artistic process. In the aphorism “The Revolution in Poetry” he argued against the tendency to 
rebel against all limitations, and compared such seemingly diverse topics as French drama, 
Goethe’s creative output, and Greek rhetoric as examples of art brought to a state of relative 
perfection through the apparent mastery of “self-imposed fetters” that made themselves appear to 
be “the supreme outcome of a necessary evolution in art.”511 “Experimentation” within and on 
one’s limits, making them appear to be no limits at all, taught people to take pleasure in life and 
“regard human life as a piece of nature, as the object of a regular evolution.”512 In the second 
book of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche described this process as learning the art of “dancing 
in chains,” and claimed that it was the talent of ancient Greek poets to create within the metrical 
and narrative constraints that were handed down to them, while also creating new constraints for 
themselves: “For that which we call ‘invention’ […] is always a self-imposed fetter.”513 Nor is 
this form of invention unique to the arts. Shortly after mentioning dancing in chains, Nietzsche 
went on to discuss what he called the “employees of science [Wissenschaft].” The training of 
young scholars [Gelehrten] also consisted of learning to act within certain limits, or methods. It 
involved memorizing pre-established facts while also becoming more familiar with what areas of 
knowledge still needed to be expanded upon. While Nietzsche is less approving of scholars than 
he is of Homer and the Greek poets, he did argue that there were some scholars who also 
innovated based on setting new limitations for themselves. These figures are: “characterized by a 
narrow limitedness foreign to [employees of science], on account of which it is impossible to 
appoint them to a post or see in them usable instruments - they can live only in their own 
atmosphere and on their own soil.”514 Earlier Nietzsche had commented that this practice helped 
humans begin to understand themselves as part of natural processes, and that the “scientific man” 
was “the further evolution of the artistic.”515 It is likely that he had in mind both scholars and 
natural scientists. Creativity and freedom for artists, scholars, or scientists revolved around the 
same processes of dynamic self-regulation that predominated in the rest of the natural world, and 
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once again bore a striking resemblance to Bernard’s understanding of the meaning of freedom as 
a matter of independence achieved through interdependence.  
 In Daybreak Nietzsche stressed the close relationship between interdependence and 
coming to understand one’s own boundaries and limitations. The ancient dictum to “know 
thyself,’ for instance, was really a call to learn everything, for: “Only when the human being has 
finally attained knowledge of all things will he have known himself. For things are merely the 
boundaries of the human being.”516 Likewise, the empathetic understanding of the lives of others 
was a projection based on their effects upon the individual. People could only see each other’s 
boundaries and the ways in which their own boundaries press up against those around them:  
In accordance with our knowledge of ourselves, we mould [our neighbour] into a satellite 
of our own system: and when he shines for us or grows dark, and in either case we are the 
ultimate cause—we nonetheless believe the opposite! World of phantoms in which we 
live! Inverted, topsy-turvy, empty world, dreamed full and upright nonetheless.517  
 
It is telling that Nietzsche likening this process of experiencing boundaries to the experience of 
inverted vision. In both instances there were creative, though unconscious physiological process 
at play that structured human experience.  
 Nietzsche’s interest in the sand figures produced by the German physicist and musician 
Ernst Chladni (1756-1827) bore a relationship to his interest in the role played by limits in 
creative acts. Chladni is sometimes called the “founder of experimental acoustics” for his work 
on visualizing different frequencies of sound. In this work he employed acoustic plates that used 
the motion of sand or other fine particles on rigid surfaces to show the nodal patterns produced 
by different resonance frequencies of sound when a bow or other instrument was run over their 
edges.518 Nietzsche made a note in 1872 that “[w]ith the organic the artistic also beings,” yet in 
the same note he stressed that this artistry was always bound within physiological limits, for: 
“[t]o think of an artistic process without a brain is a severe anthropomorphism.”519 His early 
reflections on Chladni Figures linked them with the aesthetically pleasing and seemingly free 
aspects of what were in the end fundamentally law-bound natural processes.  
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A depiction of Chladni figures from: William Henry Stone, Elementary Lessons on Sound 
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1879), 26. 
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An example of a range of Chladni figures from: Ernst Chladni, Die Akustik (Leipzig: 
Breitkopf & Härtel, 1802). 
 
The first recorded reference to Chladni in Nietzsche’s Nachlass appears around the summer 
of 1872, in which he wrote that the creativity of the dreaming mind demonstrates that in 
cognition there is a “twofold artistic process […]: that which produces images and that which 
chooses among them.”520 Production, comparison, and selection were all creative activities, 
however: 
it is obvious that here too there is no totally free artistic invention - for that would be 
something arbitrary and hence impossible. Instead, these images are the finest emanations 
of nervous activity as it is viewed on a surface. The images are related to the underlying 
nervous activity which agitates them in the same way that Chladni’s acoustical figures 
are to the sound itself. […] Considered physiologically, the artistic process is absolutely 
determined and necessary.521 
 
Thought and perception were creative and organic processes that were simultaneously necessary 
and limited by the nervous organization of the individual. The creativity and necessity of thought 
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and perception had the same relationship as Chladni’s aesthetically pleasing sand figures had to 
the unseen sound waves that produced them. While thinking and creativity seemed to be as 
arbitrary (willkürlich) and free as an individual’s tastes (Belieben), this was because people did 
not perceive the endless activity of their own nervous systems. For instance, notions of time and 
space did not make sense outside of a sentient being. Humans could only think in terms of 
aesthetic and metaphorical forms, and the concept of form belonged to the very essence of 
subjective experience: This “relationship is something like that between Chladni sound figures to 
the vibration.”522 Physiologically speaking, creativity and necessity were not actually opposites. 
Indeed, creativity was necessary for life. The necessary limits of knowledge were part of what 
made thought and perception creative, that made humans project, or create, “forms” into the 
natural world. In other notes from 1872 Nietzsche wrote: 
Surely, we live in a perpetual illusion brought about by the superficiality of our intellect: 
that is to say, we need art at every moment in order to live. Our eye holds us fast to the 
forms. But if it is we ourselves who have gradually cultivated this eye, then we see an 
artistic force at work in ourselves. Thus we see in nature itself mechanisms that oppose 
absolute knowledge: ‘we need art’ and ‘we require only a part of knowledge.’523  
 
Nietzsche later reinforced this idea in “Beyond Good and Evil” where he wrote that: “[w]e make 
up large parts of experience and cannot be other than part of its inventors.”524 There may be 
beings with organs better suited to knowledge, though human perception was not without its 
advantages.525  
 Nietzsche argued that the necessary physiological processes underlying aesthetics were 
themselves mutable. This had important metaphysical implications about how human beings 
understood their relationship to the natural world. For instance, with his break from Wagner 
Nietzsche turned against Schopenhauer’s and Wagner’s claims about the universality of music. 
In Human, All Too Human he claimed that music was not universal and could not even be tied to 
nationalities or folk.526 Musical tastes were not only culturally contingent, but how humans 
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actually heard sound changed over time.527 In Daybreak Nietzsche speculated that colour vision 
was not only physiologically mediated and dependent on the physical context in which colours 
were seen, but that it was also historically and culturally contingent. In his aphorism “Colour-
Blindness of Thinkers” he observed that the ancient Greeks used one word to describe the colour 
of dark hair, cornflowers, and the Mediterranean, and one word to describe green plants, human 
skin, honey, and yellow resin. This implied that their eyes actually saw blues as deep browns, 
and greens as yellows. A consequence of this was that the colour of human beings was also the 
colour that predominated in nature. The Greeks and their gods and demigods felt closer to nature 
in part because they actually perceived more similarities between the natural and the human than 
subsequent generations.528 This was merely a more dramatic example of a common thought 
process. Since human beings were not constituted so as to be able to see the world-in-itself, any 
kind of coherent thought about an object was to paint it “with fewer colours than there actually 
were.” This limitation was the precondition for diverse perspectives and forms of colour, or 
conceptual, harmonies. Different ways of perceiving the world brought with them different ways 
of evaluating it, and: “even now many an individual works from a particular color-blindness out 
into a richer form of seeing and differentiating: whereby he not only finds new pleasures but also 
must give up and lose several of the earlier ones.”529 This was the benefit, and the cost, of 
working through one’s limitations in order to “dance in chains.”  
 
 Høffding and the Inner World 
 
 The way that creatively self-imposed limitations opened up new forms of perception 
articulated through Nietzsche’s image of “dancing in chains” was yet another way that he 
described the processes of dynamic self-regulation, or “independence through interdependence” 
that was common throughout nature, from the nutrition and heat regulation of living organisms, 
to the cultural freedom and independence of the philosophical traveller, to how the individual 
psyche itself used ideas as an actual form of nutrition. Like Nietzsche, the Danish philosopher 
Harald Høffding felt that the human psyche was a rarefied milieu intérieur that functioned in a 
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process analogous to the more immediately physiological milieu intérieur described by Bernard. 
In this model of the milieu intérieur ideas were the nourishment of the psyche that helped the 
individual maintain and regulate the unity of their psychic life against the ever changing 
environment of their perceptions and sensations. In this way experiences and learning not only 
acted on individuals in ways that they were consciously aware of, but also in ways that were not 
immediately apparent to conscious life.  
While little known today, the German edition of Høffding’s Psychology Defined on the 
Basis of Experience (1887) is a heavily annotated work in Nietzsche’s extant library and notably 
influenced his later writings. Brobjer has already identified several key passages in The 
Genealogy of Morals that show how Nietzsche likely referenced Høffding without citing him.530 
Nietzsche’s discussions of how interpretations produced physiological responses, and 
physiological responses instigated the formation of interpretations, his critiques of English 
psychology and physiology, and his discussion of how the laws of forgetting were part of the 
physiological laws of psychic life (what Nietzsche called “inpsychation” or the incorporation of 
psychical nourishment) all have parallels in Høffding that Nietzsche annotated in his copy of the 
Danish philosopher’s work.531 In the preface to The Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche claimed that 
his engagement with the ideas he was exploring were “much older” than his notes for Human, 
All Too Human from 1876-77.532 What I wish to show here is how Nietzsche’s highlighting of 
key passages in Høffding’s work bears witness to his continued interest in the milieu intérieur 
and how psychological and perceptual dynamic self-regulation proceeded in a manner that was 
analogous with that of other organic processes.  
 In Psychology Defined Høffding argued that the inner secrets of the organization and 
development of all organic and inorganic matter depended on a theory that could unify two 
particular principles of nineteenth-century science: the conservation of energy and evolution’s 
apparent tendency to produce ever more specialized and complex organisms. Helmholtz, du 
Bois-Reymond and many nineteenth-century scientists invoked the conservation of energy to 
argue that miracles were by definition impossible, since any miraculous event would involve a 
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creation of energy where there was none. This also had consequences for the existence of free 
will, since in order to not be determined by their history and physiology, individuals’ choices 
would have to be, in some sense, uncaused and miraculous. Høffding understood these two 
principles to be fundamentally connected because the conservation of energy placed limits on 
how nature could be organized and evolutionary development was how living beings worked 
within those limits. Høffding drew from both Bernard’s idea of the milieu intérieur, as well as du 
Bois-Reymond’s discussion of the relationship between the conservation of energy and organic 
life when he made this argument in Psychology Defined.533 He felt that these connections were 
already half-evident in the ways in which natural scientists were increasingly showing how life 
was a nested series of systems that tended towards greater forms of individualization. In a 
passage that Nietzsche highlighted, Høffding wrote: “Everywhere [the process of 
individualization] forms in nature smaller totalities within the greater, eternal totality.”534 This 
series of nested totalities extended to the universe as a whole, and reached its most rarified form 
of individualization within the human mind. While his understanding of consciousness was very 
similar to Helmholtz’s, Høffding’s emphasis on how life consisted of ever more rarified and 
nested sets of self-regulating systems led him to some different conclusions that were 
particularly appealing to Nietzsche. 
 Like Helmholtz, Høffding described perception as an act of unconscious comparison 
(unwillkürliches Vergleichen) whose content was incorporated into consciousness. A 
consequence of this was that: “There is no absolutely passive sensory perception [emphasis 
Nietzsche’s].”535 Høffding also used the example of reading to describe the relationship between 
experience, perception, and the external world. Unlike Helmholtz, however, he used this analogy 
to highlight what he saw as a tension that existed between them. In reading, the individual 
sensations of lines on a page become subsumed by the feelings and ideas that those lines 
produced in the reader. This does not go against Helmholtz’s interpretation of experience, since 
Helmholtz admitted that greater familiarity makes it harder to once again experience a sensation 
as its composite parts. For Helmholtz unconscious conclusions, or experimentation, provided 
consciousness with a repository of experiences and comparisons that furnish the means for future 
                                                 
533 Høffding, Psychologie in Umrissen auf Grundlage der Erfahrung , 42, 103. 
534 Ibid., 106. The German used is “Individualisierung.” 
535 Ibid., 161. Numerous segments of this passage have been highlighted by Nietzsche, including Høffding’s 
reference to “unwillkürliches Vergleichen,” unconscious comparison.  
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action. Yet for Høffding consciousness could almost be said to actually hunger for ideas and 
experience, which provide it with the means not just to act, but also grow and impose itself on 
the individual’s sensations and perceptions.   
 Høffding described a sort of push and pull between the inner world of memory and the 
outer world of sensation and perception in which each vied for primacy in consciousness. Ideas 
helped memory to maintain its independence from being lost in the immediacy of its fragmentary 
perceptions and sensations. While memory could never entirely overcome the influence of 
sensations, it could radically reshape their interpretation.536 Høffding repeatedly referred to the 
role that the “world of memory” played in the independence (variously Selbständigkeit or 
Unabhängigkeit in Nietzsche’s translation) of ideas, in the face of which sensations played only 
the role of “triggering forces.”537 Ideas did for mental life what blood did for physical life. They 
served as the dynamic medium that helped to maintain an organism’s independence and 
interdependence with its environment. Høffding explicitly relates this to Bernard’s understanding 
of the milieu intérieur: 
Consciousness now has at its command a content that to some extent makes it 
'independent of the influences of the moment'; it can let itself be driven by a life in 
memories, a life of thought [underlined by Nietzsche], not only a life of sensation or 
perception. One has aptly compared the circulation of ideas [Vorstellungskreis] with 
blood. In the blood, which is formed out of the nourishment that is taken in from the 
outside world, the organism sustains an inner world [underlined by Nietzsche] (milieu 
intérieur, vgl. II, 3) that makes it to a certain extent independent of the outer world. 
Likewise consciousness has an inner medium [underlined by Nietzsche] in its free 
association of ideas, that is formed out of earlier sensations, and it is the same medium 
which enables it to lead its own life, even when the influx of newer sensations 
diminishes.538  
 
The inner life of consciousness, just like the inner life of an organism, was relatively independent 
of its environment. The more complicated the organism, the more pronounced this independence 
was likely to be.     
                                                 
536 Ibid., 158. See also 160. 
537 Høffding, Psychologie in Umrissen auf Grundlage der Erfahrung, 157. These terms are underlined here in 
Nietzsche’s copy, as are Høffding’s references to independence. 
538 Ibid., 157-8. It is also worthwhile to consider Nietzsche’s often-heated rhetoric around blood in light of this 
analogy. 
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 Nietzsche was already exploring ideas similar to Høffding’s in 1874 when he described 
how stronger individuals were more readily able to transform their own pasts “into blood.”539 
When he compared the spirit to a stomach around 1885 and 1886, he was again likely thinking of 
ideas as part of a physiological process.540 In “Beyond Good and Evil” he wrote that the spirit 
[Geist] had needs and capacities that were “the same as those which physiologists posit for 
everything that lives, grows, and multiplies:” 
it involuntarily emphasizes certain features and lines in what is foreign, in every piece of 
the ‘external world,’ retouching and falsifying the whole to suit itself. Its intent in all this 
is to incorporate new ‘experiences,’ to file new things in old files— growth, in a word— 
or, more precisely, the feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power.541  
 
Experience was a kind of nourishment. In light of this education changed the individual in two 
important ways. Firstly, it facilitated the individual’s ability to consciously and dynamically 
regulate themselves in relationship to their cultural and historical environments. Secondly 
however, it also facilitated their unconscious processes of psychological self-regulation. While 
there were certain elements of the human organism that were “unteachable,” because of its 
evolutionary history, Nietzsche acknowledged that: “Learning changes us; it does what all 
nourishment does which also does not merely ‘preserve’— as physiologists know.”542 Education 
was a physiological process through which the assimilation of experiences and ideas provided 
nutritional material that furthered individuals’ freedom relative to their cultural and perceptual 
environments. As was seen in chapter three, this was partly a self-conscious process of self-
determination. Yet Høffding and Nietzsche further argued that this was also an important process 
governing individuals’ unconscious and perceptual lives as well. Dynamic self-regulation was a 
physiological process that played out at every level of organic life. For Høffding, this was part of 
the universal process of individualization. For Nietzsche, however, this processes culminated in a 
more self-conscious kind of individualization in which the individual reached the pinnacle of 
independence through interdependence by embracing how the height of meaningful freedom was 
the ability to embrace creatively how they were completely determined by their environments. 
This was the task of the Übermensch. 
                                                 
539 Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” 62-3. 
540 Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil,” 230. See also: Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 179.  
541 Nietzsche, “Beyond Good and Evil,” 350. 
542 Ibid., 352.  
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 The Übermensch 
 
 Nietzsche’s understanding of education as a physiological process, his many parallels with 
Bernard, and his highlights in Høffding’s work all reflect his interest in how existence could be 
understood as being composed of “smaller totalities” that were reflective of, and interdependent 
with, the “greater, eternal totality” of existence as a whole. Different levels of organization were 
characterized by different forms of dynamic self-regulation; however, the relative freedom 
afforded at each level involved the ability to creatively fashion new limits for the individual 
where none had been before. It was not just the ancient Greeks; all of nature danced in chains. 
The Übermensch was the cumulative result of Nietzsche’s thinking about dynamic self-
regulation and its relationship to the genius-as-chain-dancer who secured meaningful freedom by 
creatively willing the limitations of the totality of their own existence. The Übermensch’s 
“environment” was the eternal return of the same, which was Nietzsche’s understanding of the 
unity of human existence as a whole. This relationship was prefigured in Nietzsche’s writing in 
his discussions about the origin and meaning of genius as well as in his earlier thoughts about 
dynamic self-regulation. This can further be seen in the way that Nietzsche described the 
Übermensch’s relationship to contingency in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  
The seeds of the Übermensch existed long before Nietzsche explicitly used that term to 
describe his educational ideal. Writing to his friend Peter Gast (1854-1918) in 1883, he reflected 
on his work up to that point, commenting: “It is curious: I wrote the commentary prior to the 
text! Everything was already promised in Schopenhauer as [E]ducator. But there was still a long 
way to go from ‘Human, All Too Human’ to the ‘[Übermensch].’”543 Nietzsche had realized the 
tensions between his own thought in “Schopenhauer as Educator” and Schopenhauer’s actual 
philosophy. He claimed as much in a letter to Cosima Wagner dated December 29th 1876. In it he 
stated that his difference with Schopenhauer had been growing unconsciously since he wrote 
“Schopenhauer as Educator,” explaining the work by saying that: “since I am removed from all 
dogmatic principles, the entire affair concerned only the human being, as I have already written 
                                                 
543 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Letter to Peter Gast, 21 April 1883,” as in Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale. 
trans. R.J. Hollingdale. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xxviii. 
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concerning Schopenhauer.”544 In that text his emphasis on the human being allowed him to 
describe Schopenhauer’s “physiological” influence on him, rhetorically excusing himself from 
actually talking about Schopenhauer so that he could instead explore his broader interest in 
education and self-fashioning.545 As has already been shown in chapter one, many of the themes 
that carried through from “Schopenhauer as Educator” to Human, All Too Human related to 
notions of genius, education, self-fashioning, and physiology. The free spirit of Human, All Too 
Human developed out of Nietzsche’s attempt to redefine the meaning and nature of genius, just 
as the Übermensch and their relationship to the eternal return of the same developed out of the 
free spirit’s relationship to necessity and contingency.  
The eternal return of the same was the culmination of Nietzsche’s thinking about necessity 
and what it meant for individuals to be meaningfully free. Not only was the individual entirely 
contingent upon their physiological and psychological contexts, this relationship did not even 
end in death since existence repeated itself exactly as it had been for all eternity. The ability to 
affirm the value and importance of one’s life and one’s necessary relationship to everything else 
in the cosmos that has existed or will exist was one of the hallmarks of the Übermensch. 
However, there has been some hesitancy in the scholarly literature surrounding whether or not it 
is even desirable to contextualize Nietzsche’s arguments about the eternal return in terms of his 
engagement with the natural sciences. George Stack stressed that it was the idea of the eternal 
return that was the “acid test” of the Übermensch, and that as a cosmological possibility it had 
little other value.546 Babich prefers to see it as a development of the Kantian “what if?” in which 
“the thinking of the [e]ternal [r]eturn of the same is directed against the seekers of the future, the 
men of the future, the last men.”547 In her view, the “(impossible) possibility [of seeing the 
eternal recurrence as a physical phenomenon] is not the point. And stylistically, it is inevitably 
beside the point.”548 In this regard she closely follows the interpretation of Heidegger, for whom 
the idea was primarily an existential thought, albeit a very powerful one.549 Yet to treat the 
                                                 
544 Nietzsche, as in: Mazzino Montinari, Reading Nietzsche, trans. Greg Whitlock (Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press, 2003), 37. See also: Wagner, Cosima Wagner’s Diary, Vol II, 938. 
545 Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 136. 
546 Stack, Lange and Nietzsche, 32. 
547 Babette E. Babich, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground  
of Art and Life (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 287. 
548 Babich, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science, 285.  
549 Martin Heiddeger, Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, trans. David Farrell Krell (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984), 13. 
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eternal return as a kind of existential thought experiment is to largely ignore Nietzsche’s own 
admission that it was the “most scientific hypothesis.” Babich goes as far as to say that 
Nietzsche’s apparently honest efforts to discover if the eternal return could actually describe a 
cosmic process was a kind of posthumous act of misdirection which he placed in his unpublished 
notes.550 Believing this prevents us from seeing some important developments in Nietzsche’s 
thought and from appreciating the full scope of his synthesis of the scientific ideas of his age.  
The relationship between the Übermensch and the eternal return of the same was prefigured 
in Nietzsche’s earlier writing about how geniuses participated in their own self-fashioning or 
dynamic self-regulation out of the contingent material of their environment, history, and culture. 
This can be seen, for instance, in a passage from Human, All Too Human, where Nietzsche 
wrote:  
And by your desiring with all your strength to see ahead how the knot of the future is 
going to be tied, your own life will acquire the value of an instrument and means of 
knowledge. You have it in your hands to achieve the absorption of all you experience —
your experiments, errors, faults, delusions, passions, your love and your hope— into your 
goal without remainder. This goal is yourself to become a necessary chain of rings of 
culture and from this necessity to recognize the necessity inherent in the course of culture 
in general.551  
 
While the eternal return of the same has often been considered as an existential, or cosmological, 
doctrine, the persistence of Nietzsche’s thoughts about the relationship between genius and 
dynamic self-regulation also position it as a profoundly physiological ideal.  
 In the context of Nietzsche’s persistent interest in the physiological dynamics of self-
regulation and genius, it seems likely that the relationship between the Übermensch and the 
eternal return of the same is best understood as the largest, cosmic instantiation of dynamic self-
regulation. Nietzsche claimed that Zarathustra, by teaching the Übermensch and the eternal 
return of the same, was “the redeemer of coincidence,” who had taught “Lord Contingency” to 
“Dance on the feet of chance.”552 The scene in Thus Spoke Zarathustra that featured the 
tightrope walker (literally “rope dancer,” Seiltänzer) and Nietzsche’s discussion of dancing in 
chains from Human, All Too Human are productively read side by side, for they both highlight 
how artistic and intellectual limitations (contingencies) were inextricably linked with meaningful 
                                                 
550 Babich, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science, 263. 
551 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 135. 
552 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 121, 143. See also, 172. 
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freedom and creativity. Nietzsche’s interest in the role of ideas as the blood of conscious self-
fashioning and dynamic self-regulation, and the idea that the spirit was a stomach were both 
points that he reiterated in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. He described contingency as the food of the 
spirit, writing: “I am Zarathustra, the Godless: I still cook up every chance event in my pot. And 
only when it is quite cooked do I bid it welcome, as my food.”553 For physiologists like Liebig, 
Bernard, du Bois-Reymond, and Helmholtz, the freedom and independence of organic life was 
actually maintained through ever more complex and subtle forms of interdependence between 
the organism and the necessities of its environment. Likewise, for physiologically inspired 
philosophers such as Lange, Høffding, and Nietzsche himself, psychological or perceptual 
independence was brought about by a similar, social, cultural, and intellectual form of 
“independence through interdependence” that was arrived at through ideas, travel, and education. 
With their ability to compare, select, and will everything that was necessary about the natural 
world, and not just once, but for all eternity, Nietzsche’s Übermenschen stand at the pinnacle of 
this model of “independence through interdependence.” Meaningful freedom, or independence, 
manifested itself differently in different contexts and at different scales. In a physical, or 
biological context, the independence of an organism was defined in terms of its ability to 
dynamically self-regulate relative to its physical environment. In a cultural or psychological 
context, the independence of an individual was defined in terms of their ability to dynamically 
self-regulate relative to their cultural, historical, and perceptual environments. However, in a 
cosmic context, the independence of an individual could only be defined in terms of their ability 
to dynamically self-regulate relative to the totality of existence. Physiology and cosmology blur 
depending on how one defines what constitutes an organism’s environment. Nietzsche’s 
understanding of this required unconventional notions of freedom, creativity, and independence. 
In this case, all of existence in its totality was the Übermensch’s environment, and their creative 
incorporation or assimilation of it was their actively willing it in its entirety.554 In this they 
                                                 
553 Ibid., 148. 
554 Ibid., 75, 179. This distinction between what constituted independence in different contexts also helps to explain 
the distinction Nietzsche made between willing what is, and merely accepting what is. At the level of the individual, 
comparison and selection were necessary elements of independent living within the interdependence of one’s 
cultural context. This is why Nietzsche attacked those who seemed to “take in” everything with indifference, 
commenting: “I respect the rebellious selective tongues and stomachs , that have learned to say ‘I’ and ‘Yes’ and 
‘No.’” Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 168. The disinclination or inability to say yes or no, to make value 
claims, was the psychological equivalent of the physiological inability to regulate one’s own temperature in 
relationship to the ambient environment. 
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simultaneously accepted their finitude and contingency, even as they embraced their connection 
to eternity.  
  
 Conclusion 
 
 Making a distinction between Nietzsche’s interest in physiological aesthetics (following 
Grant Allen) on the one hand, and “physio-aesthetic epistemology” on the other, helps show how 
he came to his physiological relativism from a stance that was initially within Schopenhauer’s 
philosophical system. Schopenhauer’s understanding of perception as an activity of the intellect 
required a twofold aesthetic component to experience: what perceptions attracted the mind, and 
how the mind creatively sought out and structured those perceptions. Schopenhauer used 
examples of physiological illusions as well as inverted and binocular vision to demonstrate this 
point. Yet in the absence of Schopenhauer’s transcendental view of the objective world, these 
same observations proved valuable material for Nietzsche’s physiological relativism. It also 
helps to explain his persistent interest in Helmholtz, who also held that much of human 
perception was projected into nature. Helmholtz, lacking Schopenhauer’s heady commitme nt to 
being able to experience the thing-in- itself, nevertheless grounded the reliability of perception in 
relation to how it furnished the material for being able to successfully act on and interact with the 
phenomenal world. This also had important consequences for what constituted learning. 
Experimentation and education could not allow one to learn about the objective world, or the 
thing- in-itself. Instead, for Helmholtz, learning was the process whereby the mind, largely 
through unconscious conclusions and comparisons, collected together and interrelated arbitrary 
perceptions into a useful whole in order to regulate an organism’s movements and actions. This 
was similar to the arbitrary qualities of language that nevertheless, when understood together, 
could be used to express complex thoughts and ideas. Learning, and learning about the limits of 
action, was thus an important part of dynamic self-regulation. Nietzsche’s predilection for 
understanding existence as a text with an unknown, and likely unknowab le referent, is best 
understood in this context. Helmholtz’s stance on perception and learning (together with other 
physiological thinkers such as Bernard, Lange, and Høffding) also served as the context in which 
Nietzsche came to see that creativity within limits was what constituted the independence and 
dynamic self-regulation of life itself.  
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 Nietzsche’s understanding of independence was defined by limitations, for while learning 
and growth were arrived at thorough experimentation and comparison, the consequences of this 
growth was to provide individuals with novel and more complicated ways to limit themselves. 
Nietzsche used the metaphors of learning and developing artistic skills and conventions, as well 
as of scholarly and scientific methods, to demonstrate how productive and vital these forms of 
self-limitation could be. However, he went beyond these metaphors to describe how in nature 
seemingly free, spontaneous, and aesthetically pleasing creative acts still depended upon law-
bound natural processes. This was also the case with human beings. Instead of raging against the 
laws of nature, Nietzsche encouraged his readers to see how innovation, creativity, and 
independence required mastering new limitations, for it was the mastering of new ones that 
opened up other ways of acting in and evaluating the world. No one person could know 
everything, but individuals could make themselves into diverse “little worlds” within the larger 
world of the cosmos as a whole.  
 Bernard described the organism as a microcosm, or little world, that existed within, was 
insulated against, and yet was also reflective of the macrocosm, or larger cosmos. Its processes 
of dynamic self-regulation were reflective of larger processes. Nietzsche took a complementary 
approach when he described how the relationship between ideas and perception existed in a 
similar relationship as that between food and an organism’s milieu intérieur, converting both into 
the “blood” that was necessary to maintain a division between one’s self and one’s surroundings. 
Nietzsche found in Høffding another account of ideas as the blood of consciousness, and how 
experiences were the food that consciousness converted into ideas in order to help buffer it 
against the changing immediacy of every passing perception and sensation in its environment. 
Høffding’s work was not the cause of Nietzsche’s association between blood and ideas, and how 
dynamic self-regulation was more than just the definition of organic life but also psychological 
life. However, the attention Nietzsche gave to the Danish philosopher does highlight his 
persistent interest in the subject. Throughout his career, Nietzsche’s use of metaphors of the 
stomach and digestion were explicitly related to actual physiological studies of nutrition and 
blood as the primary domains of dynamic self-regulation. Nietzsche’s interest in the active and 
creative dimensions of perception related to his thoughts about ideas and education as the 
sustenance of consciousness. In this view, unconscious comparison was an active part of how 
conscious organisms “sought out” material to assimilate, or digest, that furthered their own 
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independence. There was also a conscious element to this process. The individual’s cultural diet 
was partly determined by their aesthetic sensibilities, and their “taste” for different kinds of ideas 
and media. Accepting everything that one’s culture presented one with could be just as 
deleterious to the organism as going hungry. Through education and self-fashioning individuals 
could grow into their independence through processes that were fundamentally tied to other 
forms of dynamic self-regulation.    
 Finally, Nietzsche’s Übermenschen stand at the pinnacle of this model of “independence 
through interdependence” that he first arrived at through his interest in the relationship between 
genius and physiological research. Dynamic self-regulation, and the definition of independence, 
becomes more rarified and complicated the more complicated the organism becomes, from the 
level of physical qualities for the living organism, to cultural and perceptual qualities for the 
conscious individual, until at last one considers the organism in relationship to its entire 
environment: the cosmos itself. In this context instead of conventional nutrition, or ideas, serving 
as the food that sustains the growth and dynamic self-regulation of living things, it is 
contingency itself. The way that Nietzsche described the Übermensch mastering contingency by 
willing the necessity of all things was the culmination of his thinking about dynamic self-
regulation as it played out on a cosmic scale. The eternal return of the same was the 
Übermensch’s environment, and meaningful freedom within this extreme context was the 
creative willing of exactly that context. Importantly, however, the amor fati of the Übermensch 
did not preclude the kinds of comparisons and selection that made value judgments possible. 
Experimenting and working through many states, learning about the world and its 
interconnections, was the very precondition of coming to understand the necessity of the 
Übermensch, but also the need for, and existence of many paths to a diverse and startling array 
of Übermenschen.  
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Conclusion 
 
It is true to Nietzsche to pay attention to the “little things” of his biography. When his 
father died on July 30th 1849 he left a hole in his child’s education that Nietzsche would spend 
the rest of his life trying to fill; first with others, and then with himself. Nietzsche eagerly sought 
out a series of idols and role models, and latched on to the idea of the genius as the greatest idol 
of all. Yet the more he read about genius the more his early views became untenable. This was 
not in spite of Schopenhauer’s influence, but because of the way that the older philosopher 
grounded the qualities of genius in the physiological organization of the individual. Whatever 
else Wagner was to Nietzsche, the composer was once his “flesh and blood” embodiment of 
Schopenhauer’s ideal genius. Increasingly, however, it became an ideal that Nietzsche could no 
longer believe in. It was a belief that he made public with the 1878 publication of Human, All 
Too Human, however, he had had doubts about Wagner’s genius since the beginning of their 
relationship. Nietzsche’s emphasis on the importance of particulars, and the ability to “take 
things apart” in order to understand them was partially a response to his observations of the 
excesses and inconsistencies of the antivivisectionists in Wagner’s circle. It was also partly a 
deconstruction of Wagner’s superficially holistic, static, and absolutist understanding of genius, 
and genius’ relationship to knowledge, morality, and creativity. His familiarity with the debates 
surrounding vivisection played an important role in his understanding of the meaning of 
necessity and the role it had to play in definitions of cruelty, knowledge, and creativity. These 
meditations on necessity would later coalesce into his ideal of amor fati, or the love of fate, and 
its relationship to the eternal return of the same.  
Drawing from the physiological literature surrounding dynamic self-regulation Nietzsche 
began to define genius as dynamic, contingent, and diverse. Genius was a matter of education, 
conscious and creative self-fashioning, experimentation, and self-limiting that furthered the 
individual’s ability to act freely within the confines of their particular contexts. His vision of 
self-regulation and education bore striking resemblances to the thought of physiological thinkers 
such as Bernard. The idea of the Übermensch developed out of Nietzsche’s physiological 
understanding of the origin of geniuses and free spirits and the relationship they had with their 
historical and cultural environments. Experimentally living through and comparing different 
worldviews, philosophies, states of health, and physical locations gave the free spirit the freedom 
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to evaluate their surroundings, select from what they had experienced, and use it to refashion 
themselves. The free spirit achieved a state of independence through interdependence that 
paralleled the way in which organic beings achieved their free conditions of life relative to their 
physical environments. The casually interconnected necessities of nature meant that even 
cosmological concerns like the eternal return of the same were part of the physiological and 
psychological life of the individual. The Übermensch, as a conceptual descendant of the genius 
and free spirit also existed in a state of dynamic equilibrium with their environment. Yet instead 
of being merely a physical environment, or even a cultural, historical, or psychological 
environment, the Übermensch’s milieu was the eternal return of the same: the “environment” of 
the cosmos along with all of the necessities that this entailed. The freedom that Nietzsche 
ascribed to the Übermensch was not the ability to arbitrarily express their will, but of active 
rejoicing, and participating in their own interdependence with the cosmos.  
There is a growing body of literature surrounding Nietzsche and physiology, and it 
promises to help reframe and re-contextualize a great deal of his life and philosophy. I hope to 
have contributed to this body of literature by showing how Nietzsche’s relationship to 
physiological thought helps to reveal the connections between his interest in topics as diverse as 
aesthetics and vivisection, education and cosmology. Despite its importance to his thought, 
existing scholarship has made almost no mention of the role played by vivisection in his writing 
or in his cultural context. This context helps to explain the violence of Nietzsche’s rhetoric of 
cruelty, knowledge, and necessity. One further consequences of this lacuna is that it has 
hampered scholars’ ability to analyze Nietzsche’s relationship to the idea of genius.  
The literature produced by scholars has often uncritically accepted “genius” as an 
uncontested category, or took at face value the definitions employed by historical actors such as 
Wagner or Schopenhauer. Nietzsche’s own early longing to find “great men,” to mentor him and 
scholars who accept that Nietzsche himself was a “genius,” have often influenced these studies. 
However, genius was not a stable or uncontested idea, and even Nietzsche’s definition changed 
substantially over the course of his life. Historically, this tendency to accept uncritically ideas 
about genius has also led to a scholarly emphasis on Nietzsche’s relationship to “serious 
thinkers,” and “great men” such as Kant or Hegel, at the expense of less well known authors 
such as Lange, Zöllner, Høffding, scientific popularizations, and the periodical press. A great 
deal of Nietzsche’s cultural critiques came from his encounter with popular literature and other 
 199 
“ephemera” that was not preserved by his estate. There is still much work to be done to explore 
the role played by these resources in Nietzsche’s worldview. 
While there have been a number of valuable scholarly works that position Nietzsche’s 
idea of the eternal return of the same in the context of nineteenth-century debates about 
thermodynamics, probability, and atomic theory, none have explored the relationship between 
the Übermensch and the eternal return of the same in terms of their connect to Nietzsche’s 
physiological interests. This relationship has been partly obscured by an overly close emphasis 
on Grant Allen’s role in coining the term physiological aesthetics. This has prevented scholars 
from seeing that there were a number of physiological traditions that related physiology, 
epistemology, and aesthetics that Nietzsche was participating in long before the 1877 publication 
of Allen’s text. What I have called Nietzsche’s physio-aesthetic epistemology had its origins in 
his earliest encounters with Schopenhauer and Lange and was augmented by his encounters with 
other physiologically inspired philosophers such as Helmholtz and Høffding. The view of the 
dynamic relationship between perception and experience that he drew from such thinkers 
contributed to how Nietzsche related the education of the Übermensch to the cosmological 
principles of the eternal return of the same.  
History of science and STS scholarship has also begun to converge on the cultural and 
scientific importance of the intersection between physiology and aesthetics. Robert Brain’s work 
on physiological aesthetics is only the beginning of what promises to be a very rich field of 
exploration that serves as a bridge between nineteenth-century concerns about the relationship 
between art and science and the forms these concerns took in the twentieth century. If we include 
physio-aesthetic epistemology in this discussion it would help us explore the cultural and 
intellectual paths taken by Enlightenment discourses on aesthetics, physiology, and epistemology 
and how they contributed to relativistic twentieth-century movements as diverse as Einsteinian 
physics and Lovecraftian occultism.  
 Nietzsche’s exploration of the relationship between education and freedom may have 
been grounded in nineteenth-century concerns, but it is just as relevant today as it was then. 
Twenty-first century scholarship has been characterized by the growing neoliberalization of the 
university as a site of research, education, corporate management, and administrative control. It 
represents a massive shift of expenses that were once paid for by corporations and employers for 
the training and retention of their employees onto publicly funded universities that are 
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themselves increasingly beholden to private interests. Combined with the growing power and 
influence of corporate administration, rising student debt, and internalized norms that reinforce a 
disregard of work/life balance and expectation that “the life of the mind” rewards and justifies 
any material hardships, students are becoming increasingly isolated and dependent on unstable 
sources of employment and support. This now-institutionalized process of personal 
destabilization relates to our intellectual work and the quality of our scholarship and teaching. If 
the purpose of education is to be understood as helping to facilitate how students take their own 
individual paths towards independence through interdependence, and helping them develop the 
tools required to act critically and creatively within the confines of their own individual contexts, 
then the modern neoliberal university, with its emphasis on the industrial production of degrees, 
cannot be considered an educational institution. It is telling that, unlike most nineteenth and 
twentieth-century European philosophers, Nietzsche worked on the fringes of academia. His 
beliefs about education were at once older than he gave them credit for, harkening back to 
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s humanist ideals, but they are also still strikingly contemporary, and 
increasingly necessary. In the process of completing this project his vision of education has 
become one that I now hold myself, and I too believe that it lifts a corner of the veil of the future; 
if there is to be a future.  
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